LexThe rajasthan urban improvement act, 1959
Rajasthan · state statute
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this actThe Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959
Yr3R2TPT '^FR ^eir? srt^rPi^iH. 1959
ft^^ ^^ (Contents)
ETRT : ^3L3i
Preamble (y^J^TTcPTT) , 1
1. Commencement of the Act (3I^rPraTT'Em" mv^ F^TT.) 1
2. Preamble — Value of. 1
3. Statement of objects and reasons.., 1
3-A. Statement of objects and reasons—Admissibility in construing a statute....! 2
4. Expressions in an Act. :: 3
5. General and Special Laws 3
6. Regulations. : , ,.;....: , ; 3 •
7. Repeals-Meaning and Scope.. , .....3
8. Entries in Legislative List ; , .\.......3
9. Principles Interpretation , ; ...A
10. Rule of Interpretation.... ,...- 5.
11. Intention of Statutory Provision , 5
12. Interpretation of Constitutional provision—Object oriented approach must be adopted 6
13. Interpretation of Flexibility .; ; 6
14. Interpretation of Judgments. ......6
15. Value of History in interpretation 6
16. Central and State Acts ; 7
17. Courts cannot Legislate 7
18. Inaccurate regulation—Inaccuracies therein—Strict construction not proper.. 7
19. Interpretation of Statures—Procedural provision should not be allowed to defeat
substantive right to cause injustice „. ,8
20. Precedent—^fare decisis—Not a dogmatic rule allergic to logic and reasons 8
21. Precedents having binding force 8
22. Requirement of procedure in Foreign Act be fair, reasonable, just does not apply—
Procedure in Foreigners Act does not violate Article 21 9
23. Construction of statutes—Two interpretation possible which interprtation be adopted.. 10
24. Court can neither assume role of legislature nor can prescribe procedure different from
one prescribed in statute 10
25. Duty of Court—Merely because law causes hardship it cannot be interpreted in a
manner so as to defeat the object .'. : 10
26. Interpretation of Statutes Deprivation of Legal right , 11
27. Equality—Theory of guided power explained....... 11
28. Internal aid—use of Article "and" "the" and "a"—Effect ....; 11
29. Interpretation of Statute—Inaccuracies in Government regulation strict construction not
proper. ; 12
30. Harmonious construction^Effort be made that each provision in statute will have its
play 13
31. Intention behind provision cannot be used to defect express words of provision -. 13
32. Narrow and pedantic construction may not always be given effect to. 13
33. Applicability of non-obstante clau'se be considered in consideration of Act and Object
and Reasons for which Act is made :,.. , 14
34- Non-obstante clause must be given effect to extent Parliament intended and not beyond 14
35. Term "Police Station". .....: '.. ..: ...'H
• [U-«l
ft^ra ^^ • U-iii
Chapter I (3TSirJI-1)
Preliminary (ITRp^)
1. Short title aiid extent (^Fffs^ "^m afh? Rwixi) 15
2. Interpretation (STR5IT)... 15
(i) "amenity" ("g^-g/^^73#" ) '. '. 15
{W) "building" ("m^") :. -. ....; 15
(iil) "building operations" ("W^/^'yM ^'Ifhill^'") ........: ;.... 15
(iv) "Chairman" {"wmf^ ) ......,•. ., .15
(iv-a) "Coilector" ("fctcK^:') :.......... •. 15
; (v) "Engineeringoperations"("eff^m^^f \V/S'<V/5#')..... ..16
(vi) "improvement" ('^^7F"') , 16
(yii) "masterplan" ( "*itfxi\; R^TT") , 16
(viii) "Trustee" {"^?mft")....'..... .........;, 16
(;iiC)'"land" ZR6"person interested" (,"^j^ ^ 'tcTW^ ci/Rvl").... :...... ......16
(x) "urban area" ("^Flif^ S^ )... 16
(xi) "zone" c'uffr') ; .:... ....,...;•....: i6
(xii)... ; 17
(xiii) "former trust" {"^^p^ ^Ifl) .....17
Definition clause., ; ^ 17
Chapter II (3ie!iriT-2)
I . Master Plans (^H'W-i ^^IPT)
i 3. Power of State Government to order preparation of master plan (TTJ^T •«•<*!>< cA
; ^TRs^ ^<=n^ t^TR m^ ^ 3rr^ ^ ci^ ^rf^) 18
4. Contents of master plan (HKxix! ^<TPT ^^ SR^fgij) 19
5. Procedure to be followed (arg^rfer <^ ^^ m^ n9r>H\) 19
6. Submission of master plan to Government (^RcjJR c[5t HK-ti-i ^cfFT i^ U-kjfcl) 20
7. Date of operation of master plan (TTRe? ^^^TPT '^ ycicf^i cf?r frrfaT) , 20
Chapter III (3r£2IPI-3)
Constitution of Trusts (^=^TRfr ^ TTS^)
! 8. Establishment and incorporation of Trusts (^^rmf c[?r WFHT 3ik Pl^Hi) 20
1 9. Constitution of Trusts (^^mt W TIcFT) 21
\ 10. Resignation of Trustee (^m^ W] ii-^W) ..,23
j 11. Term of office of Chairman ('WHFlfrr cA •q^rfe) 23
j 12. Term of office of other Trustees (31^ "^iRlijT ^ MtJlcil^r) 24
13. Commencement of term oif office of first Trustees (^^ ••^\R\<i\ "^ MC^NRI cpy
j mv^ WPi\) ; :.... 24
14. Remuneration of Trustees ('^iRl-yT CR- wf^^lft^). 24
14-A Termination of appointment and re-constitution (PiyRn cf^t.-a^iif^ aff? yi'foi) 25
15. Removal of Trustees (rJTTf^T^ ^f^ SSRfT uTHT) :.. 26
U-iv ^?raRajfFT ^m^ ^EfR arfferf^pPT. 1959
16. Disabilities of Trustees removed under Section 15 (£TRT 15 ^ S{^ 5ST^ ^
^cfTl^Wf ^ f^R?fcTTTJ) 28
17. Filling of casual vacancies (3iicf>R-+i<^> f^fxfjqt ^ fR\ \JTRT) 28
Chapter IV (3fEqT?[-4)
Proceedings of the Trust and Committees (r^im afk •<iP^Rl'tjT ^ gn^^lf^-uT)
18. Conduct of Business by the Trust ('^'TRT 5M ^PPf WSfTcR) 30
19. Temporary association of members with the Trust for particular purposes
yijlvjHf ^ feR ">iHc;w1 ^ ^J^TRT ^ WST S^m^ -HgJllvJlH) 30
20. Constitution of committees (^frPrfrTJff WJ ^m^) 30
21. Functions of committees (^#rfrriffc^ w4) 31
21-A. Delegation of powers, duties and functions of the Trust (^^qT?T cI^^lRklilT, cPcfarf
sfr? ^PTiJf ^ yi^wlulH) •.... .; , , 33
22. Conduct of business of Committees (^Hftfcrtt W ^fTfi ^CT^HePT) 33
23. Trustees and associated members of Trust or committee not to take part in
proceedings in which they are personally interested (""MiRi<4l 3fk ^^TT^"% -HS^lRha,
^H^^ m •;3^ cfTFkrfM ;^ TTT ^ '^, f$H^ ^ s^f^jw -w^ % %m^ ?f)... 33
24. Power to fix strength, salaries etc. of staff C^eitf? c|ft wm\, tcT^ ^cillR f^TUH cf?^
cjfr ^rfrff) :. : 34
24-A. Power of transfer (T-aiHMv!"l ^ ?1%T) 35
25. Power of appointment etc (PiyRkl ^cillR c^ •?T1^) 35
26. Control by Chairman (^fnTFrfrr ^RT Pi•4-^"I) ....36
27. Delegation of Chairman's functions (^FPTNlcr t^ cfTRf ^PT TR^rratuFT) ,...36
28. Supply of information and documents to the State Government Qu^sn •^RcfJR cpt
^JJEPTT 3ik <<(-di^^T ^ arrjfcf) 37
Chapter V (3ieJiPT-5)
Framing of Schemes (•yluHlsfT ^^ ^^TTqi vJlFTT)
29. Schemes : matters to be provided therein (ill^iHHi': ^3^ \H\4f^ f^ ^3TT^ CTTC^
TTTW) 37
30. Matters to be considered when framing schemes (ii'lyiiiv; W^ ^^m^ R-ciiRa f^
^m^ cfic^ mn^). : 42
31. Scheme to conform to master plan (^zfKiHT cpr HK-rix; ^cTPT i^ STg^Ji^ #=11) 43
32. Previous notification of area for which scheme is framed (^S^ ^ c^ fcT"? ij4^
srf^RJERT, f^R?^ fen? •ifKJHT ^RRJt ^) :....,..... 43
33. Preparation, publication and transmission of notice as to schemes and supply of
documents to applicants (illvjiHisff "^ 'fRST ^ H1I^>H ^ ^^Tpft, TraiRPT 3fh7 ^^^v]
3fhr 3)l^c;ch1' -cf^ ctwi^vjfl' cf?l aTFjfS) 45
34. Transmission to Trust of representation by Municipal Board as to schemes
(jfr3HT3ff -^ TRET ^ w^PlRiMcH TTTTSel ^RT 3n^l^c;H ^PT "^m^ ^ ^\^^^) 47
35. Furnishing of copies of extracts from the assessment book of a local body (^^Tpff^
PiihiA) c)^ Pretk^ g^^fcFJ ^ vj<^x!UiX -^ ylrraf ferr ^5TFTT) 47
36. Abandonment of scheme or application to Government to sanction it ('iftvfRT '^
MRcilHI ^ ^ ^fR^t^ cp^ c^ fcTCJ '^fRcPK g^ 3)|^cH) 47
.37. Power to sanction, reject or return scheme (>4~1\JHI ti't^^a ^fy^, Si-J-qlyd c?R^ ^
HfeT^ ^ ^rf^) 49
f^T^ ^(^ U-V
38. Notification of sanction of scheme (ijlviHi ^ Wi^t^ c(5t arfSpg^HT) 51
39. Period for execution of a scheme (i)lvjni c^ Pl^MK-l c^ f^ STcrftr) .52
40. Alteration of Scheme after sanction (^fTf^ff^^RT ^ ^^-^\^ ilWHI cPT qRcicfH) 53
41. Combination of schemes (ij1uHl3ff W\ ^VIVJH)...' 54
41-A. Provision for previously sanctioned scheme (^ ^ ^-(-(^Tlya ^zfKJHT ^ fen?
W^raPT) 54
Chapter VI (sreqra-e)
Powers and duties oif the Trust where a scheme has been sanctioned
42. Transfer to Trust for purpose of scheme of building or land vested in Municipal
Board (*^Plf^4<H" ^tp^ScT H 1%1%cT Wf^ Tn v^ -^ ijlyiHI c^ yillcH c^ f!^ ^^^TRT
cf?t SRTOT) ..........„;. 55
43. Nazul lands C==n3Jef ^ff^) 56
44. Transfer of private street or square to Trust for purposes of scheme ("^lui'ii '^
w.ijlunT c^ f^ -s^mr ^ w^ w^ ^ •^ ^ 3PVR^) 57
45. Provisions of drain or waterwork to replace another situated on land vested in the
Trust under Section 42 or Section 43 or Section 44 (erm 42 ^ «rR7 43 JIT smr 44
^fT^if i^ yicltjH). , .58
46. Power of Trust to turn or close street or square vested in it (^^TRT ^ Pif^a ^uf ^
^ft^ cfn.sKdici cp^ ^ iT^ cf^ c(5t vqjRT cjfr "?Tf^) .....59
47. Power under the Municipal laws vested in the Trust (^^TRT ^ Pif^ci w^PlP^^d
f?rlirat ^ 3i??R ?rf^) ; ...60
48. Transfer of duties etc. of Municipal Board to Trust (^^^TRT ^ w^PlRj4d 'W^S^ ^
chJcilT ^<riliR cf5T 3f^vR^) 61
49. Power to make surveys or contribute towards their cost (xfT? W^ ^ vJ^ ciRJ c^
fcHj 3RT?T^ ^f^ ^ ?r1^); :....6i
50. Vesting in Municipal Board of street laid out or altered and open space provided
by the Trust under Scheme (#5HT ^ 3TEJH ^^TRT 'SR\ ^RT^ ^T^ ^ ^RclR^d ^W^,
3frf clicR«TT f^ ^ ^ ^-STPff cPT «|PlRiqd fP^eT ^ ftttcT #TT) ..61
Chapter VII (3TE!TRI-7)
Acquisition and disposal of Land (fj|^ ^T ST^^ 3tt^ Pi'WK"!)
51. Power to purchase or lease by agreement (c[5^K gM pfv^T cfvf^ 3ft^ q^ TT? ^ ^
^rf^)....: : 63
52. Compulsory acquisition of land Cjf^ ^ 3lPlc)i4 sr^) .63
53 Omitted by Rajasthan Act No. 29 of 1987] 73
54. to 59-B. Omitted by Rajasthan Act 29 of 1987] (52^ 59-^ 1987 W\ arfirf^rarr ^. .
29 IRT f^Tefrt^m) 74
60. Disposal of land by the Trust (^^^TRTf gRT 'jft ^ PlWK^I) 76
60-A. Transitory provisions for pending matters relating to acquisition of land (•"jf^T '^
s^ ^ ^FfsffSrcr.cTftcr nrndT ^ fefv aicMchifei* wrci£iM) 79
Chapter VIII (3fE2rrJT-8)
Finance (f^rT)
61. Improvement Fund (^gsTR Pri^) '. 81
U-vi ?p;rTOnR ^^PK ^errr arfferf^npr. 1959
62. Power of Trust to levy betterment charges fgEIR wm '^3'^^;jf^ ^fr^ cj^t ^^srm "^[?t
?TfERT) 82
63. Assessment of betterment charge (^gEtR y^TR cPT Pivjkuj) 82
64. Settlement of betterment charge by arbitrators (TTTSXR-eff gm ^gs^TR W^ cUT ^IR^) 83
65. Payment of betterment charge (^gEIR Vlfmi ^ •JTcTH) 84
66rCustody, investment and application of Trust Fund (^^ITH ftfSf cA 3Tl?RgTT, Picl?i
3ft^ 'NiMiiiuH) 84
66-A. Power of the Trust to borrow (^^ziRT cift ^'Erf? c^ cfff ?rfe) ..84
67. Budget of the Trust (^^fm ^ Jf^ife) S5
68. Accounts and Audit (c^ #? atc^SFT) ....85
69. Annuai Report (^7f^ fM€) .'. 85
70. Pension and Provident Funds C^^ 3ik 'tf^ f^) .• 85
7 J. Failure to repay loans or other dues (^i^ ^ 3r^ ^ c^ ^i'^^ldM '^ aTOTnTrfT) ....85
Chapter IX (3rEZira-9)
General provisions as to improvement (^ETR ^ ^'^tr ^ -HIHI^M ¥Mt4H)
72. Restriction on improvement in urban areas (^TTlUr '^^ '^ "gsTR ^ ft'^EH) 86
73. Application for permission (aT^TfrT ^ f^ sn^^^) 88
73-A. Sanction for sub-division or re-constitution of plots ('<=ffsf ^ ^pq—[^•HIUH ^
g^fffcR c^ ^ W^tf#r). .91
73-B. Restriction on change of use of land and power of State Government to allow
change in use of land (^ ^ y^ c^ i^fw^ ^ pfcRq" afk ^ c^ yzfrT ^
MR^<^^ ^fsfr^ W^ "Efft ^^^ W4>[i cf^ ^rf^) 92
Chapter X (3IE2IPI-10)
Rules and Regulations {f^TH^ ^ f^PlilHH)
74. Power of Government to make rules (f^WfT '^FrFf '^ ^>ichK ^^ ?Tf^) 96
75. Power of the Trust to make regulations (RPliJHH ^RT% cf5\ ^f^tm ^ ^T%) .......99
76. Printing and sale of copies.of rules and regulations (f^TZFTf afk |clPii|*nT tf>t yf?)iiT
^ 5^TJ7 3^ fef?^) 102
77. Power of Government to cancel regulations made under Section 75 (£17^ 75 ^
3\^ iRFT ^ RPIAIHHI' cf5t ^ cf^ ci?r 'Hx!*K ci?t ^rf^).^ 102
Chapter XI (3TE3ira-11)
Procedure and Penalties (yf^^ a#>r ?llRdiJl')
78. Stamping signature on notices or bills ('i~1lc>nT '^\ fifcff ^ Ff^SR c)^ f?tF7
dJ|m) 102
79. Public notice how to be made known (>H|tJvjlPlcb •i\[i't:\ ci5t vjiHc^l-Jl c^ <^<\^
Wtf) 103
80. Service of notice, etc (H'1(^>HT ^CAIIR ^ TTTiftcT) 103
81. Disobedience to act or to notice (3Tl?rf^RPT ^ HffefT cj^t ^fcTfrr) 106
82. Powers to Trust to execute works on failure to comply widi notice (-ilfcl-M c^
. 3?gqTcT^ ^ 3)>Hi|)ddl m ^^4 ftwifef "SfJV^ <^ ^?Tm ^ ?rf^^).. 106
83. Liability of occupier to pay in default of owner (H)[e)4) ^ oyRlfUH ^ ijncIPT cf5^
^ 3rf§r*iWf 'Ef5T cjlfilccl) :.. .106
ft^ra ^^ U-vii
84. Right of occupier to execute works in default of owner (iTrfcRP ^ <^\h^H ^ "EPlTf
Pi^MiRd ^f5^ ^ ari^riMr ^ 3[f§m?R) 107
85. Procedure upon opposition of execution by occupier (arfST'TWt IKT R^HK-I ^
fcRW ^^ 'CR yf^iji) 107
86. Recovery of cost of work by the occupier (arf^T^Mr ^NT cpr4 's^ czfzf c^ ^RJoft) 108
87. Relief to agents and trustees (srl^r^PTrf^ff afk "4lRiill' ^pt ^?m?r). 108
88. Application of provisions relating to recovery of municipal claims (^^PiRiMei •^TETT
cf?r cH^cft •^ ^ffsffSra" WNtlnl' ^ efPX^f^) • • •• "109
89. Penalty for removing fence etc. in street CTPf ^ ^ WT^ f^Jflf^ •52Fr ^ fcHJ
Wl^). ..f09
89-A. Penalty for improvements in contravention of the Act (3fft|Pi<4*i ^ vied'tn ^
^gsjRt ^ f^ ?TTf^)... :.... 110
90. Power to prevent or demoUsh building (TcpT PI^TW ^ %^ ^ Pt^ cf?r ?rf?trr)..., 110
91. Penalty for non-compliance with notice under Section 90 (EIM 90 c^ arefh' ^^fffefT
^ STJTTePn ^ f?Ti? ?TT%T) , : 112
91-A-. Order of demolition of buildings etc Cmf ^c^llR cpt f?RT^ cpr 3TT^) 113
91-B. Power to stop improper use of land or buildings in urban areas (^FT^ ST^ ^
*li^ ^ Tcpft ^ aijMycW ?r#T cF^ ^?f^ c[?r :?Tf^) 116
91-C. Power to stop building operations CTcPT PIHIU| ^H'ljbiJiaff cpT 7t^ ^ ^]f^) 116
91-D. Offences by Companies (cfTRTf^ gM 3W?TEr) , 117
91-E. Fines payable to the Trust (^^^!TM ^ -^ ^5^).. 118
91-F. Defaults in providing amenities (^g^-^gfct^ ^I^H cfJ^ ^ cZTt^fFT) 118
91-G. Power to require local authority to assume responsibility in certain cases (cf>faMii
TTFieff ^ f^M^ Ti¥^ '^f^ ^ ^mj^ yifSi*i-51 ^ sT^m "Ef?^ ^ ?if?t^) 119
92. Penalty for obstructing contractor or removing mark (ij^qi^; c^ cj^rf ^ ^rrar ^Tg^rr^
m f%r^ ?^ c^ f^ "?rrf^) : ii9
92-A. Encroachment or obstruction upon public land ("'«i4«ip|ct> ^jft ^ arfrtsFFT ^
srrar) : 120
Chapter XII (3ICJIPI-12)
Supplemental Provisions (STJ^C?^ Tfil^JH)
93. Trustees etc, deemed to be public servants (^=^irrft W^ ^ ^^ ^^^1^ ''^^^ ^STFTT) 126
93-A. Liability of Trustees and officers and servant of the Trust (^W^ ^ -iJlRlijl' afhf
3rt?lchiRA)1' cT i^c^ -3p\ <iiRlrt) 126
94. Contribution by Trust towards leave allowance and pensions of Government
servants (^FR^mfT ^^ ^ ^ iT^ 3ik ^RPT ^ feH? ^^^TRT ^M 3r?mH) 127
95. Authority for prosecutions (arftillvjIHl' c^ leHJ "RTf§R5r^) 127
95-A. Cognizance of offences (ST'MEfli ^ W-d'5lH) .'....127
96. Power of the Trust as to legal matters {W^ fnwf ^ ^^T ^ ^^^TM ^ •?Tf^) 127
,97. Indemnity to Trust etc (^^^TTH ^rijlR ^ ^ffTRaiT) 128
98. Notice of suit against Trust etc (^^^TRT^c^nf^ ^ f?nf^ ^^ •5f5T ^^Ttfe^) 128
99. Mode of proof of Trust records (^i^TRT arf^r^^ ^ OTFT ^ cTfT^^) 129
100; Restriction on the summoning of Trust servants to produce documents (ci-wiclui
m^ ^f^ ^ feR ^J^TRT ^^dr>) ^ ^fTfpT cf?^ tR ijfcfsftT) 130
101. Validation of acts and proceedings (^f^ sfr? chi4c)lfB>!jl' ^ f^HMch^i^JI) 130
U-viii ^^TGRSTFT ;;pR ^ETR 3rf^P|<JH, 1959
102. Power of entry (y^ ^ '?jf^) 130
103. General power of Trust to pay compensation (wfrlchxi •g^raPT CR^ ^ ^^^JTfT ^
WfTF^T ?rf^) .• 132
104. Compensation to be paid by offenders for damage caused by them (3TtKrf^pfl ^KT
cmf^ jct^^HM c^ fcnj ^3^ 5RT ^rf^cfv? cPT •t^'IdH f%^ yTFTT). 132
105. Ultimate dissolution of Trust and Transfer of its assets and liabilities to the
Municipal Board (ST^^fKT: ^^TRT CFJT RlyeH #7 t^PlRlMet TprSef cpf ^^Flcf^t auR-dill'
afk ^rteft ^ ar^^RTT) 133
106. Repeal and Saving (f^PW^ 3ft? ciiicilrl) 134
i^iki^ik^
Commentary on
The Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959^
^fluT^erpr ^:T»K ^STR srf^Pli^H, 1959
(Act No. 35 of 1959)
(1959 ^ Sff^rf^rarf ^. 35)
[Received the assent of the President on 24.07.1959]
(24 ^efT^ 1959 ^ ^?F$^ "^ 'flFRrfcf ^T^ 1^)
Preamble.—An Act for the improvement of Urban Aieas in Rajasthan.
WHEREAS it is expedient to make provision for the improvement and expansion of
Urban area in the State of Rajasthan.
; BE it enacted by the Rajasthan State Legislature in the Tenth year of the Repubjic of
India as Follows:^— •
3Tcr: •^TuRSTR ^^^Jv^ ^ •^TfT^ ?f^ ^ Rl*KH ^ fcpfcTR '^ feT? y|c|t|H epTRTT WRT
, ^ Comments
1. Commencement of •the Act.—^T'he Rajasthan Urban Improvement Bill,
1957 (Bill No. 26 of 1957) having been passed and received the assent of the
President on 24.07.1959. It came on the statute book as THE RAJASTHAN
URBAN IMPROVEMENT ACT, 1959 (Rajasthan Act No. 35 of 1959) and
publishedin the Rajasthan Gazette, Part IV-A, Extraordinary dated 03.08.1959.
1. aifferPPTfi"^ yi<**i it^.-^fT^jRSTPT ^^FR ^^m fsTef, 1957 (1957 ^ ^ ^. 26)
qrf^ f^5^ -fXm 3fh? 24.07,195,9 ^ ^JFJ^frT -^I^r "^^ W^ 1^ I ^ ^?F3RSTFr ^FR '^m ^^Jm,
1959 (1959 ^ TFJR^TFT ^Tttrf^pCFT ^. Z5) '^ "^n ^ teR ^^xfcp tR aj^qj 3ik ^n^a^«fR ^MM^,
TFT TV-A Ryltll* f§F?fcp 03.08.1959 ^ Ucbif^id fSTTI
"2. Preamble — Value, of.—-It is well settled rule that in interpreting the
provisions of a statute the Court will presume that the legislation was intended
to the intra vires and also reasonable. Tlie rule followed is that the section ought
to be interpreted consistent with the presumption which imputes to the
legislature an intention of limiting the direct operation of its enactment to the
extent that is permissible. Street on Doctrine of Ultra Wres, 1930 Page 302.
The reading down of a provision of a statue puts into operation the principle
that so far as it is reasonably possible to do so, the legislation should be
construed as being within its power. It has the principal effect that where an act
is expressed in language of a generality which makes it capable, if read literally,
of apply to matter beyond the relevant legislative powers, the Court will
£j;onstrue it in a more limited sense so as to ke;ep it within power.—AH Saints High
''School etc. vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., etc. etc., AIR 1980 SC 1042 at
pp. 1083-1084 = 1980 (2) sec 478.
3. Statement of objects and reasons.—The facts stated in the preamble and
the statement of objects and reasons appended to any legislation -are evidence of
legislative judgment. .They indicate the thought process of the elected
' Published in Rajasthan Gazette, Extraordinary, Part IV-A, dated 03.08.1959.
[U-1]
U-2 ^KiTfsp^ ^^fTR ^CTK Slf^ri^WI, 1959
representative of the people and their cognizance of the prevalent state of affairs
impelling them to enact the law. These, therefore, constitute important factors
which amongst others will be taken into consideration by the Courts in judging
the reasonableness of any restrictions imposed on the Fundamental Rights of the
individuals. The Court would begin with presumption of reasonability of the
restrictions, more so when the facts stated in the Statement of Objects and
Reasons and the preamble are taken to the correct and they justify the enacement
of law for the purpose sought to be achieved.—State of Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti
Kureshi Kasab ]amat & Ors, AIR 2006 SC 212 at Page 232.
The law is well settled that it is permissible to look into the circumstances
which prevailed at the time when the law was passed and which necessitated the
passing of that law to determine the purpose or object of the legislation. Ballarpur
•Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India, AtR 1997 Del. 1 at 9. It was so stated in Shashikant
Laxman kale vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 2114 = 1990 (4) SCC 366, Paragraphs
16 and 17 of this judgment may be reproduced us xmder;^
"16. For determining the purpose or object of the legislation, it is permissible
to look into the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the law was •
passed and which necessitated the passing of that law. For the limited
purpose of appreciating the background and the antecedent factual matrix
leading to the legislation, it is permissible to look into the Statement of
Objects and Reasons of the Bill which actuated the step to provide a remedy
for the then existing malady. In A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar vs. M.
Venkatachalam Potti, AIR 1956 SC 246 = 1955 (2) SCR 1196, the Statement of
Objects and Reasons was used for judging the reasonableness of
classification made in an enactment to see if it infringed or was contrary to
the Constitution. In that decision for detennining the question, even affidavit
on behalf of the State of "the circumstances which prevailed at the time when
the law there under consideration had been passed and which necessitated
the passing of that law" was relied on. It has reiterated in State of West Bengal
vs,._ Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241 = 1964 (1) SCR 371, that the statement of
, objects and reasons accompanying a Bill, when introduced in Parliarnent, can
be used for 'the limited purpose of understanding the background and the
antecedent state of affairs leading up to the legislation'. Similarly, in Pannalal
Binfraj vs. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397= 1957 SCR 233, a'challertge to the
validity of classification was repelled placing reliance on an affidavit filed bh
behalf of the Central Board of Revenue disclosing the trUe object of enacting
the impugned provision in the Income Tax Act.
"17. Not only this, to sustain the presumption of constitutionality,
consideration may be had even to matters of common knowledge; the history
of the times; and every conceivable state of facts existing of at the time of
legislation which can be assumed. Even though for the purpose of construing
the meaning of the enacted provision, it is not permissible to use these aids,
yet it is permissible to look into the historical facts and surrounding
circumstances for ascertaining the evil sought to be remedied. The
distinction between the purpose or object of the legislation and the legislative
intention, indicated earlier, is significant in this exercige to emphasise the
availability of larger material to the Court for reliance when determining the
purpose or object of the legislation as distinguished from the meaning of the
enacted provision."
3-A. Statement of objects and reasons—Admissibility in construing a
statute.-—Be it noted that the Statement of Objects and Reasons is not otherwise
g'WIcHI U-3
admissible as an aid to tlie construction of a Statute but the same simply assists
as to the necessity of introduction of such a law and since the decision of this
Court in Aswlni Kumar Ghosh & Another vs. Arabinda Bose & Anr., (1953 SCR 1)^
the law seems to be well settled without a contra note being sounded till now
that while construing the clear terms of an,Act the Court is not required to
ascertain the object of the enactment. Court, however, hasten to add that though,
in case of an urgent need of the situation by reason wherefor the intent of the
legislature is to be assessed, the Statements and Objects can be looked into for the
limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time which
prompted or actuated the proposer of the Bill to introduce the same andi the
extent of remedying the existing evil of the society.—Subhash Ram Kumar Bind @
Vakil and Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra, 2003 CrLJ 443 at pages 450-451 (DB).
4. Expressions in an' Act.—It is not a sound principle of construction to
interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act.
The decisions rendered with reference to construction of one Act cannot apply to the
provisions of another Act unless the two Acts are pari materia.—Ashok Maniklal Harkut
vs. Collector ofAmravati, AIR 1988 Bom 207 (FB).
5. General and Special Laws.—When there is a genefallaw and a special
law dealing with a particular matter, the special excludes the general.—Kedar Lai
Seal vs. Hari Lai Seal, AIR 1952 SC 47 = 1952 SCR 179 = 1952 (1) MLJ 431.
The general rule and the special rule should relate to the same subject.—
Bengal Community Co. Ltd. vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 = 1955 (2) SCR 603 =
1955 SCJ 672.
6. Regulations.—The constitutionality of the impugned regulations has to be
adjudged only by a three-fold test, namely—
(1) whether the provisions of such regulations fall within the scope and
ambit of the power conferred by the statute on the delegate;
(2) whether the rules/regulations, framed by the delegate, are to any extent
inconsistent with the provisions of the parent enactment; and
(3) whether they infringe any of the fundamental rights or other restrictions
or limitations imposed by the Constitution.—Maharashtra State Board of Secondary
and Higher Secondary Education vs. Paritosh Bhupesh Kumar Shethi, AIR 1984 SC
1543 (2 Judges) = 1984 (4) sec 27 = 1984 (86) Bom LR 428.
7. Repeal—Meaning and Scope.—It is one of the cardinal principles of
interpretation of statutes that a repeal means a complete obliteration of the Act
repealed imless it is otherwise expressed.—R.P. Jain & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar,
1977CrLJ1758atp. 1761 (Pat.). '
Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act though it has been specifically mentioned in
the repealing Act or not, will follow, unless, as the section itself says, a different
intention appears.—T. Barai vs. Henry, AIR 1983 SC 150 at p. 156 = 1983 UJ 132
(SC) = 1983 (1) sec 177 = 1983 sec (Cr) 143.
In State of Punjab vs.Mohar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84, the Supreme Court has
elaborately dealt with the effect of repeal. In the case of a simple repeal, if
followed by fresh legislation on the same subject, the Court would undoubtedly
have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of
determining whether they indicate a different intention.—T. Barai vs. Henry, AIR
1983 SC 150 at p. 156 = 1983 UJ 132 (SC) = 1983 (1) SCC 177 = 1983 SCC (Cr) 143.
8. Entries in Legislative List.—^The Courts must always give the most liberal
construction to the words conferring legislative power.
U-4 ^n^JRafPT ^TfK ^EfR Sff^rf^^^T^, 1959
They must give such meaning so that those words may have effect in their
widest amplitude.
None of the legislative items in the List sholild be read in a narrow restricted
sense, and each general world should be held to extend to all ancillary and
subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be
comprehended.—R.S. Joshi vs. Ajit Mills Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 2279 at p. 2295; H.
Puttappa vs. State of Kamataka, AIR 1978 Kam. 148 (FB) = ILR1978 (1) Kam. 605 =
1978 (1) Ker LJ 302.
The Entries in the Lists should be construed broadly and must be given wide
possible interpretation, and not in a narrow pedantic sense.—Wni^erZy Jute Mills
Co. Ltd. vs. Raymon & Co. (India) Private Ltd, AIR 1963 SC 90 = 1963 (3) SCR 209;
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes vs. Ramkishan, AIR 1968 SC 59 - 1968 (1) SCR
142.—The utility of the preamble diminishes on a conclusion as to clarity of
enacting provisions. It is therefore, said that the preamble is not to influence the
meaning otherwise ascribable to the enacting parts unless there is a compelling
reason for it. If in an Act preamble is general or brief statement of the main
purpose, it may well be of little value. Mudholkar J. had observed in Burakar Coal
Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 954, "It is one of the cardinal principles of
construction that where the language of an Act is clear, the preamble must be
disregarded though, where the object meaning of an enactment is not clear the
preamble may be resorted to explain it. Again where very general language is
used ill an enactment which, it is clear must be intended to have limited
application, the preamble may be used to indicate to what particular instances,
the enactment is intended to apply. We cannot, therefore, start with the preamble
for construing the provisions of an Act, though we could be justified in resorting
to it nay we will be required to do so if we find that the language used by
Parliament is ambiguous or is too general though in point of fact Parliament
intended that it should have a limited application. In Coal Bearing Areas
(Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 the Court was construing a
Notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the said Act and as in the represent case
the preamble of that Act was to the effect "An Act to establish in the economic
interest of India greater public control over the coal mining industry and its
development by providing of the acquisition by the State of unworked land
contaiiiing or likely to contain coal deposits or of right in or over such laiid, for
the extinguishment or modification of such rights accruing by virtue of any
agreement, lease license or otherwise, and for matters connected therewith."
Repelling an argument advariced on behalf of the Mine owners that the Act
intended to apply only to virgin land and not on the land which are being
worked or were worked in the past because of the use of the words 'unworked
land' in the preamble, this Court held that the language of the enacting
provisions was clear and therefore not controller by the preamble. (See : Burrakur
Coal Co. vs. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 954 at p. 957).—Union of India vs.
Elphinstone Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd., AIR 2001 SC 724 = 2001 (4) SCC 139 =
2001 (1) JT 536 = 2001 (1) SCC 537.
9. Principles Interpretation.—A rule as it exists must be construed in the ;
light of the Act, the purpose for which the rule is enacted a serious general
inconvenience resulting to persons concerned if it is construed in one way or:
another are relevant considerations. Of course an alteration in the statute have to
the notice of but that be a sole basis of construction of a statutory provision.—;
Martand Balvant Risaldar vs. Chhaganlal Ambalal Gandhi & Ors., 1978 CrLR'(Guj.)''
204 at p. 208 = 1978 GLR 487 = 1978 CrLJ 1032. -- i
y^R^ U-5
The cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes is that words should be
read in their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning unless such a reading
leads to absurdity. If the words are susceptible of another meaning the Court
may adopt the same.—Ajai Singh vs. Nathi Lai & Ors., 1978 CrLJ 629.
10. Rule of Interpretation.—It is well-settled rule of interpretation that a
word occurring in the same Act is usually to be given the same meaning unless a
different intention is expressed by the provisions of the Act. As such the word
"contravention" has be iriterpreted in Section 6-A and in Section 7 to mean that
the provision of any order framed Under Section 3 of the Act has been
contravened intentionally. On the other hand, if it is found that the contravention
was unintentional and the person concerned has taken all reasonable care and
was carrying on the business in a bona fide manner, then even for Section-6-A of
the Act, it has to be interpreted that in the eye of law there has been no
contravention so as to visit the dealer with the consequences of confiscating the
articles which has been seized.—Mewalal Kapiladeo Pd. (M/s.) vs. State of Bihar,
1978 CrLJ 873 at p. 876.
Sections of statues calling for construction by Courts are not petrified print
but vibrant words with social functions to fulfil. The brodding presence of the
constitutional sympathy for the weaker sections like women and children must
inform interpretation if it has social relevance. So viewed^ it is possible to be
selective in picking out that interpretation out of two alternatives which advance
the cause of the derelicts.—Ramesh Chander Kaushal [Capt.] vs. Mrs. Veena Kaushal
& Ors., 1978 CrLR (SC) 348 at p. 350 = AIR 1978 SC 1807 - 1978 (4) SCC 70 = 1978
sec (Cr) 508.
The words of the statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be
uriderstood in the sense, in which they best harmonise with the aspect of the
enactment and the object which the Legislature had in view. The Court has to
seek aid from other provisions of the statue in order to arrive at the proper
meaning of the words and that interpretation should be accepted, which would
result in properly carrying out the intention of the Legislatute.—Bhuneshwar
Singh & Ors., vs. State of Bihar & Ors., 1978 Bih. LJR 372 at p. 374.
A word occurring in the same Act is usually to be given the same meaning
unless a different intention is expressed by the provisions of the Act.—Mewalal
Kapiladeo Prasad (M/s) vs. State of Bihar & Ors., 1978 Bih, LJ 206 at p. 212 = 1978
Pat. LJR 315 = 1978 CrLJ 873. ' ^
It is a settled rule of interpretation that a statute must be construed as a
whole and any interpretation of particular which would render other material
provisions nugatory, is to be avoided, if possible,—Gurbaksh Singh Sibia vs. State
of Punjab, 1977 CrLJ 322 = 1977 CrLJ 240.
The normal rule of interpretation, of course is that the words of statute
should be given their literal and grammatical meaning. But if such a literal
interpretation leads to an anomalous and absurd situation and if this literal
interpretation leads to a conflict between two provisions of law on the subject the
Court has to find out the real intention of the Legislature. If two views are ,
possible, one which results in any anomaly and the other not, the duty of the
Court is to adopt the latter and the former.—Ram Adhin vs. Shyama Devi, 1977 All
CrC 10 at p. 12 = 1977 AH LJ 382 = 1977 CrLJ 453.
11. Intention of Statutory Provision.—In order to arrive at true intendment
of a statute, the Court should pose to itself the following questions:-—
(1) What was the situation prior to the provisions under consideration;
u-6 ^fTTfRarr^ ^TfK ^cmr giffeift^R, 1959
(2) What mischief or defect was noticed before introducing the provision;
(3) Whether it was remedial; and
(4) the reason for the remedy.—Babaji Kondaji Garad vs. Nasik Merchants Co-
operative Bank Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 192 (3 Judges) = 1984 UJ 239 (SC) = 1984 (2)
sec 50.
12. Interpretation of Constitutional provision—Object oriented approach
must be adopted.—The framers of the Constitution did not visualise that a non-
legislator can be repeatedly appointed as Minister for a turn of six months each
tiihe, without getting elected because such a course strikes at the very root of
parliamentary democracy. According to learned Counsel for the respondent,
there is no bar to this course being adopted on the plain language of the Article',
which does not 'expressly' prohibit re-appointment of the Minister, without
being elected, even repeatedly, during the term of the - same Legislative
Assembly. We cannot persuade oufselves to agree.
Constitutional provisions are required to be understood and interpreted with
an object oriented approach. A Constitution must not be construed in a narrow
and pedantic sense. The words used may be general in terms but, their full
import and true meaning, has to be appreciated considering the true context in
which the same are used and the purpose which they seek to achieve. Debates in
the Constituent Assembly referred to in an earlier part of this judgment clearly
indicates that non-member's inclusion in the cabinet was considered to be a
'privilege' that extends only for six months', during which period the member
must get elected otherwise he would cease to be a Minister. It is a settled position
that debates in the Constitueiit Assembly may be relifed upon as an aid to
interpret a constitutional provision because it is the fxxnctidn of the Court to find
out the intention of the framers of the Constitution. We must remember that a
Constitution is not just a document is solemn form, but a living framework for
the Government of the people exhibiting a sufficient degree of cohesion and its
successful working depends upon the democratic spirit underlying it being
respected in letter and in spirit. The debates clearly indicate the 'privilege' to
extend "only" for six months.—S.R. Chaudhuri vs. State of Punjab, AIR 2001 SC
2707 = 2001 (7) sec 126 (SC) = 2001 (6) JT 446.
13. Interpretation of Flexibility.—"The law, howsoever rigid it may be, has to
be interpreted in a flexible manner so as to see that the rule of law is not
abrogated and merely on technical grounds a party is not deprived of being
heard as regards the merits of the case.—Balu Ram vs. Ariun Lai, AIR 1978 All 243
(SJ).
14. Interpretation of Judgments.—^Judgments of Courts are not to be
construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and'provisions of a statute, it
may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the
discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes they do
not interpret judgment. They interpret words of statues; their words are not to be
interpreted as statutes.—Amar Nath vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 218 at p. 227
= 1985 (1) sec 345.
15. Value of History in interpretation—^Tlie interpreter of the statute must
take note of the well known historical facts. In conventional language the
interpreter must put himself in the arm chair of those who were passing the Act
i.e. the Member of the Parliament. It is the collective will of the Parliament with
which the Supreme Court is concerned.—Dowack System Pvt. Ltd.(M/s.) vs. Union
of India, AIR 1988 SC 782 at p. 797 = 1988 (2) UJ 54 (SC) = 1988 (2) SCC 299 = 1988
(1) JT (SC) 304.
y'WIcHi U-7
16. Central and State Acts.—Article 14 of the Constitution does not authorise
the striking down of a law of one State on the ground that, in constrast with a
law of another State on the same subject, its provisions are discriminatory.
Nor does it contemplate a law of the Central or of the State dealing with similar
subjects being held to lie unconstitutional by a process of comparative study of the
provisions of the two enactments.
The sources of authority for the two statues being different. Article 14 has no
application.—Parb^ja Karan Nair vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1987 SC 2117;
Chapadgaon Vividh Karyakari Seva Sahakari Society vs. Collector of Ahmednagar, 1989
(3) Bom. CR 641.
17. Courts cannot Legislate.—The function of the Courts is to apply the law
as it stands. May be the Courts notices the anomalies. But it is not for the Court to
re-write the law even though the Court considers the provisions as they stand to
be unreasonable. Of course Courts do resort to the device of reading words into
the provisions of the statute purporting to bring it in accord with what is
evidently the intention of the legislature. But where it is evident that there is an
omission on the part of the legislature to make an amendment which it ought to
hftve made, even if such omission appears to be inadvertant, the Courts cannot
supply the omission, for then it would be arrogating to itself legislative functions
wnich it does not possess.—Dflfcs^flyini vs. Madnavan, AIR 1982 Kant 126.
18. Inaccurate regulation—Inaccuracies therein—Strict construction not
proper.^-By a second Resolution dated 24.04.1995 the State Govemrnent
sanctioned a list of buildings and precincts of historical, aesthetical, architectural
or cultural value as per the scheduled annexed to that resolution. The schedule
contains in all 633 items as Heritage buildings or precincts with their "location"
described in the riext column. Many of the items are overlapping. For example
item 633 pertains to Fort Precinct which includes 14 sub-precincts. Within those
precincts there are several buildings which have been separately listed including
the Bombay High Court at item 77. Again item 107 mentions "all buildings at
Dadabhai Naroji Road with a special focus on Fort House" This is followed by
items 108 to 127 each of which relate to building/structure on the Dada Bhai
Naoroji Road. There is apparently no consistency in the way that the list has been
prepared. Not only is there overlapping but there are, at times, inaccuracies^ For
example against item 442 under the heading, 'location' in respect of several
buildings within the Mahalaxmi Precinct, the word-appearing is "deleted". If one
were to read the list as it, is, one would have to come to the absurd conclusion
that the location of the several buildings mentioned in 442 was "deleted".
Therefore a strict or literal construction of the list would be misplaced.
^ It is true as far as Mahalaxmi Precinct is concerned, although there is a
separate map indicating the precinct along with all other precincts. It does not
appear under the column "Nature of Monuments Building, Precincts etc." but in
the column headed "location". Against serial Nos. 441 and 442. But locations
have generally been indicated in the Isit with reference to roads. A precinct
cannot be a "location" since it is really an area. In such circumstances it is
reasonable to ascertain the intention of the State Government from the map
annexed to the list. The fact that no map of any other location has been given
coupled with fact that only maps of heritage precincts have been given in our
opinion would certainly indicate that Mahalaxmi precinct is indeed a listed
heritage precinct against Serial No. 442 as mentioned in the map.
The list also refers to five precincts, namely Banganga Precincts mentioned
against Serial No. 384, Opera House Precincts, Serial No. 401, Gamdevi Precinct,
Serial No. 432, Mahalaxmi Precinct, Serial No. 442, Khotachiwadi precinct. Serial
U-8 ^?K5RarpT ^^FPf ^ETR 3lf^P)i|H, 1959
No. 508, Matharpaklnadi Precinct Serial No. 522 and Bandra Precinct Serial No.
612. Tliere is no other precinct which is mentioned as a location.
The MHCC has taken into consideration the nature of the list, particularly
the maps annexed thereto, to come to the conclusion that the mentioning the
Mahalaxmi Precinct under the heading of "location" was clearly not the intention
of the State Government, but the intention was to treat the precinct along with all
other precincts of which maps are given as heritage precincts.—Mass Holdings
Private Ltd. vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Anr., AIR 2006 SC 749 at
Pages 751-752 (DB).
19. Interpretation of Statures—Procedural provision should not be allowed
to defeat substantive right to cause injustice.—Non-compliarice with any
procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or
application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or
rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and
irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive
rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a handmaiden, to justice, should never be
made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive
use. The well recognized exceptions to this principle are:—
(i) Where the Statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically
the consequence of non-compliance;
(ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after it is pointed out
and due opportunity is given for rectifying if;
(iii) where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or
mischievous;
(iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will
affect the jurisdiction of the Court;
(v) in case of Memorandum of Appeal, there is complete absence of authority
and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority
of the appellant.—Uday Shankar Triyar vs. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh & Anr.,
AIR 2006 SC 269 at Page 274 (FB)
20. Precedent—Stare decisis—Not a dogmatic rule allergic to logic and
reasons.—^The trend of judicial opinion is that stare decisis is not a dogmatic rule
allergic to logic and reason, it is a flexible principle of law operating in the
province of precedents providing room to collaborate with the demands of
changing times dictated by social needs, State policy and judicial conscience.
TTie doctrine of stare decisis is generally to be adhered to, because well settled
principles of law founded on a series of authoritative pronouncements ought to
be followed yet, the demands of the changed facts and circumstances dictated by
forceful factors supported by logic, amply justify the need for a fresh look.—State
of Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 212 at Pages
243-245 (F.B.) . •
21. Precedents having binding force.—When the allegation is of cheating or
deceiving, whether the alleged act is wilful or not depends upon the
circumstances of the concerned case and there cannot be any strait jacket
formula. The High Court unfortunately did not discuss the factual aspects and
by merely placiExcerpt shown. Open the full act in Lexace.