LexZILE SINGH versus STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.
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A ZILE SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. OCTOBER 7, 2004 B [R.C. LAHOTI, CJ., G.P. MATHUR AND P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, JJ.] Haryana Municipal Act, 1973: Section 13A(J)(c)(as inserted by Haryana Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act No.3of1994) and amended by Haryana C Municipal (Second Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act No.15 of 1994)- Disqualification for being member of Municipality-On having more than two children-However, proviso to the effect that person having more than two children on or after expiry of one year of commencement of the Act 5. 4. 1994 not disqualified-Substitution of word 'upto' for word 'after' by Second Amendment on 4. 10. 1994-Nature of Amendment-Held: Second Amendment D alters the text of First Amendment from the date of commencement of First Amendment-5.4. 1994-It is declaratory in nature and though not expressly retrospective, would operate retrospectively Interpretation of Statutes: Principles of construction-Retrospective operation-General rule-Held: It is cardinal principle that every statute is E prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made retrospective-However, rule is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burden or to impair existing obligations-Furthermore, presumption against retrospectivity is not applicable to explanatory and declaratory statutes. F Statute Law: Legislative Drafting-Substitution of one text for the other pre-existing text-Held: Results in repeal of earlier provision and its replacement by the new provision. Section 13A(l)(c) inserted by Haryana Municipal (Amendment) Act, G 1994 (Act No. 3 of 1994) in the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 imposed disqualification for holding office of member of Municipality on having more than two living children with effect from 5.4.1994. However, under the proviso person having more than two children on or after expiry of one year from 5.4.1994 were not be disqualified. In view of the absurdity, H Haryana Municipal (Second Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act No. 15of1994) 272 .: . - ZILE SINGH v. ST A TE OF HARY ANA 273 was passed on 4.10.1994 and for the word 'after' the word 'upto' was A substituted. Appellant was holding office of member of Municipality. He had three children from the first marriage and second child was born to him from the second marriage on 13.8.1995-one year after commencement of the First Amendment Act. A complaint was filed against the appellant for B having incurred disqualification within the meaning of the section 13A(l)(c) of the Act. Both the Competent Authority and the High Court held that the appellant had incurred disqualification. Hence the present appeal. Appellant contended that the view of two judge Bench of this Court in Sunil Kumar Rana's case that the legislative intent to commute the period of one year under the proviso is from the 'commencement of this Act- 5.4.1994 and not 4.10.1994 which merely substituted the word 'after' by the word 'upto', was not correct and as such needs reconsideration and c requires to be overruled. D Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. But the rule in general E is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only 'nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis' - a new law ought to regulate . p what is to follow, not the past. (280-C) 1.2. Where a Statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute or to 'explain' a former statute, the subsequent statute has relation back to the time when the prior Act was passed. The presumption against retrospectivity is not applicable to 'G explanatory and declaratory statutes. 1281-CJ 1.3. The relevant factors., to find out legislative intent in giving it retrqspectivity are: (i) general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what it was the legislature 'contemplated. The rule against retrospectivity does H 274 · SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 5 S.C.R
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