YUSUFALLI ESMAIL NAGREE versus THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
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YUSUFALLI ESMAIL NAGREE v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA April 19, 1967 [M. HIDAYATULLAH, R. S. BACHAWAT AND C. A. VAIDiALINGAM, JJ.] Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act 1 of 1872) ss. 7 ·and 8-Tape re• cording-Value-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ( Act 5 of 1898) s. 162-Talk recorded on tape in seclusion with police decoy,-Pollce Officer in another room-If statement made to the police. Constitution of India, Art. 20(3)-Police laid trap-Person makes incriminating statement not knowing the trap-If protected, On report of S, that the appellant had offered a bribe to him, which S did not accept, the Police laid' a· trap. S called the appellant at his residence and in the room where they alone were present, the appellant handed over the bribe to S. In the room a microphone of a tape re· corder was concealed and their conversation recorded. The Poliee offi· cers and the radio mechanic kept concealed in another room. S was tho only eye-witness to the offer of the bribe and the tape was kept in the custody of the police inspector but was not sealed. The appellant was convicted under s. 165A I.P.C., which the High Court upheld. In appeal, this Court :- HELD : The conviction must be upheld. The contemporaneous dialogue bet.ween the appellant and S formed part of the res gestae and is relevant and admissible under s. 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. The dialogue is proved by S. The tape record of the dialogue corroborates his testimony. The process of tape record· ing offers an accurate method of storing and later reproducing sounds. The imprint on the magnetic. tape is the direct effect of the relevant sounds. Like a photograph of a relevant incident, a cont.:mporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under s. 7 of the Indian Evidence Act. The time and place and accuracy of the recording must be proved by a competent witness and the voices must be properly identified. One of. the features of magnetic tape re- cording is the ability to erase and re-use the recording medium. Because of this facility of erasure and re-use, the evidence must be received with caution. The court must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the record has not been tampered with. [723 H-724 B, DJ Rup Chand v. Mahabir Parshad and Anr. A.I.R. 1956 Punj. 173; Mahindra Nath v. Biswanath Kundu, 61 C.W.N. 191; approved. S. Pratap Singh v. The Slate of Punjab,', (1964] 4 S.C.R, 733 and R. v. Maqs11d Ali, [1965] 2 All E.R. 464; .followed. A B c D E F G There. was other evidence showing thRt · the tape recording w~s not tamp~red with. The fact that the defence did not sugant any tamper· H in~ lends assurance to the credibility of the other evidence. The courts below rightly held that the tape recorder faithfully recorded and repro· duced the actual conversation. The use of the stateme11ts of both S and the appellant when the trap was laid. was not barred by s, 162 of the A B c D E ' G H YUSUFALLI v. MAHARASHTRA (Bachawat, J.) 72 L Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant was not making a state· ment to the sub-inspector of police or to any other police officer. He was not even aware that any police officer was listening to him. He was talk- ing to S. No doubt S was a police decoy assisting the police in their investigation, but the statement of the appellant to S while making an- other offer of a bribe cannot be regarded as a statement ·by him to the police. Nor can the words uttered by S be regarded as a statement to· the police. S was talking to the appellant. He knew that what he said was being recorded for subsequent use by the police officers. But he was not speaking to any police officer. There was a dialogue in which S and the appellant took part, Each spoke to the other. but neither made· a statement to a police officer. [724 H; 725 D·FJ Ramkisha11 Mitlzan/al Sharma v. The State of Bombay, [1955) I S.C.R. 903, 922-23; referred to. · The appellant was not right in claiming protection under Art. 20(3) of·the Constitution against the use of the statement made by him on the ground that by the active deception of the police, he was compelled to be a . witness against himself. The appellant was not compelled to be a witness against himself. He was free to talk or not to talk. His con- versation with S was voluntary. There was no element of duress, coer4 cion or compulsion. His statements were not extracted from him in an oppressiv
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