YOGESH UPADHYAY AND ANR. versus ATLANTA LIMITED

Citation: [2023] 2 S.C.R. 511 · Decided: 21-02-2023 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: DINESH MAHESHWARI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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   [2023] 2 S.C.R. 511
511
YOGESH UPADHYAY AND ANR.
v.
ATLANTA LIMITED
(Transfer Petition (Criminal) Nos. 526-527 of 2022)
FEBRUARY 21, 2023
[DINESH MAHESHWARI AND SANJAY KUMAR, JJ.]
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138, 142(1) – Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.406 – Transfer of criminal cases –
Power of Supreme Court – Held: Notwithstanding the non-obstante
clause in s.142(1), the power of Supreme Court to transfer criminal
cases u/s.406, Cr.P.C. remains intact in relation to offences u/s.138,
if it is found expedient for the ends of justice – In the present case,
as the six complaint cases filed by the respondent (four before the
Dwarka Courts at New Delhi and two before the Courts at Nagpur,
Maharashtra) pertain to the same transaction, it would be advisable
to have a common adjudication to obviate the possibility of
contradictory findings being rendered in connection therewith by
different Courts – Cases pending before the Courts at Nagpur,
Maharashtra transferred to the Dwarka Courts at New Delhi –
Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015 – ss. 142(2), 142-
A.
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138, 142(2)(a) – Held:
s.142(2)(a) vests jurisdiction for initiating proceedings for an
offence u/s.138 in the Court where the cheque is delivered for
collection, i.e., through an account in the branch of the bank where
the payee or holder in due course maintains an account – Negotiable
Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015.
Words & Phrases – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 –
s.142(2) – ‘shall be inquired into and tried only by a Court within
whose local jurisdiction……’ – Discussed.
Allowing the transfer petitions, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Perusal of the Statement of Objects and
Reasons in Amendment Act 26 of 2015 makes it amply clear that
insertion of Sections 142(2) and 142-A in the Act of 1881 was a
direct consequence of the judgment of this Court in Dashrath
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 2 S.C.R.
Rupsingh Rathod. Therefore, the use of the phrase: ‘shall be
inquired into and tried only by a Court within whose local
jurisdiction……’in Section 142(2) of the Act 1881 is contextual
to the ratio laid down in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod to the contrary,
whereby territorial jurisdiction to try an offence under Section
138 of the Act of 1881 vested in the Court having jurisdiction
over the drawee bank and not the complainant’s bank where he
had presented the cheque. Section 142(2) now makes it clear
that the jurisdiction to try such an offence would vest only in the
Court within whose jurisdiction the branch of the Bank where
the cheque was delivered for collection, through the account of
the payee or holder in due course, is situated. The newly inserted
Section 142-A further clarifies this position by validating the
transfer of pending cases to the Courts conferred with such
jurisdiction after the amendment. [Para 11][516-E-H]
Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra
and another (2014) 9 SCC 129: [2014] 11 SCR 921;
Bridgestone India Private Limited vs. Inderpal Singh
(2016) 2 SCC 75 : [2015] 14 SCR 153 – relied on.
1.2 Institution of the first two complaint cases before the
Courts at Nagpur is in keeping with the legal position obtaining
now. The non obstante clause was there in the original Section
142 itself and was not introduced by way of the amendments in
the year 2015, along with Section 142(2). The said clause merely
has reference to the manner in which cognizance is to be taken
in offences under Section 138 of the Act of 1881, as a departure
has to be made from the usual procedure inasmuch as prosecution
for the said offence stands postponed despite commission of the
offence being complete upon dishonour of the cheque and it must
necessarily be in terms of the procedure prescribed. The clause,
therefore, has to be read and understood in the context and for
the purpose it is used and it does not lend itself to the
interpretation that Section 406 Cr.P.C. would stand excluded vis-
à-vis offences under Section 138 of the Act of 1881. The power of
this Court to transfer pending criminal proceedings under Section
406 Cr.P.C. does not stand abrogated thereby in respect of
offences under Section 138 of the Act of 1881. It may be noted
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that this Court exercised power under Section 406 Cr.P.C. in
relation to offences under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 even
during the time the original Section 142 held the field. We,
therefore, hold that, notwithstanding 

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