LexY. SLEEBACHEN ETC. versus SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER WRO/PWD &ANR.
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A B [2014] 13 S.C.R. 1050 Y. SLEEBACHEN ETC. v. SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER WRO/PWD &ANR. (Civil Appeal Nos. 7164-7166 of 2014) AUGUST 4, 2014. [J. CHELAMESWAR AND A. K. SIKRI, JJ.] Decree: C Consent decree - Arbitral award - Challenged in District Court - Pending petitions, negotiations failed - However, when petitions listed for hearing, contractor offered to further reduction of his claims - Offer accepted by Government Pleader appearing for employers and, 0 accordingly, a consent decree passed by District Court - Appeal by employer on the ground that its advocate was not authorised to enter into any compromise - High Court setting aside the consent decree - Held: Nothing has been brought out by respondents to show that the advocate was not E authorised to enter into such a settlement- Even otherwise, respondents should have filed an application before District Court immediately after the passing of decrees in compromise terms, or even thereafter, for recall of the compromise order, but this was not done - High Court was F not justified in setting aside the consent decree passed by District Judge - Such a consent decree operates as an estoppel and was binding on parties and respondents could not wriggle out of it by taking an after thought plea that its lawyer was not authorised to enter into such a settlement- Impugned judgment of High Court set aside and consent G decrees passed by District Court restored-Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - ss. 34 and 37- Estoppel. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 : 0. 23, r. 3 rlw 0. 3, r. 4 - Compromise decree -Arbitral H award challenged in District Court - Government Pleader 1050 Y. SLEEBACHEN ETC. v. SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER 1051 WRO/PWD &ANR. appearing for employer accepting the offer made by A contractor and accordingly consent decree passed - Held: Counsel appearing for a party is fully competent to put his signature to the terms of any compromise upon which a decree can be passed in proper compliance with the provisions of 0. 23, r, 3 and such a decree is perfectly B valid- The authority of a counsel to act on behalf of a party is expressly given in 0. 3, r. 1 - In the instant case, Government Pleader was legally entitled to enter into a compromise with the appellant-contractor and his written endorsement on the Memos filed by appellant can be C deemed as a valid consent of respondent-employer itself . . The appellants-contractors were awarded three contracts by the respondents-employers. Disputes arose between the parties and ultimately arbitral awards were passed. The respondents-employers challenged D the said awards in petitions u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Pending the petitions, negotiation between the parties was explored and the contractor ultimately, in the meeting held on 9.1.2009, agreed to 5% reduction in the principal amount in addition to 40% E · reduction in the interest amount. However, as the employers insisted on 10% reduction in the principal amount, the negotiations failed and when the petitions were listed in court on 9.4.2011, the appellant came forward with memoranda to the effect that apart from the F offer made on 9.1.2009 reduction of 5% from the principal amount and forgoing 40% interest, he was also willing to forgo further accrued interest on the award amount after 9.1.2009. This offer appeared to the Government Pleader as fair and he made written endorsements on G the memoranda on behalf of the Government-employer that it had no objection to the same. Accordingly, on the said compromise, the petitions were disposed of. The Government filed appeals before the High Court contending that the Government Pleader in the District H 1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 13 S.C.R. A Court was not authorised to enter into the compromise. B The High Court accepted the said plea and set aside the order passed by the District Court. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 The only ground which has prevailed with the High Court in accepting the appeals of the re.srondents against the orders of the District Judge is that the Government Pleader was not authorised by the respondents to enter into such a settlement. Such c reasoning cannot be accepted in the scenario which prevails on the record. In the first instance, it is to be kept in mind that nothing has been brought out by the respondents which would show that the advocate was not authorised t
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