WORKMEN OF MESSRS FIRESTONE TYRE & RUBBER COMPANY OF INDIA (P.) LTD. versus MANAGEMENT & OTHERS
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A n c D E F G , p WORKMEN OF MESSRS FIRESTONE TYRE & RUBBER COMPANY OF INDIA (P.) LTD. v. "-iANAGEMENT & OTHERS (With connected appeals) · March 6, 1973 · [l. D. DUA & C .. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.] , JndustriGi Disputes Act 1947 as anze1i.ded by Industrial Disputes (Anzendnzent) Act 1971-Sect:on lIA, interpretation of-Power of Tri- bunal ho•v far nzodificd-Section whether applicable to disputes referred before 15-12-71, when ft ca1ne into force. " The Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act 1971 ·inter alia introduced s .. llA int:J the parent Act of 1947. The new Section provided that if in the course of the adjudication of an Industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workm1:i a Labour Court, Tribunal, or Na- . tionat Tribunal is satisfied that the o:-der of d:scharge or dismissal v1as. not justified, it may, by its a\vard, set aside the order of discharge or dis- missal and direct reinstatement of the workmen or reduce punishment etc. The proyiso to the section laid do¥/n that i:i a1y procecdirig u:der the sectio:i the Court or Tribunal in question shall rely only on the material; on re:ord arid shall not take any fresh evidence jn relatio:i to the matter • . The sectio:i cam~ into force \Vith effect from D.'!;;:embcr 15, 1971. In the . pi-esent appeals by special "leave the two questions that arose for considera- fon \\·ere: (i) ·whether s. llA had made any changes in the existing legal situatio:i as laid do\vn by this Cou':"t and if so, to \vhat extent; (ii) wh:!ther the section was app!icable to industrial disputes which had been already referred for adjudication and were pending as on December 15, 1972. HELD : (i) The statement of objects and reasons cannot be taken into account for the purpose o"f interpreting the plain words of the sec- .tio:i. But it gives an indicatiori as _to what the Legislative wanted to achieve .. ~608 A-BJ (ii) The .Ac-t is "a beneficial piece of legislation enacted in the interest cf employees. It is well settled that in construing the provisions of . a \velfare legislation, courts should adopt, what is described as. a beneficent rule .of construcfo:t. If t\vo constructions are reasonably possible to be placed on the section, it follows that the constructio~ which furthers the policy and object of the Act and is more. beneficial to the employees has to be preferred. The interpretation must be liberal enou~ to achieve the leg'.slative purpose. It must still be in accordance with the plain v;orCs: of the statute or the section and must not do violence to the language useJ by the legislature. It \vill further have to be found from the v.rords of the section whether it has altered the entire law as laid down in the existing decisions and, i'f so, whether there is a clear expression of that intention in the language of the sect:on. [608 G·H; 609 kC] · (iii) Both in respect of cases where a domestic enquiry has been held as also in cases \\'·hen the Tribunal considers the matter on the evidence adduced before it for the first time, the satisfaction under s. J lA, about the guilt or otherwise of the workmen concerned is that of the Tribunal. It has to consider the evidence and come to a conclusion one way or other. Even· in· cases where an enquiry has been held by an Cmployer and a finding of misconduct arrived at, the Tribunal can now differ from that finding in a proper case anO hold that no misconduct is proved. ' . ·. [611 A-CJ The contention that the ·stage for interference under·section llA by the Tribunal is reached only when it has to consider the punishment after 588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1973] 3 S.C'.R. having accepted the finding of guilt recorded by the employee, could not A be accepted.. The Tribunal under s. l lA can consider the question of guilt as well as of punishment. It can also alter the punishment imposed by an employer. [pll C-H; 612 A·B] · It was specifically contended before the Court in Workmen of Motipur Sugar Factories (Private) Limited, that when an employer had held no enquiry as required by the Standing Orders, it was not open to him to add~ce evidence before the Tribunal for the first time and justify the order of discharge. This contention was rejected by this Court and it was held that if the enquiry was defective or no inquiry had been held, as required by the Standing Orders, the entire case would be open before the Tribunal and the employer would hav
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