WORKMEN OF DEWAN TEA ESTATE AND ORS. versus THE MANAGEMENT

Citation: [1964] 5 S.C.R. 548 · Decided: 25-11-1963 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

1963 
November, 25 
548 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1964] 
WORKMEN OF DEWAN TEA ESTATE AND ORS. 
v. 
THE MANAGEMENT 
(P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO AND 
· K.C. DAS GUPTA JJ.) 
Industrial Disputes-Lay-off due to financial position or trade 
reasons-Whether justified-If common law right could be spelt 
out of s. 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act to declare lay-~ff-Standing 
Order No. 8-"Stoppage of supply" al(d "other causes beyond his 
control", meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act 14of1947), 
ss. 2(kkk) and 25C-Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) 
Act, 1946 (Act 20 of 1946).-Rule 8 of the Standing Orders. 
As a result of the lay-off declared by the respondent in the 
11 tea estates, managed by them an industrial dispute arose between 
the respondent and their workmen, the appellant. The respondent 
justified the lay-off on the ground thJt its financial position was 
very difficult and that the lay-off was appropriate in the interests 
of the employees and their own in order to avoid closure of business. 
The appellants urged, inter alia, that the depression in trade or 
financial difficulties which may be characterised as trade reasons 
did not justify the lay-off under the relevant Standing Order, and 
so, they justified their claim for full wages during the period of the 
lay-off. The Tribunal held that the relevant Standing Order No. 
8 justified the lay-off, and the trade reasons resulting from the 
depression in trade and financial liabilities arising therefrom fell 
within the scope of the Standing Order. Alternatively, the Tribunal 
thought that even if the lay-off was not justified by the relevant 
clause of the Standing Order, the respondent had a common law 
right to declare a lay-off and this right was recognised by s. 25C 
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and since it is a statutory pro-
vision, it overrides the relevant clause in the Standing Order. 
In appeal by special leave: 
Held: 
(i) The Tribunal was not right in holding thats. 25C of 
the Industrial Disputes Act recognises the inherent right of the 
employer to declare lay-off for reasons which he may regard as 
sufficient or satisfactory in that behalf. No such common law 
right can be spelt out from the provisions of s. 25C. When the 
laying off of the workmen is referred to in s. 25C, it is laying 
off as defined by s. 2 (kkk), and so, workmen who can claim the 
benefit of s. 25C must be workmen who are laid off for the reasons 
contemplated by s. 2(kkk); that is all that s. 25C means. If in 
any case the lay-off is not covered by the Standing Orders, it will 
necessarily be governed by the provisions of the Act, and lay-off 
would be permissible only where one or the other of the factors 
mentioned by s. 2(kkk) is present, and for such lay-off compensation 
would be awarded under s. 25C. 
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. 5 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
549 
(ii) "Stoppage of supply" must, in the context, mean stoppage 
1963 
of raw material or other such thing. In regard to the factory, 
"stoppage of supply" may mean the stoppage of tea leaves, or 
Workmen of 
in the case of field work, it may mean the stoppage of supply of 
Dewon Tea 
other articles necessary for field operations. "Supply" in the context E 1 
d 0 
cannot mean money or funds. 
sta e an 
rs. 
(iii) The last clause of r. S(a) (i) of the Standing Order which 
v. 
refers to "other causes beyond his control" would not take in the The Management 
financial difficulties of the companies. 
Oth~r causes beyond his 
control for one thing should be similar to the causes that have 
preceded; even otherwise there is no justification for the argument 
that the financial difficulty which is alleged to have confronted 
the respondent was beyond its control. 
Rule S(a) (iii) which refers to temporary curtailment of produc-
tion must obviously be read in the light of r. S(a) (i) and if the case 
of the present lay-off does not fall under r. S(a) (i), r. S(a)(iii) 
would not improve the position. 
(iv) The present dispute must be governed by r. 8(a)(i) of the 
respondent's Standing Orders. It cannot be accepted that the 
Standing Orders having been certified before the definition of the 
lay-off was introduced in the Act, the respondent is entitled to 
rely upon the said definition in support of the plea that the impugned 
lay-off was justified. 
Management of Kairbetta /''state, Kotagiri v. Raja-manickam 
& Ors., [1969) 3 S.C.R. 371, referred to. 
C1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: 
Civil Appea

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