WEST U.P. SUGAR MILLS ASSOCIATION AND ORS. versus STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
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WEST U.P. SUGAR MILLS ASSOCIATION AND ORS. A v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. FEBRUARY 7, 2002 [V.N. KHARE, S.N. PHUKAN AND ASHOK BHAN, JJ.] B LEโขgislative Intention: U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 19531 U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1954-Sections 18 C and 281.'?.ule 49-Sugar factories to pay society commission to cooperative cane societies towards administrative expenses-Amendment of rule 49 providing society commission-Old rule 49 substituted by new rule 49- Substituied new rule operative for ftxed period-Effect of old rule when substituted rule ceases to be operative-Held, old rule does not revive, since D legislatiFe intention is to repeal the old rule and substitute it with new one. Ur der Section 18 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchas1!) Act, 1953, appellants-sugarcane factories are required to pay a commis!.ion as society commission to the respondents-cooperative cane societies and the rate of commission is to be determined and prescribed by E the State Government by the statutory rules. State Government amended rule 49 and revised the society commission and fixed at 5% of the minimum statutory cane price fixed by the Central Government. Subsequently, it substitut:d rule 49 by which society commission was at the rate of 2.69% of the minimum statutory price of sugarcane. Substituted rule remained operative for the period from l.10.91 to 30.9.92. Thereafter, State Cane F Commissioner ordered that after 30.9.92 commission shall be charged at the rate of S'Vo since the substituted rule became inoperative after 30.9.92 and old rule has revived. Aggrieved, appellant filed a petition challenging the order. High Cot1rt dismissed the petition holding that on application of Section 6-C of U.P. General Clauses Act, the repealed or deleted rule 49 revived after G substitut~d rule 49 ceased to be operative. Hence the present appeal and the connecteC writ petition. Appellant contended that after the statutory rule 49 having bt,>en deleted or repeah'd and substituted by a new rule 49, the old rule 49 does not revive 897 H 898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) I S.C.R. A even after the substituted rule ceased to be operative and also that High Court was not legally justified in applying Section 6-C of the Act. Respondents contended that since the substituted rule in pith and substance has been rendered non-existent, the old rule would revive. B Allowing the matters, the Court HELD: I. Once the old rule has been deleted or repealed and substituted by a ne';V rule, old rule would not revive when the substituted rule ceased to be operative. (902-D-E; 904-C) C B.N. Tiwari v. Union of India and Ors., [1965) 2 SCR 421; Firm A.T.B Mehtab Majid and Co. v. State of Madras and Anr., (1963) Supp. 2 435 end Indian Express Newspaper (Bom) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. etc. v. Union of India and Ors., I 1985) I sec 641, relied on. 2. The State Government in exercise of power under Section 211 read D with Section 18 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, amended rule 49 by deleting it and substituting the same by a new rule 49 providing the ~oclety [email protected]% of the minimum statutory cane price Oxed by the Government of India. The notification clearly and in an unambiguous terms provided that old rule shall be substituted by the new E rule. In fact, by doing so, the Government was very clear in its intention that it is substitutinR on old rule by new one. Had the Government ever Intended that after 30.9.92 the old rule would revive, it could have added a proviso to the old rule 49 providing for society commission @ 2.69% with effect from 1.10.91 to 30.9.92. The deliberate commission to provide what has been contained in the new rule 49 by way of a proviso to old rule 49 shows that F the State Government intended to repeal the old rule and substitute it by a new rule 49. (903-E-H) 3. It would have been a different case where a subsequent law which modified the earlier law held to be void. In such a case, the earlier law shall q- G be deemed to have never been modified or repealed and, therefore, continued to be in force. Where it is found that the legislature lacked competence to enact a law, still amends the existing law and subsequently it is found that the legislature or the authority was denuded of the power to amend the existing law, in such a case the old law would revive and continue.
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