VUAYSINGH RATHORE versus MURARILAL & ORS.

Citation: [1980] 1 S.C.R. 205 · Decided: 03-08-1979 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: V.R. KRISHNA IYER, D.A. DESAI, A.D. KOSHAL · Disposal: Case Partly allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

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205 
VUAYSINGH RATHORE 
v . 
MURARILAL & ORS. 
August 3, 1979 
[V, R. KRISHNA IYER, D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KOSHAL, J!) 
Advocates Act 1961-S. 35-Rule 10, Chapter ll, Part 6 of the Rules for 
professjonal misconduct-Scope of-Reprimand whether meets ends of justice. 
Rule 10, Chapter II, Part 6 of the Rules framed by the Bar Council of 
India for professional mis~conduct provides that an advocate shall not stand 
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a surety, or certify_Jhe soundness of a surety, for his: client required for the pur-
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poses of any legal proceedings. 
The appeIJant, a practising advocate, was suspended for Ohe month by the 
Disciplinary Tribunal of the Bar Council of India on the ground that in viola~ 
tion of the rules, he had certified the solvency of a surety in a bailable offence 
in which the accused was his client. The appellate body dismissed his appeal. 
On the question whether a reprimand would meet the ends of justice, 
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Allowing the appeal in part, 
.IIELD : (I) Sectfon 35 of the Advocates Act permits reprimand provided 
the ends of public justice are met by this leniency. Ordinarily this Court does 
not interfere with a punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Tribunal except 
where strong circumstances involving principle are present. Censure 
has 
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better deterrent value on the· errant brethren in the profession in some Aitua-
tions than suspension for a month trom professional practice. 
Jn the present case the lawyer vafs young, the offence v.ras not tainted with 
ttirpitude and the surety whose solvency he certified was found to be good. 
These circumstances are amelioratory and hardly warrant codign punishment. 
Public admonition is an appropriate sentence in the present case. 
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Public professions which enjoy a monopoly of public audience 
have a 
statutorily enforced social accountability for purity, probity and people-conscious 
service. 
In our country bail has become a logey and an instrument of unjust 
incarceration. This harasses the poor and leads to corruption. 
A smart law-
yer who appears for an indigent accused may commiserate and enquire whether 
the surety is solvent. If he is satisfied that the surety is sufficiently solvent, he 
rilay certify the solvency of the surety. In some cases the detainee may be a 
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close .relation or close friend or a poor servant of bis. In that capacity, :iot !ls 
a lawyer, he may know the surety and , his solvency or may offer himself 
as 3. surety. In such cases he violates the rule all the same. The degree of 
culpability in such cases depends on the total circumstances and 
the 
social 
milieu. 
The rule under consideration is a wholesome one in the sense that lawyers 
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sl:lOU:ld itot misuse their role for making extra perquisite's by standing surety 
for their clients or certifying the solvency of such sureties. The Court may not 
206 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1980] l S.C.R. 
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frown upon a lawyer \Vho helps out the person, not by false pretences, but on 
the strength of factual certitude and proven inability to substantiate solvency. 
The Court reprin1anded the appellant and directed that he shall not violate 
the norm of professional conduct and shall uphold the purity and probity of 
the profession generally. 
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1922 of 1979. 
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From the Judgment and Order dated 7-5-1979 of the Disciplinary 
Committee of the Bar Council of India in D.C. Appeal No. 19/78. 
Appellant in Person and S. S. Khanduja for the Appellant. 
The Order of the Court was delivered by 
KRISHNA IYl':R, J. 
The Appellant, a fledging in the legal pro-
fession, has been punished by the Tribunal of the Bar Council for 
eating the forbidden fruit of dubious professional conduct by impro-
perly certifying the solvency of a surety for an accused person, his 
client. 
Suspension from practice for one month is the punishment 
awarded by the trial tribunal and in appeal. Counsel for the appellant 
Shri Khanduja, has pleaded for an admonitory sentence by the Court 
ex-misericordium. Of course, the punitive pharmacopoeia of the Advo-
cates Act, in Section 35, does permit reprimand provided the ends of 
public justice are met by this lenien'cy. 
After all, public professions 
which enjoy a monopoly of public audience have a statutorily enforced 
social. accountability for purity, probity and people-conscious service. 
In our Republic, Article 19(1) (g) vests a fundamental right to practise 
any profession only subject to reasonable

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