VODAFONE IDEA CELLULAR LTD. versus AJAY KUMAR AGARWAL

Citation: [2022] 2 S.C.R. 748 · Decided: 16-02-2022 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: D.Y. CHANDRACHUD · Disposal: Disposed off

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · cites 3 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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748
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 2 S.C.R.
[2022] 2 S.C.R. 748
748
VODAFONE IDEA CELLULAR LTD.
v.
AJAY KUMAR AGARWAL
(Civil Appeal No. 923 of 2017)
FEBRUARY 16, 2022
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, SURYA KANT
AND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.]
Telegraph Act, 1885: s.7B – Whether s.7B of the Act of 1885
providing for statutory remedy of arbitration ousts the jurisdiction
of the consumer forum in deciding the dispute between a telecom
company and a consumer – Held: While the Act of 1885 can be
construed to be a special enactment for regulating telegraphs, the
Consumer Protection Act is a special (and later) enactment intended
to protect the interest and welfare of consumers – The fact that the
remedy of arbitration under the Act 1885 is of a statutory nature,
would not oust the jurisdiction of the consumer forum – The Act of
1986 and its successor, the Act of 2019 are subsequent enactments
which have been enacted by Parliament to protect the interest of
consumers – Therefore, an ouster of jurisdiction cannot be lightly
assumed unless express words are used or such a consequence
follows by necessary implication – The existence of an arbitral
remedy will not, therefore, oust the jurisdiction of the consumer
forum – It would be open to a consumer to opt for the remedy of
arbitration, but there is no compulsion in law to do so and it would
be open to a consumer to seek recourse to the remedies which are
provided under the Act of 1986, now replaced by the Act of 2019 –
Consumer Protection Act 2019 – Consumer Protection Act 1986 –
Jurisdiction – Arbitration.
Consumer Protection Act 2019: s.2(42) – Telecom services –
The insertion of the expression ‘telecom services’ in the definition
which is contained in s.2(42) of the Act of 2019 cannot be construed
to mean that telecom services were not included from the jurisdiction
of the consumer forum under the Act of 1986 – On the contrary, the
definition of the expression ‘service’ in s.2(o) of the Act of 1986
was wide enough to comprehend services of every description
including telecom services – Consumer Protection Act 1986 – s.2(o)
– Interpretation of statutes.
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Consumer Protection Act, 1986: s.2(o) – ‘Service’ –
Interpretation of – Parliament has used the expression “service of
any description which is made available to potential users” – The
definition employs the ‘means and includes formula’ – The means
part of the definition incorporates service of “any” description –
The inclusive part incorporates services by way of illustration, such
as facilities in connection with banking, finance, insurance,
transport, processing, supply of electrical and other energy, board
or lodging and housing construction – The inclusive part is prefaced
by the clarification that the services which are specified are not
exhaustive – This is apparent from the expression “but not limited
to” – The last part of the definition excludes (i) the rendering of
any service free of charge; and (ii) services under a contract of
personal service – Thus, Parliament has confined the exclusion only
to two specified categories – The initial part of the definition however
makes it abundantly clear that the expression ‘service’ is defined to
mean service of any description.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The definition of the expression ‘service’ is
couched in wide terms. The width of statutory language emerges
from the manner in which the definition is cast. Parliament has
used the expression “service of any description which is made
available to potential users”. The definition employs the ‘means
and includes formula’. The means part of the definition
incorporates service of “any” description. The inclusive part
incorporates services by way of illustration, such as facilities in
connection with banking, finance, insurance, transport,
processing, supply of electrical and other energy, board or lodging
and housing construction. The inclusive part is prefaced by the
clarification that the services which are specified are not
exhaustive. This is apparent from the expression “but not limited
to”. The last part of the definition excludes (i) the rendering of
any service free of charge; and (ii) services under a contract of
personal service. Parliament has confined the exclusion only to
two specified categories. The initial part of the definition however
makes it abundantly clear that the expression ‘service’ is defined
to mean service of any description. In other words, a service of
eve

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