V.M. SALGAOCAR AND BROS. PVT. LTD. ETC. ETC. versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX ETC.
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
V.M. SALGAOCAR AND BROS. PVT. LTD. ETC. ETC. A v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX ETC. APRIL 10, 2000 [D.P. WADHWAAND S.S. MOHAMMED QUADRI, JJ.] B Income Tax Act 1961-Sections 17(2), 40A(5)-Amounts drawn from company by directors and employees-Interest ยทnot charged by company- Company borrowing monies on payments of interest-Whether Revenue can object to the allowance of expenditure to the extent of interest not charged C on the directors-Held, No, in the absence of any proof that the amounts were diverled for the benefit of the directors. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal-Whether High Courl can go beyond the finding of Held, No. Interpretation of Statutes-Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, I984- Amendment to Section 17(2) and 40A( 5)-Introduced with effect from I .4. I 985- Later on omitted with effect from the date of insenion-Held, cannot be brushed aside while interpreting the parlicular provisions-Constitution of India- Article I 33-Appeal by cenificate dismissed in limine-Held, it merges with the order of the High Court or Tribunal from which the appeal was provided. In the assessment year 1979-80, the Income Tax Officer disallowed a sum equal to 15 % of the amount standing to the debit of the Directors in the books of the Assessee Company, under Sections 40-A(5) and 17(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Income Tax Officer observed that the assessee which was a company borrowed monies by paying interest @ 15 % p.a. and claimed the interest as deductible expenditure. He held that since the Directors of the Assessee Company were drawing monies from the company without paying any interest, an amount equal to the interest that could have been charged was not to be allowed as a deduction in view of Section 40-A(5). On appeal by the Assessee Company, the CIT (Appeals) upheld the order of the Income Tax Officer. On appeal by the Assessee before the Appellate Tribunal, it was held that no evidence had been led by the Revenue to show that borrowed funds were directly diverted for the benefit of the Directors, and that the non-charging of interest on the debit balance in running account of the Directors would not constitute perqui- l l 69 D E F G H 1170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R. A site. The Tribunal also observed that the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1984 for the first time provided that the difference in interest between the prescribed rate and that charged by an employer to the employee should be treated as perquisite. B c D E F G H On a reference, the High Court relying on the Judgment of Madras High Court, held in favour of the Revenue and against the Assessee Com- pany. During the assessment years 1980-81 and 1981-82 in the case of assessment of a Director of the Company, the Income Tax Officer held that non-charging of interest on the debit balance would amount to perquisite within the meaning of Section 17(2) of the Act 1961. On appeal by the assessee, the CIT (Appeals) relying on the decision in the case of Assessee- Director for the earlier year held that it could not be treated as a perqui- site. On appeal by Revenue before the Tribunal, the order of CIT (Ap- peals) was upheld holding that no ground had been made out by the Revenue to depart from the view taken earlier. The reference before the High Court at the instance of the Revenue was dismissed based on the Judgments rendered in two different cases. In appeal to this Court the Assessee-Appellant contended that, in the case of the Company for the assessment year 1980-81 the decision of the CIT (Appeals) holding that the non-charging of interest will not amount to a perquisite has been approved by this Court and the Appeals have been dismissed after admission, that a different view cannot be taken in respect of the same Company for the assessment year 1979-80. Allowing the Appeals by assessee and dismissing the appeals filed by Revenue this Court HELD : 1. Different considerations apply when a special leave peti- tion under Article 136 of the Constitution is simply dismissed by saying 'dismissed' and an appeal provided under Article 133 is dismissed also with the words 'the appeal is dismissed'. In the former case it has been laid by this Court that when special leave petition is dismissed this Court does not comment on the correctness or otherwise of the order from which leave to appeal is sought. But what the Court means is that it does not consider it to be a fit case for exerc
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex