VJJAYABAL AND ORS. versus SHRLRAM TUKARAM AND ORS.
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A B c VJJA Y ABAl AND ORS. 11. SHRlRAM TUKARAM AND ORS. NOVEMBER 20, 1998 [SUJATA V. MANOHAR AND A.P. MISRA, JJ.] Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958: Sections 8(3) and 498. Tenancy laws-Tenant-Claim for stallls of-Determination a/- Reopening of concluded matter-Proceedings for deletion of name of respondent No. I from the list of tenants-Compromise during proceedings- Consequently respondent No. 1 held not tenant of appellants-Matter attaining finality-After lapse of 11 years Tahsildar re-opened the matter suo D motu under Section 498 and held respondent No. I was not tenant-On appeal Collector held compromise was under pressure and therefore respondent No. I was tenant-Collector's order unsuccessfully challenged before Tribunal and High Court-Appeal before Supreme Court-Held; High Court erred in holding that respondent No. 1 was tenant-Jn proceedings under Section 498 Tahsildar must act on the basis of material on record- E Such power has to be exercised with circumspection. Constitution of India, 1950: Article 136 Appeal-Supreme Court-Power to interfere with finding of fact-Held permissible when conclusions are arrived at by misconstruing the provisions F of Act. G Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 : Section I I Res judicata-Constructive res judicata-/ssue decided in early proceedings-Held: impermissible for party to raise inter se such issue. The appellant's predecessors filed an application under Section 8(3) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 for deleting the name of respondent No. 1 from the list of tenants pertaining to the suit land. The entry in favour of respondent No. 1 as tenant was H recorded for only one year, namely, in the records of 1958-59 which was 54 ... _ - ยท--= - VIJA Y ABAI v. SHRIRAM TUKARAM 55 prepared under Section 8(1) of the Act. During the pendency of the said A proceedings a compromise was arrived at and pursuant thereto the name of respondent No. 1 was deleted from the list of tenants. Further, he also purchased part of the property from the appellants. This order became final as none of' the parties filed appeal against it. After 11 years suo motu proceedings were initiated by Tahsildar under section 49B of the Act wherein B he upheld the contention of the appellants on the basis of compromise and held that respondent No. 1 had not cultivated the rnit land as tenant during the year 1958-59 and hence he was not entitled for restoration of the suit land. Hence he dropped the proceedings under Section 49B. The Collector allowed the appeal of respondent No. I and held he was a tenant. Appellants unsuccessfully challenged the Collector's order before the Revenue Tribunal. C The writ petition and the letters patent appeal filed by the appellants were also dismissed. The High Court upheld the orders of the courts below and held that without an order of the Tahsildar under Section 36(2), which was not in the present case, the appellants cannot obtain possession of the suit land. D In appeal to this Court it was contended for the appellants: (i) the order passed in proceedings u/s 8 holding that respondent No. I was not tenant of appellants having become final, the latter was estopped from raising a contradictory plea in subsequent proceeding initiated by Tahsildar under section 49B in respect of the same land; (ii) the entry for one ytar i.e. 1958- E 59 which was the foundation for the claim ofrespondent having been deleted there was no foundation even for the Tahsildar to initiate suo motu proceedings. Allowing the appeal, this Court HELD : I. The decision by the Appellate and the Revisional Authority in the proceedings under section 49B and the High Court in the writ petition and finally under letters patent appeal is contrary to law. The findings recorded against the appellants in the proceedings under section 49B of the Act are quashed. [66-A-B] 2. Normally this Court would not interfere with any finding of fact recorded but where the conclusions are arrived at by misconstruing the provisions of an Act and without appreciating the principle of estoppel, including adjudication of such right in early proceedings under the same F G Act between the same party this Court would not hesitate to r~consider such adjudication of facts. In this case the question, whether respondent No. 1 was H 56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) SUPP. 3 S.C.R. A a tenant of appel
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