VISHNU NAGNATH DESHMUKH versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
A B c VISHNU NAGNATH DESHMUKH v. ST A TE OF MAHARASHTRA NOVEMBER 8, 2000 [UMESH C. BANERJEE AND K.G .. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.] Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 : Sections 5(J)(d) and 5(2). Indian Penal Code, 1860 : Section 161. Prevention of Corruption-Illegal gratification-Conviction for- Sentencing-Appellant-Accused-Acceptance of illega( gratification by- Finding of Trial Judge-Upheld by High Court-Conviction-Imprisonment ofsix months-Appeal before Supreme Court-Held no interference was D called for with fact finding-In view of smallness of amount involved sentence imposed on the accused reduced to the period already undergone by him. E F Criminal trial-Accused-Sentence-Punishment-Purpose of E.G. Goswami v. Delhi Administration, [1974) 1 SCR 222, relied on. Constitution of India, 1950 : Article 136 Appeal-Examination of evidence by Supreme Court-Permissibility of-Held Supreme Court does not examine the evidence for itself except when the interest of justice so requires. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1127 of 1995. From the Judgment and Order dated 13.4.93 of the Bombay High Court in Crl. A. No. 799 of 1986. G V.N. Ganpule and K. Sarada Devi (A.C.) for the Appellant. H I.G. Shah, S.S. Shinde and S.V. Deshpande for the Respondent. The following Order of the Court was delivered : The appellant in this appeal by grant of special leave challenges the 462 VISHNU NAGNATH DESHMUKH v. ST A TE 463 judgment and order dated 13 .4.1993 passed by the learned single Judge of the A Bombay High Court upholding on appeal the appellant's conviction under section 5(2) read with section 5(i)( d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 194 7 -โข and under section 161 lPC. The Special Judge, Solapur, in Case No. 4/1986 -.... ยท convicted the appellant with rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. I 00 and in default of payment of fine the appellant to undergo further B rigorous imprisonment for 15 days. The subject-matter of the appeal pertains to illegal gratification of Rs. 10. The learned advocate appearing in support of the appeal took us in great detail to the evidence tendered and contended that question of there being any corruption involved does not arise since the Tahsildar himself has allowed C the appellant to retain a book for collection of money for soldiers welfare fund. Payment of Rs. 10 thus stands admitted. The dispute being whereas the appellant is contending that the same was collected at the instance of the Tahsildar on account of soldiers welfare fund, the prosecution harped upon illegal gratification. The record depicts that PW2 Yunus went to the office of the Tahsi\dar on 8.1.1986 and gave an application for issuance of necessary D succession certificate and it is the accused who is said to have informed Yunus (PW2) that the application would be sent for inquiry but one can get a certificate only upon payment of certificate fees and in that case fees was prescribed at Rs. IO and it is on this score that a complaint was lodged with the Anti-Corruption Department and the usual formalities regarding these E matters were duly complied with. Before we proceed further in the matter we ought to appreciate that this Court does not examine the evidence for itself in appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution except when the interest of justice so requires. In the instant case the facts have been gone in detail by both the Special Judge as also by the learned single Judge of the High Court in appeal. The question of any intervention on the factual situation at this F stage of the proceedings is not warranted. On the factual aspect also and having due regard to the evidence, we also cannot come as a matter of fact to a different conclusion than what has been arrived at, except however on the question of sentence. The learned advocate appearing in support of the appeal in the alternative submitted that by reason of the smailness of the G amount involved and by reason of the factum that the appellant being in jail for a period of four months, the question of further punishment would not arise in the factual context and submitted that the appellant has enough sufferings already by reason of the long lapse of time during the pendency of the proceedings and interest of justice would be sub-served in having the punishment for the period already undergone. In support of the alternative H ยท 464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex