VIRENDRA SINGH versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Citation: [2010] 9 S.C.R. 772 · Decided: 09-08-2010 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: DALVEER BHANDARI · Disposal: Dismissed
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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
8 
[2010] 9 S.C.R. 772 
VIRENDRA SINGH 
v. 
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
(Criminal Appeal No. 1316 of 2002) 
AUGUST 09, 2010 
[DALVEER BHANDARI AND A.K. PATNAIK, JJ.] 
Penal Code, 1860: s.302 r.w. s.34 - Murder- Vicarious 
liability - Appellant along with his father and brother armed 
C with weapons went to the house of the deceased - After verbal 
altercation, appellant and his father started beating the son 
of the deceased - When deceased intervened, the brother of 
the appellant on exhortation of his father, fired at the deceased 
which resulted in his death - Conviction of all the three 
D accused by courts below by invoking of s.34 - Challenged by 
appellant - Held: All the three accused in consonance with a 
prearranged plan had gone to the house of the deceased -
They all were armed with weapons so there was prior meeting 
of minds - Appellant rightly convicted under ss.302134 by 
E courts below by invoking the principle of vicarious liability. 
s. 34 and s. 149 - Resemblance with and distinction 
between - Discussed. 
The prosecution case was that the appellant went to 
F the house of the deceased along with his father and his 
brother. The father of the appellant asked the deceased 
to reap their crop. The deceased informed him that he 
was busy and could not reap their crop. On hearing this, 
the father of the appellant got very annoyed. The next 
G day, all the three again went to the house of the 
deceased. The appellant and his father were armed with 
lathis and his brother with a firearm. They insisted that 
the deceased should reap their crop. On getting a 
negative response, the appellant and his father started 
H 
772 
VIRENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 773 
abusing and beating the son of the deceased. The family 
A 
members of the deceased tried to intervene and in the 
process they also got injured. The deceased tried to save 
his son. At that point of time, father of the appellant 
exhorted the other son to shoot the deceased, who then 
shot at the deceased in the stomach, which resulted in 
B 
his death. The trial court convicted all the three accused 
under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The High 
Court upheld the order of conviction. 
In the instant appeal, the appellant contended that in 
C 
the facts and circumstances of the case Section 34 IPC 
could not be invoked. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. A person can be vicariously responsible 
D 
for the acts of others, if he had a common intention to 
commit the offence. The vicarious or constructive liability 
under Section 34 IPC can arise only when two conditions 
stand fulfilled, i.e., the mental element or the intention to 
commit the criminal act conjointly with others; and the 
E 
actual participation in one form or the other in the 
commission of the crime. Section 34 is not a substantive 
offence. It is imperative that .Jefore a man can be held 
liable for acts done by another, under the provisions of 
this section, it must be established that there was 
common intention in the sense of a pre-arranged plan 
between the two and the person sought to be so held 
liable had participated in some manner. in the act 
.constituting the offence. Such a common intention 
should be anterior in point of time to the commission of 
the crime, but may also develop on the spot when such 
G 
a crime is committed. In most of the cases it is difficult to 
procure direct evidence of such intention and it can be 
inferred from the acts or conduct of the accused and 
other relevant circumstances. The essence of Section 34 
IPC is a simultaneous consensus of the minds of the H 
F 
774 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2010] 9 S.C.R. 
A persons participating in the criminal action to bring about 
a particular result. Section 34 IPC does not create any 
distinct offence, but it lays down the principle of 
constructive liability. [Paras 17, 43-46] [780-H; 781-A; 792-
0-H; 793-A-C] 
B 
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor AIR 1925 PC 
1; Mehbub Shah v. King-Emperor AIR 1945 PC 148; 
Pandurang, Tukia and Bhillia v. The State of Hyderabad 
(1955) 1 SCR 1083; Mohan Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab 
C AIR 1963 SC 174; State of UP. v. lftikhar Khan & Ors. (1973) 
1 SCC 512; Ramaswami Ayyangar & Others v. State of Tamil 
Nadu (1976) 3 SCC 779; Rambilas Singh & Ors. v. State of 
Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 605; Krishnan & Another. v. State of 
Kera/a (1996) 10 SCC 508; Surendra Chauhan v. State of 
MP. (2000) 4 SCC 110; Suresh & Another v. State of UP. 
D (2001)
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