VINOD KUMAR versus PREM LATA
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
VINODKUMAR A v. PREMLATA AUGUST 19, 2003 [R.C. LAHOTI, SHIV ARAJ V. PATIL AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.] B Rent Control and Eviction: Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973-Section l 3(2)(i)-Defau/t in payment of rent-Eviction-By Courts below-Supreme C Court sent back the case to rent controller for hearing afresh in accordance with law laid down in Rakesh Wadhawan 's case-Review petition- Challenging correctness of law in Rakesh Wadhawan's case on the ground that the earlier decisions not brought to the notice of Court while deciding the case and that Wadhawan 's case being under Punjab Act was not applicable D to the case under Haryana Act-Held, Rakesh Wadhawan 's case correctly lays down the law-The interpretation in that case applies for interpreting the provision under Haryana Act-East Punjab Urban Rent and Restriction Act, 1949-Section 13(2j(i). Proceedings for eviction were initiated under Section 13(2)(i) ofHaryana E Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 which was decided by the Courts below in favour of the landlord on finding that the tenant had not paid the rent due, in respect of the rented premises. In appeal by special leave this Court set aside the judgments of High Court and the authorities below and directed the case to be sent back to Rent Controller for hearing and deciding F afresh in accordance with the law laid down in Rakesh Wadhawan and Ors. v. Jagdamba Industrial Corporation and Ors., [2002) S SCC 440, wherein it was held that the expression "assessed by the Controller" as occurring in the proviso to Section 13(2)(i) of the Act qualifies all the three things~ i.e. (i) the arrears of rent, (ii) interest at 6% per annum on such arrears, and (iii) the cost of application, which are included in the preceding part of the G sentence; and that order of the Rent Controller making an assessment !!hall, in the scheme of the section, be an interim or provisional order which would be based on a summary enquiry leading to the formation of a prima facie opinion based on the consideration of relevant material brought on record by the parties, which may consist of the documents, affidavits and pleadings which 803 H 804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. A would enable the Controller to make a provisional and yet judicial assessment, and place it on record by way of an order to satisfy the spirit of the proviso. In Review Petition the petitioner questioned the correctness of the law laid down in Rakesh Wadhawan's case on the ground that two earlier decisions of this Court i.e. Mis. Rubber House v. Mis. Excelsior Needle Industries Pvt. B Ltd., (1989) 2 SCC 413 and Rajinder Kumar Joshi v. Veena' Rani, (1990) 4 SCC 526 were not brought to the notice of this Court while deciding Rakesh Wadhawan's case; and that there is a distinction between the provisions of Punjab Urban Rent and Restriction Act, 1949 and the Haryana Act, as the phraseology employed in the two acts is different and, therefore, the decision C in Rakesh Wadhawan's case which is under the Punjab Act has no relevance and applicability in so far as the provisions of the Haryana Act are concerned. Dismissing the petition, the Court HELD: 1. On the plain language of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent D and Eviction) Act, 1973, the expression "to be calculated by the Controller" qualifies both the arrears of rent and interest. The succeeding expression "such costs of the application" is again qualified by the expression "if any, as may be allowed by the Controller". Thus the provision itself casts an obligation on the Controller to calculate and determine by its order (i) the arrears of rent; (ii) the interest; and (iii) the costs, quantifying the amount E which should be paid or tendered by the tenant (at that stage) to comply with the proviso. The words 'calculated' and 'allowed' occurring in the proviso imply a duty cast on the Controller which has to be discharged judicially. Such determination will be only for the purpose 'or securing compliance by the tenant on 'the first date of hearing' succeeding the date of order by the. Controller, F which order would be based on a summary enquiry and would obviously be subject to final determination by the Controller at the end of the regular full- tledged enquiry. Thus it is not correct to say that the provision does not contemplate an enquiry, nor is it correct to say that such an interpretation would result in th
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex