LexVINOD KUMAR CHOWDHRY versus NARAIN DEVI TANEJA
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746 A VlNOD KUMAR CHOWDHRY \I. NARAIN DEVI TANEJA January 11, 1980 B [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. S. KAILASAM AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.] c D E G H Delhi Rent Control Act, 1970-Sccfions 25A and 25B(8)--Scope of. Clause (e) of the ·proviso to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act provides that a landlord can evict a tenant of premises let for residential pur- poses on the ground thot the same were required by him bona fide for occu- pation as a residence for himself and thnt he bas no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. An appeal from the order of the Controller lies to the tribunal and a further appeal to the High Court. In September, 1975, the Government of India took a decision that Govern .. ment employees owning houses in Delhi shall be required to vacate accommo- dation allotted to jhem by the Government within a period of three montlos from !st October. 1975. To avoid pro:edural delays in the matter of evic- tion of tenants from houses let out by (Jovernment servants who were requir- ed to shift to their own houses, Chapter ill A was introduced by an Amending Act. Section I4A which was added in Chapter III provided a right to a person in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Govern- ment to recover immediate possession of the premises' let out by him in case he was required by the Government to vacate the residential premises allotted to him. The non-obstante clause contained in section 25A provides that .ithe provisions of this Chapter or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything. inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in this Act or any other law ;for the time being in force." Section 25B(B) pre>· vides that \Vhen "an order for the recovery of possession of any premises" has been made by the Controller on an application covered by section 25B no appeal or second appeal shall lie ther<:from. The respondent's application under clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Act was rejected by the Rent Controller on the ground that it was not legally permissible for her to CJbtain possession of the premises under the section because she had sought evic;tion only in respect of a part of the premises. In the respondent's rev1s1on petition before the High Court the tenant contended that the petition 'vas incompetent because in view of the provisions of section 25B(B) the cnly remedy available to the respondent was by way of appeal under section 38. Rejecting this contention the High Court held that :ii petition for revision as envisaged by section 25B(8) lay against the order accept~ ing or rejecting an eviction application and against such an order alone. Dismissing the· tenant's appeal. HELD : The remedy of the !aad la.dy against the order of the Controller in the present case was by way of revision (and revision only) of that order by the High Court under the proviso to section 25B(B), even though it - •' • ' V. K. CHOWDHRY V, N. D. TANEJA 747 an order not directing but by refusing rocovery of possession of the premises A in dispute. [756 G-Hl The non-obstante clause in section 25A provides that whenever there is a conflict between the provisions of Chapter IIIA and those of the rest of the Act or of any other law in force the former shall prevail. If an application is made under cl~use ( e) of the proviso to section 14 (I) it has to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in section 25B and not under B the provision.:; contained in Chapters other than Chapter IIIA. Therefore, the procedure laid down in section 25A read with section 25B(1) envisages a shortcut to the conclusion of the proceedings before the Controller. Section 25B(8) further provides that when an order for the recovery of possession of any premises has b'een made no appeal under section 38 or second appeal under section 39 shall lie. The combined effect of section 25A and section 25B(l) and (10) is that in wh>tever respect section 25B makes a departure C from the procedure prescribed in other chapters of the Act, the provisions of Chapter IUA shall prevail. [753 B-D; 754 DJ The expre~sion "order for the recovery of possession of any premises" has to be construed, in the context in which it appears, as an order deciding an application for the recovery of possession of any premises; because, firstly, if an order in favour of the landlord alone was meant to be covered by sub-sec·
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