LexVINOD GURUDAS RAIKAR versus NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD AND ORS.
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A VINOi) GURUDAS RAIKAR v . . NATIONAL HEURANCE CO. LTD AND ORS. SE!' fEMBER 6, 1991 B [LAUT MOHAN SHARMA AND J.S. VERMA. JJ.] c Motor Vehicles Act, 1939/ 1988: Section 110-A/ 166-Accident occurred when the old Act was in force-Claim filed after the new Act came into being-Delay beyond the stipulated period of six months- Condonation of-Whether the provisions under the old Act or the new Act applicable-Clause 6 of General Clauses Act-Whether attracted. The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for con- donation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal. D Meanwhile, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was repealed and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force with effect from 1.7.1989. The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of .the new Act, the delay of more than six months could not be condoned, and dismissed the claim. Before the High Court the appellant challenged the Tribunal's decision, but was not success- E ful. Thereafter, he preferred this appeal by special leave. On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that since the acci- dent took place when the old Act was in force, the proceeding before the Accident Claims Tribunal most be held to be governed by the old Aet under which the appellant had a right to tile a claim petition even more F than six months after the expiry of the pel'iod oflimitation and this right is preserved by reason of the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897; and that bis claim could not have been rejected on the ground of limitation under the new Act. G Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The High Court was right in taking the view that the case was covered by the new Act, and delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned. [920D I 2. The claim to compensation which the appellant was entitled to, H by reason of the accident was certainly enforceable as a right. So far the 912 J • V .G. RAIKAR v. INSURANCE CO. 913 period of limitation for commencing a legal proceeding is concerned, it is adjectival in nature, and has to be governed hy the new Act-<mbject to two conditions. If under the repealing Act the remedy suddenly stands barred as a result of a shorter period of limitation, the same cannot be held to govern the case, otherwise the result will he to deprive the suitor of an accrned right. The second exception is where the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it impractical for him to availoftheremedy. [916F-G] New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, [1976] 2 SCR 266, relied on. 3. There is a vital difference between an application claiming compensation and a prayer to condone the delay in filing such an appli- cation. Liberty to apply for a right is not in itself an accrued right or privilege. 1917E] A B c lsha Valimohammad & Anr. v. Haji .Gu/am Mohammad & Haji D Dada Trust. [1975] 1 SCR 720 and Lalji Raja and Sons v. Firm Hansraj Nathuram, [1971] l SCC 721, relied on. Director of Public Works and Anr. v. Ho Po Sang and Ors., [1961] 2 AER 721 and Abbott v. Minister of Lands, [1895] AC 425, referred to. E 4. In the instant case the period oflimitation for lodging the claim under the old as well as the new Act was the same viz., six months which expired three weeks after coming into force of the new Act. It was open to the appellant to file his claim within this period or even later by 22.7.1989 with a prayer to condone the delay. His right to claim com- fl pensation was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act with another. Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the appellant being taken hy snrprise. So far the question of condonation of six months delay was concerned, there was no charge in the position under the new Act. The right or privilege to claim benefit of a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only hy the law in G force at the time of delay. Even the hope or expectation of getting the benefit of an enactment presupposes applicability of the enactment when the need arises to take its benefit. The occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condonation of delay in filing the claim arose only after repeal of the old law. Obviously the ground for condonation set up as 'sufficient
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