VIMAL CHAND GHEVARCHAND JAIN & ORS. versus RAMAKANT EKNATH JAJOO

Citation: [2009] 4 S.C.R. 794 · Decided: 23-03-2009 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.B. SINHA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

(2009] 4 S.C.R. 794 
A 
VIMAL CHAND GHEVARCHAND JAIN & ORS. 
v. 
RAMAKANT EKNATH JAJOO 
•""'"
Civil appeal No. 1784 of 2009 
B 
MARCH 23, 2009 
[S.B. SINHA AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ.] 
Transfer of Property Act, 1882- s. 54 - Sale by registered 
deed of sale in favour of plaintiff by defendants - Stipulation 
in the deed that if plaintiff dispossessed, defendant was to pay 
c compensation - Defendant continuing in possession of the 
property as a licencee - On failure to pay licence fee, suit for 
recove1y of possession - At trial stage defendant proving his 
possession - Suit dismissed - At appellate stage defendant 
disputing the sale deed stating that it was executed only as 
D security for a money-lending transaction between the parties 
- Appellate Court a/so dismissing the suit - On appeal, held : 
The suit was liable to be decreed - The Sale deed being a 
registered document carries presumption as regards 
genuiness of the transaction - The onus to prove that the sale 
E 
deed was a sham, was on the defendant, and he failed to 
discharge the burden - The deed of sale was required to be 
considered in its proper perspective - On facts, legal fiction is 
created in terms whereof owner becomes dispossessed and 
regains possession in different capacity- Stipulation regarding 
F 
compensation not material as it did not affect real nature of 
transaction -
The question regarding compensation not 
entertainable since raised before this court for the first time -
Defendant also not entitled to equitable relief as he did not 
approach the court with clean hands - Legal Fiction - Deeds 
G and Documents - Practice and Procedure - Equity. 
" 
Plea: 
Alternative <?r inconsistent pleas can be raised but not 
mutually destructive pleas. 
H 
794 
VIMAL CHAND GHEVARCHAND JAIN & ORS. V 
795 
RAMAKANT EKNATH JAJOO 
• 
New Plea - Raising of, for the first time before Supreme A 
• 
Court - Held : Not permissible. 
Practice and Procedures - Raising of new plea - Before 
Supreme Court - Held : Not permissible. 
Deeds and Documents : Interpretation of document -
B 
Held: A document must be construed in its entirety 
A deed of sale was executed by father of respondent 
in favour of a partnership firm. The deed was registered. 
Respondent himself was a witness to the deed. Thereafter 
the father of respondent was put in possession of the C 
property as a licencee at an agreed licence fee. After 
dissolution of the firm, appellant became the owner of the 
property. 
Appellant filed a suit for recovery of possession as 0 
the cheque issued by the respondent towards licence fee 
was dishonored. Respondent disputed the transaction 
and examined three witnesses to prove his possession. 
Trial court dismissed the suit holding that the appellant-
p la i ntiff failed to prove that the suit property was 
purchased by the sale deed; and that the circumstantial E 
evidence shows that the deed was executed only as a 
security for a money-lending transaction between the 
parties. 
Appellants preferred appeal. During pendency F 
thereof, respondent amended the Written Statement, 
stating that the sale deed was executed as a security for 
the loan amount taken from the partnership firm having 
money-lending business. Respondent also examined 
himself as a witness. It. was also stated that loan amount G 
has been repaid. First appellate court framed an additional 
issue whether the sale deed was executed as a security 
for the money lent. Appellate court dismissed the suit. 
However, disbelieving the case that loan has been repaid, 
held that the appellant-plaintiff was entitled to loan amount H 
796 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2009] 4 S.C.R 
A 
with interest. Second appeal was dismissed by High 
Court. Hence the present appeal. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 In the facts and circumstances of this case, 
B 
the plaintiff's suit should have been decreed. The deed of 
sale was a registered one. It, therefore, carries a 
presumption that the transaction was a genuine one. 
Respondent was the son of the vendor. He was an 
attesting witness. In his written statement, he categorically 
denied execution of the said deed of sale. He also denied 
C that he had attested the document. He even did not 
examine himself before the trial judge. His witnesses 
merely proved his possession. The fact that the 
respondent's father was put in possession was not in 
dispute. What was in dispute was the character of his 
D 
possession, which was not considered 

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