LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
โš–๏ธ Ask the AI about your situation:๐Ÿš— Car Accident๐Ÿ’ผ Work / Job๐Ÿ  Housing / Eviction๐Ÿ‘ช Family / Divorce๐Ÿ“‹ Contract Dispute๐Ÿ’ฐ Money Owed

VIKAS CHAUDHARY versus STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR.

Citation: [2010] 9 S.C.R. 1076 · Decided: 11-08-2010 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ALTAMAS KABIR · Disposal: Dismissed

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
[2010] 9 S.C.R. 1076 
VIKAS CHAUDHARY 
v. 
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & 'ANR. 
(SLP (Crl.) No. 8628 of 2009) 
AUGUST 11, 2010 
[ALTAMAS KABIR AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, 
JJ.) 
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 364A - Abduction for ransom -
c Victim killed - Ransom calls made even after the death of 
the victim - Held: Offence uls. 364A does not stand abrogated 
upon death of the victim - Continuation of ransom calls made 
even after the death of victim, converts the offence into a 
continuing offence uls. 472 Cr.P. C. - Code of Criminal 
o Procedure, 1973 - s. 472. 
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 
2000 - Applicability of the Act - Offence u/s. 364A /PC -
Continuous ransom calls - Held: The relevant date- for 
determining the age of the accused would be the last date on 
E which ransom call was made - On facts, the accused was not 
a juvenile on the date when the last call was made - Thus, 
the Act not applicable - Penal Code, 1860 - s. 364A. 
It was alleged that petitioner-accused and the co-
F accused abducted the son of the complainant. They 
committed murder of the victim and even after his death, 
kept on giving phone-calls to the parents of the deceased 
demanding ransom money. 
During trial, at the stage of recording of the evidence, 
G the petitioner-accused moved an applicatiol), for 
transferring his case to Juvenile Justice Board, on the 
ground that at the time of commission of the offence, he 
was a juvenile. The application was dismissed. In 
H 
1076 
VIKAS CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & 1077 
ANR. 
Revision, High Court remanded the matter to trial court. 
A 
On remand also, the trial court held that the petitioner-
accused was not a juvenile on the date of the offence. 
The Revision Petition against the order was allowed by 
High Court. 
B 
The trial of the petitioner-accused was separated and 
transferred to Juvenile Justice Board. The Supreme Court 
set aside the order of the High Court, whereby it had 
transferred the case of the petitioner-accused to Juvenile 
Court and remanded the matter to trial court for deciding 
C 
the issue in the light of s. 472 Cr.P.C. 
The trial court held that the offence of murder 
coupled with abduction could be considered to be a 
continuing offence; and that the last date on which the 
ransom call was made, would be the relevant date from 
D 
which the age of the petitioner-accused was to be 
counted to determine the applicability of Juvenile Justice 
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Revision 
Petition against the order was dismissed by High Court. 
In the instant Special Leave Petition, the questions 
E 
for consideration were: whether making of ransom calls, 
even after the death of the victim, was aยท continuing 
offence as to attract provisions u/s. 364A IPC; and 
whether Juvenile Justice Act is applicable to the case of 
F 
the petitioner-accused. 
Dismissing the petition, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 It is not correct to say that the offence u/ 
s. 364A IPC stood abrogated upon the death of the 
G 
victim. The continuation of ransom calls being made, 
even after the death of the victim, converts the offence 
into a continuing offence within the meaning of Section 
472 Cr.P.C. [Para 18] [1086-E-F] 
H 
1078 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2010] 9 S.C.R. 
A 
1.2 In the instant case, the main object of the offence 
committed by the accused was to extort money from the 
parents of the deceased victim by way of ransom, even 
after the death of the victim, as is evident from the 
subsequent phone calls made, asking for ransom. The 
B offence u/s. 364A IPC did not come to an end only on 
account of the death of the victim, since ransom calls had 
been made even though the victim had been killed. [Para 
17] (1086-B-C] 
2.1 It is true that if the initial date of abduction is taken 
C to be the date on which the offence u/s. 364A had been 
committed, as an isolated event, the petitioner would 
have been a minor within the meaning of the Juvenile 
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. 
However, if the date on which the last ransom call was 
D made, is taken as the date on which the aforesaid offence 
was committed, then the petitioner would have ceased to 
be a minor and the Juvenile Justice Act would not apply 
to him. [Para 17] (1086-C-D] 
E 
2.2 If Section 364A IPC and Section 472 Cr.P.C. are 
read together, it is evident that even after the death of the 
victim, every time a ransom call was made, a fresh period 
of limitation commenced. Ac

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.