LexVIJAYA BANK versus SHYAMAL KUMAR LODH
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[2010] 7 S.C.R. 569 VIJAYA BANK v. \. SHYAMAL KUMAR LODH (Civil Appeal No. 4211 of 2007) JULY 06, 2010 !G.S. SINGHVI AND C.K. PRASAD, JJ.] Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: A B s.'33C(2) - Subsistence allowance - Application for c suspension/subsistence allowance filed under s.33C(2) before the Labour Court, Dibrugarh constituted under s. 7 of the Act - Employer situated within the local limits of its jurisdiction - Jurisdiction of Labour Court, Dibrugarh to decide the dispute - Held: Labour Court, Dibrugarh is not specifi-ed by the D appropriate government i.e. Central Government for adjudication of the disputes under s.33C(2), however dispute can be entertained in view of s.10A(2) of 1946 Act- Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946 - s. 1 OA(2). s.33C(2) - Expression 'labour court' - Includes Court E constituted under any law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State. Jurisdiction: Incorrect label of the application and mentioning wrong.provision neither confers jurisdiction ·nor F . denudes the Court of its jurisdiction. Interpretation of statutes: Explanation appended to a section - Object of - Held: Is to explain the meaning of the words contained in the section G - lndi.J.$trial Disputes Act, 1947 - s.33C(2). Meaningful construction - Legislature never waste its words or says anything in vain - Construction rejecting the 569 H 570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 OJ 7 S.C.R. A words of a statute not to be resorted to, excepting for compelling reasons. The question which arose for consideration in these appeals was whether the Labour Court, Dibrugarh 8 constituted by the State Government under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 had jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the respondent- employE~e of appellant bank for an award of suspension/ subsistence allowance filed under Section 33(2) of the C Act. Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. From a plain reading of Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it is evident that 0 money due to a workman has to be decided by such Labour Court "as may be specified in this behalf by the. appropriate Government." Explanation appended to Section 33C of the Act provides to include any Court constituted under any law relating to investigation and E settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State as Labour Court. The underlying object behind inserting explanation seems to be varying qualification prescribed for appointment of Presiding Officers of Labour Court by different State enactments. The Parliament took note of the fact while inserting explanation that there ~re F different kinds of Labour Courts constituted under Industrial Disputes Act and State Acts and a question may arise whether a Labour Court constituted under Acts, Central or State could entertain a claim made under Section 33C(2) of the Act. [Para 12) (580-F-H; 581-A-B) G 1.2. An explanation is appended ordinarily to a section to explain the meaning of words contained in that section. In view of the explanation appended to Section 33C of the Act, Labour Court shall include any Court H constituted under any law relating to investigation and VIJAYA BANK v. SHYAMAL KUMAR LODH 571 settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State. It A widens the choice of appropriate Government and it can specify not only the Labour Courts constituted under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but such other Courts constituted under any other law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in s force in any State. [Para 13] (581-B-E] 1.3. The power to adjudicate money claim is to be decided by the Labour Court "as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government". Every word used by the Legislature carries meaning and therefore effort C has 'to be made t~ give meaning to each and every word used by it. A construction brushing aside words in a Statute is not a sound principle of construction. The Court avoids a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which renders an expression or part of the D · Statute devoid of any meaning or application. Legislature never waste its words or says c;tnything in vain and a construction rejecting the words of a Statute is not resorted to, excepting for compelling reasons. There does not exist any reason, much less compelling E reason to adopt
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