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VIJAY NARAYAN THATTE & ORS. versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

Citation: [2009] 14 S.C.R. 891 · Decided: 18-08-2009 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: MARKANDEY KATJU, A.K. GANGULY · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

(2009] 14 S.C.R. 891 
VIJAY NARAYAN THATTE & ORS. 
v. 
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 5614 of 2009) 
AUGUST 18, 2009 
[MARKANDEY KAT JU AND ASOK KUMAR 
GANGULY, JJ.] 
Land Acquisition Act, 1894: 
Sections 4, SA, 6 ...;. Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 
A 
B 
c 
- Challenged by filing a writ petition - High Court quashing 
the Notification under Section 6 - Subsequently second 
notice under Section 6 was issued - Writ petition rejected by 
High Court - On appeal, Held: Second Notification is time-
D 
barred -
The language of proviso to Section 6 is clear -
Hence literal interpretation to be applied - In the impugned 
judgment no specific reference made in Clause (ii) to proviso 
to Section 6, there has b(!en general reference to Section 6 -
Hence the observations in para 3 of the impugned judgment E 
have to be construed as per incuriam - Impugned judgment 
set aside - However, it is open to the State Government to 
issue a fresh Notification under Section 6 and take 
proceedings in accordance with law thereafter - Interpretation 
of statutes - Literal interpretation. 
Mimans~ Principles of Interpretation - Discussed. 
maxims: 
'Dura Lex Sed Lex - Meaning of. 
Law and Equity: 
When there is conflict between law and equity it is the law 
which must prevail. 
891 
F 
G 
H 
892 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 
A 
Law of Estoppal - There can be no estoppal against a 
• 
statute. 
' 
Judgments: 
Judgment per incuriam - Meaning of - Discussed. 
~ 
B 
In respect of the lands in question, Notification under 
Section 4 was issued. Thereafter Notification under 
Section 6 was issued, which was challenged in a writ 
r 
petition and quashed by the High Court. Again, a second 
c Notification under Section 6 was issued and challenge 
thereto was rejected by the High Court. Hence the 
appeal. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
D 
HELD: 1.1. Nishedha Vidhis of Mimansa Rules of 
(,.. 
I 
Interpretation is to be interpreted most comprehensively 
and ,as mandatory. The proviso to Section 6 of the Land 
Acquisition Act is totally mandatory and bears no 
't 
exceptions. [Paras 16 and 17) [900-E-F] 
E 
'{:: 
1.2. The proviso to Section 6 is mandatory, and 
hence the Notification under Section 6 dated 30.10.2006 
is t~me barred. When the language of the Statute is plain 
and clear then the literal rule of interpretation has to be 
F applied and there is ordinarily no scope for consideration 
of equity, public interest or seeking the intention of the 
legislature. It is only when the language of the Statute is 
not clear or ambiguous or there is some conflict etc. or 
the plain language leads to some absurdity that one can 
G depart from the literal rule of interpretation. [Para 18) 
[900-G-H; 901-A] 
1.3. A perusal of the proviso to Section 6 shows that 
the language of the proviso is clear. Hence the literal rule 
of interpretation must be applied to it. When there is a 
H conflict between the law and equity it is the law which 
VIJAY NARAYAN THATTE & ORS. v. STATE OF 
893 
MAHARASHTRA & ORS. 
must prevail. As stated in the Latin Maxim 'Dura Lex Sed A 
Lex' which means "the law is hard but it is the law". [Para 
19] [901-B] 
Beni Prasad vs. Hardai Bibi 1892 ILR 14 All 67 and 
.. 
Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Others vs. State of T.N. And B 
Others (2002) 3 sec 533, relied on. 
Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh 
:>(' 
11th Edition, 2008; K.L. Sarkar's 'Mimansa Rules of 
Interpretation', a collection of Tagore Law Lectures c 
delivered in 1905 and P. V. Kane's 'History of the 
Dharmashastra', Vol. V, Pt.II, Ch.XXIX and Ch.XXX, pp. 
1282-1351, referred to. 
2. There can be no estoppel against a Statute. Since 
the Statute is very clear, the period of limitation provided D 
in Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6 of the Act has to 
be followed, and concessions of the counsel can have 
no effect. The proviso is mandatory in nature, and must 
operate with its full rigour. [Para 21] [902-D-E] 
Ashok Kumar vs. State of Haryana (2007) 3 SCC 470, 
E 
relied on. 
3.1. The observations in para 3 of the impugned 
judgment dated 20.1.2004 have to be regarded as per 
incuriam. [Para 24] [904-C-D] 
F 
3.2. In the aforesaid judgment no specific reference 
has been made to the limitation period prescribed in 
clause (ii) to proviso to Section 6 of the Act, though no 
doubt Section 6 has been generally referred to. Hence, G 
the observations in paragraph 3 of the aforesaid judgment 
~ 
dated 20.

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