VIJAY NARAYAN THATTE & ORS. versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
(2009] 14 S.C.R. 891
VIJAY NARAYAN THATTE & ORS.
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5614 of 2009)
AUGUST 18, 2009
[MARKANDEY KAT JU AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
Sections 4, SA, 6 ...;. Notifications under Sections 4 and 6
A
B
c
- Challenged by filing a writ petition - High Court quashing
the Notification under Section 6 - Subsequently second
notice under Section 6 was issued - Writ petition rejected by
High Court - On appeal, Held: Second Notification is time-
D
barred -
The language of proviso to Section 6 is clear -
Hence literal interpretation to be applied - In the impugned
judgment no specific reference made in Clause (ii) to proviso
to Section 6, there has b(!en general reference to Section 6 -
Hence the observations in para 3 of the impugned judgment E
have to be construed as per incuriam - Impugned judgment
set aside - However, it is open to the State Government to
issue a fresh Notification under Section 6 and take
proceedings in accordance with law thereafter - Interpretation
of statutes - Literal interpretation.
Mimans~ Principles of Interpretation - Discussed.
maxims:
'Dura Lex Sed Lex - Meaning of.
Law and Equity:
When there is conflict between law and equity it is the law
which must prevail.
891
F
G
H
892
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
Law of Estoppal - There can be no estoppal against a
•
statute.
'
Judgments:
Judgment per incuriam - Meaning of - Discussed.
~
B
In respect of the lands in question, Notification under
Section 4 was issued. Thereafter Notification under
Section 6 was issued, which was challenged in a writ
r
petition and quashed by the High Court. Again, a second
c Notification under Section 6 was issued and challenge
thereto was rejected by the High Court. Hence the
appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
D
HELD: 1.1. Nishedha Vidhis of Mimansa Rules of
(,..
I
Interpretation is to be interpreted most comprehensively
and ,as mandatory. The proviso to Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act is totally mandatory and bears no
't
exceptions. [Paras 16 and 17) [900-E-F]
E
'{::
1.2. The proviso to Section 6 is mandatory, and
hence the Notification under Section 6 dated 30.10.2006
is t~me barred. When the language of the Statute is plain
and clear then the literal rule of interpretation has to be
F applied and there is ordinarily no scope for consideration
of equity, public interest or seeking the intention of the
legislature. It is only when the language of the Statute is
not clear or ambiguous or there is some conflict etc. or
the plain language leads to some absurdity that one can
G depart from the literal rule of interpretation. [Para 18)
[900-G-H; 901-A]
1.3. A perusal of the proviso to Section 6 shows that
the language of the proviso is clear. Hence the literal rule
of interpretation must be applied to it. When there is a
H conflict between the law and equity it is the law which
VIJAY NARAYAN THATTE & ORS. v. STATE OF
893
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
must prevail. As stated in the Latin Maxim 'Dura Lex Sed A
Lex' which means "the law is hard but it is the law". [Para
19] [901-B]
Beni Prasad vs. Hardai Bibi 1892 ILR 14 All 67 and
..
Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Others vs. State of T.N. And B
Others (2002) 3 sec 533, relied on.
Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh
:>('
11th Edition, 2008; K.L. Sarkar's 'Mimansa Rules of
Interpretation', a collection of Tagore Law Lectures c
delivered in 1905 and P. V. Kane's 'History of the
Dharmashastra', Vol. V, Pt.II, Ch.XXIX and Ch.XXX, pp.
1282-1351, referred to.
2. There can be no estoppel against a Statute. Since
the Statute is very clear, the period of limitation provided D
in Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6 of the Act has to
be followed, and concessions of the counsel can have
no effect. The proviso is mandatory in nature, and must
operate with its full rigour. [Para 21] [902-D-E]
Ashok Kumar vs. State of Haryana (2007) 3 SCC 470,
E
relied on.
3.1. The observations in para 3 of the impugned
judgment dated 20.1.2004 have to be regarded as per
incuriam. [Para 24] [904-C-D]
F
3.2. In the aforesaid judgment no specific reference
has been made to the limitation period prescribed in
clause (ii) to proviso to Section 6 of the Act, though no
doubt Section 6 has been generally referred to. Hence, G
the observations in paragraph 3 of the aforesaid judgment
~
dated 20.Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
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