VIDYACHARAN SHUKLA versus KHUBCHAND BAGHEL AND OTHERS
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• 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 129 umbrella fllld soap which never paid tax under the Act of 1961 1918 could be dealt with by the partners as they liked Sail Nagi•• p,,,. without affecting 'the question of relief under s. 25 in respect shottam &: Co. .of the head business. Commi.s:~,,.,. ot lncome·ta>:. · In my judgment, these appeals must be allowed ano the Madr., question answered in favour of the assessee firm but only in Hidayatul/IJh 1.; respect of the business in piece-goods, yarn and banking which alone had paid tax under the Income-tax Act of 1918. I would therefore allow the appeals with costs here and in the High Court ORDER BY COURT . In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeals are dismissed with costs. VIDY ACHARAN SHUKLA 11. KHUBCHAND BAGHEL AND OTHERS (B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.) Election-Appeal ta High Court under s. 116·A-Whether in computing period of limitation for filing an appeal to High Court, time provided by s. 12 of Limitation Act for getting a copy of the order CIJll be excluded-Whether s. 29(2)(a) applied to cases of appeal preferre4 under s. 116-A-Relationship between the two limbs of •· 29(2) of Limi· tation Act-Limitation Act. 1908 (9 of 1908), ss. 12, 29(2), Fir/II Schedule, Art, 156-Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), •· 116-A. The appellant was elected to the House of the People from a con· •tituency in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The respondents were tho other contesting candidates' Respondent No. 1 filed an election petition challenging the election of the appellant. That election petition was dismissed by the Election Tribunal. Against the order of the Tribunal. the first respondent preferred an appeal to the High Court under s. 116-A 134-159 S.C.-9. 1963 Decunber, 20 1963 Vltlyac/raran Sltukla v. Xhubchand Baghel SUPREME COURT REPORTS of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Admittedly, the appeal was filed more than 30 days after the order of the Election Tribunal. If the time requisite for obtaining a copy o(. the order of the Tribunal was excluded. the appeal was filed within 30 days. However, if that was not tlone, the appeal was out of time. The contention of the- appellant before the High Court was that the respondent No. I was not entitled in law to exclude the time taken by him i'l obtaining the copy of the order of the Tribunal. That contention was rejected by the High Court. The High Court also found that the appellant was guilty of two corrupt practices and hence his election was set aside. The appellant came to this Court by special leave. The only question raised before this Court was whether for the- purpose of computing the period of 30 days prescribed under s. 116-A(3) of tho Act, the provisions of s. 12 of the Limitation Act could be invoked or not. Dismissing the appeal. Held: (per B. P. Sinha, C.J., K. Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar JI.) (i) The exclusion of time provided for by s. 12 is permissible in computing the period of limitation for filing the appeal in the High Court. Per B. p. Sinha, C.J., K. Sobba Rao and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar JI.) (ii) Though the right of appeal is conferred by s. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and it is by virtue thereof that the appeal was filed by respondent in the High Court, it is still an appeal "under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, tO the High Court". To attract Art. 156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. it is not necessary for an appeal to be an "appeal under the Code of Civil Pro- cedure" that tho right to prefer the appeal should be conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure. It is sufficient if the proccaure for the filing. of the appeal and the power of the Court for dealing With the ippeal, when filed, are &overned by the Code. Per Raghubar Dayal and Mudholkar JJ.-There is no warrant fer holding that an appeal which is not given by the Code of Civil Proce- dure is still an appeal under the Code merely because its procedural provisions govern its course. Where a right of appeal is given by some· other law, the appeal must be regarded as one untler that law and not under the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no reason for constr.llng the words "under the Code of Civil Procedure" as meaning ••governed in the matter of procedure by the Code of Civil Procedure". Held:
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