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VEDABAI @VAIJAYANATABAI BABURAO PATIL versus SHANTARAM BABURAO PATIL AND ORS.

Citation: [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1053 · Decided: 20-07-2001 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.S.M. QUADRI, S.N. PHUKAN · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

VEDABAI @VAIJAYANATABAI BABURAO PATIL 
A 
v. 
SHANTARAM BABURAO PATIL AND ORS. 
JULY 20, 2001 
[SYED SHAH MOAMMED QUADRI AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.] 
B 
Limitation Act, 1963: 
S.5-Seven days' delay in filing appeal due to illness of appellant-
Appellate Court and High Court declining to condone the delay-Held, in C 
exercising discretion u/s. 5, courts should adopt a pragmatic approach-
A distinction must be made between a case where delay is inordinate and 
a case where delay is of a few days- whereas in the former case consideration 
of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for 
a more cautious approach but in the latter case no such consideration may D 
arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach-Expression 'sufficient 
cause' should receive liberal construction and in construing it courts should 
keep in mind that principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime 
importance-High Court in exercising jurisdiction u!s. 115, CPC failed to 
correct the jurisdictional error of the appellate court -Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1908-S. l l 5. 
E 
Interpretation of Statutes: 
Expression-"sufficient cause" occurring in S. 5 of Limitation Act-
He/d should be interpreted liberally. 
State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality & 
Ors., [1972] 1 SCC 366 and Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani 
Debi & Ors., (1978] 2 SCC 116, relied on. 
F 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4494 of 
2oot. 
G 
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.8.2000 of the Bombay High Court 
in C.R.A. No. 884of1999. 
A.P. Mayee and Ms. Rucha Mayee for S.V. Tambwkar, for the appellant. H 
1053 
1054 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(200 I] 3 S.C.R. 
A 
S.U.K. Sagar, Sanjay V. Kharde and Naresh Kumar for the Respondents. 
The following Order of the Court was delivered: 
Leave is granted. 
B 
Heard learned counsel for the parties. 
This appeal is directed against the order of the High Court of Bombay, 
Aurangabad Bench in Civil Revision Application No. 884 of 1999 dated 
August 7 ,2000, declining to interfere with the order of the Additional District 
Judge, Amalner, dated March 16, 1998 dismissing Misc. Civil Application No. 
C 21 of 1997. The appellant made that application for condonation of delay of 
7 days in filing the appeal against the order of the trial court in Special C.S. 
No. 5195 on the file of the Civil Judge, S.D. Arnalner. 
A perusal of the order of the learned Additional District Judge shows 
that he found fault with the appellant on two grounds: (i) the judgement under 
D appeal was delivered on April 30, 1997 but the application for certified copy 
was made on June 5, 1997 and (ii) in regard to the averment in the affidavit, 
filed in support of the application, her Β·illness was given as a reason for the 
delay; it was pointed out that while she was still ill she filed the appeal. For 
those two reasons the application to condone the delay of seven days in 
E filing the appeal was dismissed. It appears that the fact that during the period 
from May 1, 1997 to June 1,1997 the Court was in vacation, has escaped the 
attention of the learned Appellate Judge. To avert further delay in filing the 
appeal as soon as she felt a little better she filed the appeal. This depicts her 
anxiety to minimise the delay rather than falsity of her case or malajides. 
F 
In exercising discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the Courts 
should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a 
case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. 
Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side 
will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach but 
G in the latter case no such consideration inay arise and such a case deserves 
a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. The 
Court has to exercise the discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind 
that in construing the expression 'sufficient cause' the principle of advancing 
substantial justice is of prime importance. In our view in this case, the 
approach of the Iea~ed Additional District Judge is wholly erroneous, and his 
H order is unsustainable. It is evident that the disci;etion under Section 5 of the 
... 
,. 
VEDABAlv. S.B.PATIL 
1055 
Limitation Act is exercised by the Additional District Judge in contravention A 
of the law laid down by this Court, that the expression 'sufficient cause' 
should r

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