V.C. SHUKLA versus STATE THROUGH C.B.I.

Citation: [1980] 2 S.C.R. 380 · Decided: 07-12-1979 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 6 judgment(s) · cites 9 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

380 
'A 
V. C. SHUKLA 
v. 
STATE THROUGH C.B.I. 
December 1, 1979 
B 
[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. N. SHINGHAL, D. A. Dl!SAI AND 
c 
A. P. SEN, JJ.] 
Special Courts Act, 1919-Section 11(1) and 11(2)-Scope of-Order of 
Judge of Special Court directing a charge to be framed against the accused-
Whethcr an interlocutory order-Appeal-If Ues against that order-
Interlocutory order-What is. 
Non-obstante clause-Interpretation of. 
Section 11(1) of the Special Courts Act, 1979 provides that ''notwithstand· 
ing anything in the Code of Criminal Procedure an appeal shall lie as of right 
from any judgment, sentence or order, not being interlocutory order, of a 
D 
Special Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and law." Sub-section (2) 
provides that "except as aforesaid no appeal or revision shall lie to any court 
from any judgment, sentence or order of a Special Court." 
The Special Judge appointed under the Special Courts Act, 1979 directed a 
charge to be framed against the appellant under section 120B J.P.C. read with 
oection 5(l)(d) and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. 
E 
At the stage of hearing, a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of 
the appeal was raised on behalf of the State on the ground that the order 
impugned being purely an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 
11 (1) of the Act no appeal lay to this Court. 
On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the term "interlocutory 
order" has been used in the same sense as has been used in section 397 (2) of 
F 
the Code of Criminal Procedure and the same construction placed by this Court 
on the expression should apply in interPreting this expression, psrticularly v.hen 
the Act does not give any remedy to the accused. 
Per S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and Sen, JJ • . 
The order passed by the Special Judge was an interlocutory order and the 
G 
appeal filed against that order in this Court is not maintainable. { 434 AO 
l(a) The expression interlocutory order in section 11(1) has been used in 
•• ' 
' 
the natural sense and not in a special or in the wider sense in which .It is used 1 
Y 
II 
in section 397(2) of the Code. [433 GJ 
(b) On a true construction of section 11 (1) and taking into C011Sideration 
the natural meaning of the expresoion interlocutory order there can be no doubt 
that the order framing charges against the appellant under the Act was merely 
oo interlocutory order which neither terminated the 
proceeding nor finally 
decided the rights of the parties. 
0Taking its natural meaning and applying the 
' 
V. C. SHUKLA V. STATE 
!._ 
381 
non·obstante clause the po8ition is that tbe provisious of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure are expressly excluded by the non·obstante clause and, 
therefore, 
section 397(2) of the Code cannot be called into aid for holding that tbe order 
impugned is not an interlocutory order. [433 B-C] 
(c) The term "interlocutory order" used in section 397(2) of the Code 
relates to various stages of tbe trial, namely inquiry, trial or any other proceed-
ing. The object seems to be to cut down the delays in stages through which a 
aiminal c~ passes before it culminates in an acquittal, discharg~ or convic· 
lion. H"'ing regard to the very large ambit and range of tho Code the 
apre8sion interlocutory order would have to be given a broad moaning so as 
to achieve the object of the Code without disturbing or interfering with the 
fairness of the trial. [392 A-CJ 
(d) In Amar Nath v. The State of Haryana, although this Court held that 
an order summoning an accused was not an interlocutory order being a matter 
of moment which decided an important aspect of the trial it was, in a' sense, a 
final order which could be revised by the Sessions Judge or the High Court 
under section 397 of the Code. In the circumstances of that case this Court 
held thait such an order could not be said to be purely an interlocutory order. 
[394 DJ 
A. 
B 
c 
Amar Nath & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. [1978] 1 SCR 222, approved. 
D 
(e) In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra this Court beld that an 
order framing a charge was not an interlocutory order and, therefore, a revisioii 
against such an order was competent before the Sessions Judge or the High 
Court. 
But in the circumstances of this case the order was not merely inter· 
locutory order but partook tho nature of a final order or at any rate an inter-
mediate order so as to be taken out of the bar contained fu section 397(2) of 
the Code of 

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