LexVASUMATIBEN GAURISHANKAR BHATT versus NAVAIRAM MANCHHARAM VORA AND ORS.
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1963 Gurugobint1• Buu v. Sankari Prasai Ghosal and Others 1963 August H 324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1%4] office of profit under the Government of India within the meaning of Art. 102(1)(a) of the Constitution. As such he was disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament. It is unnecessary to consider the further question whether he was a holder of an office of profit either under the Government of India or the Government of West Bengal by reason of being an auditor for the Life Insurance Corporation of India or a Director of the West Bengal Financial Corporation. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. VASUMATIBEN GAURISHANKAR BHATT fl. NAVAIRAM MANCHHARAM VORA AND ORS. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR AND K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) Landlord and Tenant-Tenant in arrears of rent /01· about ltvo years-Notice served by the landlord-A few days later the Act amended-Suit· filed by the landlord for eviction-Pend:ng the hearing of suit all arrears paid by tenant-Whether the u:rtartt can be evicted on the ground of arrears of rent-Bon1bay l?.e1,ts, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Cont1·ol Act, 1947 (Born. 57 of 1947) s. 12. The appellant was a tenant of the respondents occupying one room of a building belonging to them. She was in arrears c,f rent. The respondents served a notice on her clai1ning to 1eco\'er arrears of rent for a period of two years and tvvo 1nonths. ·A fe\v days after the service of this notice the. Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, \vhich govern-' this case was amend· ed. The respondents thereafter filed a suit for the eviction of the appellant on the ground that they required the premises for bona fidr: personal use and on the ground that the· appellant was in arrears of rent for more than 6 months. The suit was resisted by the appellant on several grounds but pending the hearing of the ·suit and before the decree was passed she deposited the entire rent due from her. The trial Judge upheld both the contentions of the respondent and decreed the eviction of the appellant. On appeal the District Judge rejected the contention of bona fidr: personal use put for- ward by the respondent but found that the appellant was in arrears of rent and dismissed the appeal. The revision filed by the present - ' - - 4 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 325 appelh1nt fail~rt; the present appeal 1s by way of special leave granted by this Court. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the provisions of s. 12(1) and (2) were mandatory and that in construing s. 12(3) (a) it must be borne in mind that the object of the statute and particularly s. 12 was to give protection to the tenant. It was further contended that before s. 12(3)(a) was amended it was open to the tenant to pay the arrears at any time during the pendency of the suit or even during the pendency of the appeal. In order to avoid hardship to the tenant s. 12(3)(a) should he read as reauiring the landlord to issue a fresh notice after the arnenderl section came into force. It \Vas also urged thats. 11(3)(a) suggests that the neglect or failure of the tenant to make the pay- ment of arrears must be subsequent to the date on which the amendn1ent came into force. Lastly it was argued that the right giYen to the tenant to deposit arrears was a vested right and therefore s. 12(3)(a) should not be construed in such a way as to take a'vay this vested right. Held : (i) S. 12(3)(a) refers to a notice served by the land- lord as required by s. 12(2) and in s. 12(2) the legislature has 1nade no an1endment \vhen it amended sub-s. ( 3). The notice ser\"ed by the appellant in the present case satisfies the requirements of s. 12(2). H the notice has been served as required by s. 12(2) and the tenant is shown to have neglected to comply with the notice until the expiry of one month thereafter s. 12(2) is satisfied and '· 12(3)(a) come. into operation. (ii) S. 12(3)(a) does not confer any right or vested right on tenant and even if such a right is conferred it would not alter the plain effect of the words of s. 12(3)(a). The plain meaning of s. 12(3)(a) is that if a notice is served on the tenant and he has not made the payment as required within the time specified in s. 12(3)(a) the court is bound to pass a decree of eviction against the tenant. The appeal is dismissed. Dayaram Kashiram Shimpi v.
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