VASANTHI versus VENUGOPAL (D) THR. LRS.
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[2017] 4 S.C.R. 919 VASANTHI v. VENUGOPAL (D) THR. LRS. (Civil Appeal Nos. 4311-4312 of 2017) MARCH21, 2017 [DIPAK MISRA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.) Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - s.53A - Part performance - Protection of possession under - Pre-requisites - When not satisfied A B - Suit by appellant-plaintiff for declaration of title in suit property C and alsC' for recovery of possession thereof which she claimed to have purchased from the sons of one 'R' - The original defendant pleaded that he purchased the suit property from 'R' and was in possession thereof in view of part performance of the contract and claimed protection of possession u/s.53A - Plea of plaintiff is that she was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of any such D agreement between 'R ' and the original defendant and even if such agreement existed, the defendant was not entitled to remain in possession of suit property without enforcing the same in law and thus not entitled to avail protection u/s.53A - Suit dismissed by trial court holding that possession of original defendant was protected E u/s. 53A - Appeal by appellant, dismissed - LPA by appellant dismissed as not maintainable - On appeal, held: The evidence on record shows that an agreement for sale was indeed executed between R and the original defendant, in part performance whireof the original defendant was in possession of suit property - However, admittedly neither the original defendant nor the respondents took F recourse to law for specific performance of the agreement - Original defendant also failed to plead in the written statement his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract - Further, the sale deed in favour of appellant has been duly proved and in terms of evidence it is also clear that the appellant had no notice or G knowledge of agreement for sale between 'R' and the original defendant, at the time of her purchase - Thus, though LPA filed by appellant-plaintiff was not maintainable, respondents not entitled to benefit of protection u/s.53A r/w. s.16, Specific Relief Act having failed to aver and prove that they have performed or have always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract H 919 920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R. A to be performed by them - Suit filed by appellant accordingly decrer!d, as prayed for - Specific Relief Act, 1963 - s.16. Limitation - Bar of. for filing suit for specific performance - When inapplicable for claiming protection of possession uls.53-A, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Held: Mere expiry of period of B limitation for a suit for specific performance may not be a bar for a person in possession of an immovable property in part performance of a contract to claim protection of possession uls. 53A if all the essential pre-requisites of s.53A are complied with - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - s.53A. c Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002 - s. l 00-A - Effect of. reiterated. Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD:l.l In regard to the availability of the protection of Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act, 1883 to the original D defendant and on his death, to the present respondents, the evidence on record does proclaim that the agreement for sale dated 20.5.1975 had indeed been executed between 'R', the predecessor-in-interest of the vendors of the appellant/plaintiff, and the respondents, pursuant. whereto, the respondents are in E occupation of the suit property. However, adequate evidence is not forthcoming to convincingly authenticate that the proposed purchaser (original defendant) and thereafter his heirs i.e. the present respondents, had always been ready and willing to perform his/their part of the contract, which amongst others, is attested by his/their admitted omission to enforce the contract in F law. His/their readiness and willingness to perform his/their part of the contract is also not pleaded in the written statement in clear.and specific terms as required.(Paras 17, 24] [927-B-C; 930- E-G) 1.2 Further, on a perusal of the evidence adduced, it G transpires that the sale deed dated 26.6.1982 had been proved on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff. The evidence on record, further shows that the appellant/plaintiff had no conscious notice or knowledge of the agreement for sale dated 20.5.1975 executed between 'R', the predecessor-in-interest of her vendors and the H respondents at the
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