VASANT GANESH DAMLE versus SHRIKANT TRIMBAK DATAR AND ANR.
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A V ASANT GANESH DAMLE v. SHRIKANT TRIM BAK DAT AR AND ANR. MARCH 5, 2002 B [R.P. SETHI AND K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.] Rent Control and Eviction Β· Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947-S. C 12(3)--Evictioi:-Default in payment of rent-Application for depositing the arrears of rent-Not made on the first day of hearing of suit-Held, tenant not entitled to avail protection under S. 12(3)-Eviction order upheld-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-S. 107. D Words and Phrases Expression "such other date as the court may fvc "-Meaning of in the ).._ context of S. 12(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Β· Control Act, 1947. E Respondent-landlords filed a suit for eviction of appellant-tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent. The said suit was dismissed by the trial court. On appeal, the Appellate Court found that as the appellant-tenant had defaulted in payment of rent, he was liable to be evicted from the leased premises. Appellant-tenant's writ petition before the High Court was dismissed. Hence the present appeal. F On behalf of appellant-tenant it was contented that appellant was not liable to be evicted as he had deposited the arrears of rent in the court in terms of the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947; that even if the order of the trial court was not an order in terms of S. 12(3) of the Act, as the appeal was the continuation of a suit, G the appellate court had the jurisdiction to pass the order in terms of S. 12(3) of the Act directing the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent and since the direction was complied with no decree of eviction could be passed. On behalf of respondent-landlords it was contended that the order of H the trial court could not be termed to be an order within the meaning of S. 198 - V ASANT GANESH DAMLE v. SHRIKANT TRIMBAK DAT AR 199 12(3) of the Act and the order of the appellate court was passed without A prejudice to the rights of the parties; that though the appeal was the continuation of the suit, the provisions of S. 12(3) being a concession conferred upon the tenant had to be availed of on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the court may fix which could not be stretched to authorize the tenant to avail the benelicial 11rovision at any time according B to his convenience and evenΒ· at the appellate stage. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The High Court was, justified in holding that the appellant cannot take advantage of Section 12(3) of the Act at the appellate stage which he had failed to avail before the trial court. The appellant was rightly held to C be in arrears of rent for more than 6 months from the date of filing of the suit and had failed to apply before the trial court on the first day of hearing of the suit for depositing the arrears of rent [204-B-C] 1.2. A perusal of the trial order clearly and unambiguously shows that D the said order had not been passed in terms of sub-section (3) of section 12 of the Act. The aforesaid order was not passed at the request of the tenant but passed on the application of the respondents-plaintiffs who had prayed for payment of the rent The said order was passed not on the first day of hearing or on or before any other date as fixed by the court. The amount mentioned in the order was the suit amount which did not include permitted increase or E interest and costs as contemplated by the aforesaid provision. Despite the aforesaid order the appellant did not make the payment within time specified and defaulted the payment of future rent in terms thereof. The suit of the plaintiff could not, therefore, be dismissed on the basis of the trial court's order. [202-H; 203-A-B) F 2. Appeal is considered to be an extension of the suit because under Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellate court has the same powers as are conferred by the Code on courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. Such a power can he exercised by the appellate court "as nearly as may be" exercised by the trial court under the G Code. However, in the instant case the appellant, by filing the application under Section 12(3) of the Act, had not made a prayer to the appellate court for passing any order which the trial court was intended to pass under the Code of Civil Procedure. His prayer was to invoke the benefit conferred
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