VALLAPALLY PLANTATIONS PVT. LTD. versus STATE OF KERALA
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- VALLAPALLY PLANTATIONS PVT. LTD. A v. ST A TE OF KERALA MAY 6, 1999 [K.T. THOMAS AND D.P. MOHAPATRA, JJ.] B Tenancy and Land Laws : Kera/a Land Reforms Act, 1963 as amended in 1969 : c Sections 85(9), 85(1) 85(5) and 2(56-A)-Power of Taluk Land Board in setting aside its own orders-Scope of-Question regarding surplus land under the Act settled by the High Court between the parties in an earlier case-No appeal filed by the State-Within one year of the judgment, the law was changed by way of another decision of the High Court-Board issued notice to the appellant under Section 85(9) seeking to open the D proceedings-proceedings dropped by the Board on the plea of the appellant that the issue settled inter parties by way of the earlier order of the High Court which was not challenged by the State-Held, provision of Section 85(9) intended to empower the Board to correct errors in its orders and not to upset any competent court's judgement, order or decree which had become E final between the parties-To hold otherwise would amount to vesting power in the Board to reopen any proceedings at any ti11]e disposed of finally by a competent court-The result would be unsetting of the settled position between parties and would also go against judicial discipline. Section 85(9)-Res Judicata-Power of Ta/uk Land Board to set aside F its own order and proceed afresh-Board may not set aside an order passed in pursuance of directions of the High Court because so doing the Board may only be complying with the order to the High Court-To vest jurisdiction in the Board to set aside such an order would be to permit the Board interfere with a decision of the High Court which had attained finality inter-parties- G -Civil Procedure Code, 1908, 'Section 11. The appellant owned 130.47 acres of land. While filing a return under Section 85A of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, it submitted that 125 acres out of the total area was in use as a rubber plantation as on 1.1.1970, and was thus exempt for the purpose of calculating the ceiling area. This H 1091 1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R. A plea was rejected by the Taluk Land Board on the ground that the area was not covered by the rubber plantation on 1.4.1964, on the date when the Act came into force, but only converted afterwards. The Board determined the land held in excess of the ceiling area to be 115.17 acres. This order was challenged by the appellant before the High Court and Single Judge held that as the Act was made applicable to the. companies by Act 35 of 1969, which B came into force on 1.1.1970, the said date would be relevant to determine the surplus land held by comp.anies. High Court remanded the matter back to the Board for fresh disposal in light its observations. The Board in pursuance of this Order dated 18.5.1979 held that 125 acres being converted by rubber plantation as on 1.1.1970, the appellant could not be said to hold any surplus C land and dropped the proceedings. Within a year a Division Bench of the High Court dealing with a similar question, held that the insertion of Section 82(1)(d) w.e.f. 1.1.1970 would have no impact on the applicability of Section 82(4) and hence the conversion of dry land into plantations after 1.4.1964 would be ignored for D the purpose of calculating surplus holdings. As a result the judgement of the Single Judge stood overruled. The Board then issued notice under Section 85(9) to the appellant with a view to reopening the proceedings but dropped the proceedings on the basis of the contention of the appellant that the order of the Single Judge had attained finality inter parties and thus E could not be opened under Section 85(9). The State challenged the order of the Board before the High Court by way of a revision petition, which was allowed by it and the mfltter was remitted back to the Board for fresh disposal in accordance with law. Hence this appeal. It was contended by the appellant that the earlier order of the High Court remitting the matter before the Board for fresh disposal was not challenged by the State, thus attained F finality between the parties, and hence the suo motu power could not have been exercised by the Board; and that taking a view unsettling settled decisions between the parties would create confusion and chaos. It was contended by State that remand order passed by the High Court in revisional proceedings between the parties was no bar
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