VAKIL PRASAD SINGH versus STATE OF BIHAR
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(2009] 1 S.C.R. 517 VAKIL PRASAD SINGH A v. STATE OF BIHAR (Criminal Appeal No. 138 of 2009) JANUARY 23, 2009 B [D.K. JAIN AND R.M. LODHA, JJ.] CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950: Article 21 - Right to speedy trial - HELD: Is an c inalienable rig(lt applicable not only to actual proceedings in court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well - In the instant case, prosecution has failed to show any exceptional circumstance for condoning a ' ~' callous and inordinate delay of more than 20 years in D investigation and the trial - In the circumstances, continuance of criminal proceedings against appellant is unwarranted - Proceedings quashed - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 161, 109, 120-B - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 - s. 5(2). E The appellant was an Assistant Engineer in the Bihar State Electricity Board. A complaint was lodged against him by a contractor for allegedly demanding Rs.1,000/- as illegal gratification. A trap was laid and the appellant was caught red handed. A charge-sheet was filed on 28.2.1982 F against the appellant for commission of offences punishable u/ss 161, 109, 120-B IPC and s.5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Magistrate took cognizance on 9.12.1982. The appellant filed a petition u/ s 482 CrPC before the High Court contending that the G . , Inspector of Police who had conducted the investigation ... had no jurisdiction to do so. The High Court by its order dated 7 .12.1990 quashed the order of Magistrate taking - cognizance, with a direction to get the investigation 517 H 518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R. A completed by the appropriate officer, within three months, but to no avail. In the year 1998 the appellant filed another petition uls 482 CrPC for quashing of the proceedings pending against him in Special Case No. 29 of 1987 before the Special Judge. During the pendency B of the petition, the investigation was completed and a fresh charge-sheet was filed on 1.5.2007. On 9.7.2007, the High Court dismissed the appellant's petition. In the instant appeal, it was contended for the appellant that though a period of about 28 years since the C registration of the case against him had elapsed, the trial did not commence and the appellant was deprived of his constitutional right of speedy investigation and trial flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution. D. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. Time and again this Court has emphasized the need for speedy investigations and trial as both are mandated by the letter and spirit of the . E provisions of the Cr.P.C. (in particular, Sections 197, 173, 309, 437 (6) and 468 etc.) and the constitutional protection enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. It is well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal prosecutions is an inalienable right under Article 21. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but F also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. [Para 12 and 15] [524-E-F; 528-B] P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578; Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. v. R.S. Nayak & Anr. G (1992) 1 SCC 225; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr. (1978) 1 SCC 248; Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. (1992) 4 SCC 305 and H Kurukshetra University & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Anr. .. VAKIL PRASAD SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR 519 -'" (1977) 4 sec 451, relied on. A -- "Common Cause" A Registered Society v. Union of India (UOI) & Ors. (1996) 4 SCC 33; "Common Cause", A Registered Society v. Union of India & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 775; Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar 1998) 7 SCC 507 and Raj B Deo Sharma II v. State of Bihar (1999) 7 SCC 604, referred to. + 1.2. In the instant case, the prosecution has failed to show any exceptional circumstance which could possibly be taken into consideration for condoning a callous and c inordinate delay of more than two decades in investigations and the trial. The said delay cannot, in any way, be said to be arising from any default on the part of the appellant. It is also pertinent to note that even till date, ~ it is not clear whether sanction for prosecuting the D appellant is required and if so, whether it has been
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