V. TULASAMMA & ORS. versus V. SESHA REDDI (DEAD) BY L.RS.

Citation: [1977] 3 S.C.R. 261 · Decided: 17-03-1977 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.N. BHAGWATI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 15 judgment(s) · cites 4 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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261 
V. TULASAMMA & ORS. 
A 
v. 
V. SESHA REDD! (DEAD) BY L. Rs. 
March 17, 1977 
(P. N. BHAGWATI, A. C. GUPTA AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.J 
B 
Hindu Succession Act, 1956-S. 14(1) and (2)-Scope of. 
Section 14 ( !) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 proyides that "any property 
possessed by a female Hindu! whether acquired before or after the commence-
ment of the Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and \llOt as a 
limited owner}' According to the 
explanation to this sub-section 
the term 
"property'' includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female 
Hindu in: Heu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or in any other manner 
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whatsoever. Sub-section (2) provides that nothing in sub-s. (!) shall apply to 
any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument 
which prescribes a restricted estate in such property. 
At the time of his death, the appellant's. husband, who was the1 brother of 
the respondent, lived in a state of jointness with the respondent. 
On her 
husband's death the appellant filed a petition for maintenance. The respondent 
entered into a ·compromise with her, one of the terms of which was that the 
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.appellant should enjoy during her life time certain properties given tOI her and 
on her death tbooe properties should revert to the respondent. The appellant 
sold some of the properties. 
The respondent sought a declaration that under 
the terms of the compromise the appellant's interest, which was a limited one, 
could not be enlarged into a~ absolute interest enabling her to sell the proper-
.ties. 
The District Munsiff decreed the suit. 
On appeal, the District Judge held 
that by virtue of the provisions of the 1956-Act, the appellant had acquired an 
absolute interest in the properties and that s. 14(2) had no application to the 
case because the compromise was an instrument in recognition of_ a pre-existing 
right. The High Court. on the other hand, held that the compromise was an 
instrument contemplated by s.14(2) and the appellant could not get an absolute 
interest, under s.14(1); and that since her husband died even before the Hindu 
Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 came into force, she could not be said 
10 have any pre-existing right because she had got the right for the first time 
under the compromise. 
Allowing the appea1, 
(Per Bhagwati and Gupta, JJ) 
HELD : Since the properties were acquired by the appellant under the com-
promise in lieu or satisfaction of her right to rnaintainance it is s. 14(1) and not 
•.14(2) which would be applicable. 
The appellant must be deemed to have 
become fuJJ owner of the properties notwithstanding that the compromise pres· 
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cribed a limited. interest in the properties. [274 C-D] 
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l. Under the Sastric Hindri ,Law a widow has a right to be maintiiined out 
of joint family prope·rtY and this right would ripen into a charge if the \l/idoW 
took the necessary steps for having her maintenance ascertained and specifi· 
cally charged on the joint famiJy property and even if no specific charge were 
created, this right would be enforceable against joint family property i.11. 
the 
hands of a volunteer or a purchaser taking it with notice of her claim. The 
right of the widow to 1 be maintailled is not a jus in rem, since it does not give 
any interest in the joint family property but it is jus ad ren1. 
When specific 
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property is aJlotted to the widow in Jieu of her claim for mainfenance, the 
a11otment would be in satisfaction of her jus ad rem, namely, the rh~ht tO be 
maintained out of the joint family property. It would not be a grant for the 
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262 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1977] 3 S.C.R. 
first time without any pre-existing right in the widow. 
The widow would be 
getting the J?fOperty in. virtue of her pre-existing right, the instrument giving the 
property being merely a document effectuating such pre-existing right. [273 
A·Cl 
2(a) Section 14(1) is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acqui-
sition of property by: a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of mainte-
nance. 
Where such property was possessed by her at the date of commence-
ment of the Act or was subsequently acquired and possessed, she would become 
tho full owner of the property. [268 G] 
(b) The words "any property" are large enough to cover any and every 
kind of property but in order to expand the reach and ambit of the section anJ. 
1nake it all-comprehens

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