LexV. C RANGADURAI versus D. GOPALAN AND ORS.
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A B c ' ... :-- \ V. C. RANGADURAI v. D. GOPALAN AND ORS. October 4, 1978 [V. R. KRISHNA IYER, D. A. DESAI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.] Judicial legisputation, nzeaning of-Punishment under Sec. 35(3) of the Advocates Act, 1961, applying the princ;ple of legisputation. Appeal-Appeal under Sec. 38 of the Advocates Act 1961 interference of the Supreme Court. ' ' Disciplinary proceedings-Disciplinary proceedings under the Advocates Act, 1961-Nature and proof of. Professional ethics of a men1ber of legal fraternity-Relations between a lawyer and a client explained D The appellant was found guilty of gross professional misconduct by the· Di!it- E ciplinary Committee ll of the State Bar Council, Tamil Nadu and \Vas therefore, debarred from practice as an Advocate for a period of six years. In appeal, the Bar Council of India upheld the said findings but reduced the period of suspen- sion to one year. Dismissing the appeal, the Court Per Iyer, J. (on behalf of Desai, ]. and hin1self) HELD : 1. Punishment has a functional duality-deterrence and correction. But conventional penalties have their punitive limitations and flaws, viewed from the refonnatory angle. A therapeutic touch, a correctional twist, and a locus penitentiae, may have rehabilitative impact if only Courts may experiment F unorthodoxly but within the parameters of the law. [1057 F-G; 105S El G When the Constitution under Art. 19 enables professional expertise to eajoy a privilege and the Advocates Act confers a monopoly, the goal is not assured income but commitment to the people whose hunger, privation and hamstrung hun1an rights need the advocacy of the- profess.ion to change the existing order into a Human Tomorrow. [1058 B-C] Justice has correctional edge a socially useful function especially when the delinquent is too old to be pardoned and too young to be disbarred. Therefore, a curative not cruel punishment has to be designed in the social setting of the legal profession. Punishment for professional misconduct is no exception to this 'social justice' test. [1058 A, EJ H In the present case, therefore, the deterrent component of the punitive impo- sition persuades non-interference with the suspension from practice reduced "benignly at the appellate level to one year. From the correctional angle a gesture from the Court may encourage the appellant to turn a new page. He is 1 i • r ' ' , .. RANGADURAI V. GOPALAN !055 .not too old to mend his ways. He has suffered a litigativc ordeal, but more A importantly he has a career ahead. To give him an opportunity to rehabilitate . himseff by changing his ways, resisting temptations and atoning for the serious .delinquency, by a more zealous devotion to people's cause like legalt aid to the poor may be a step in the correctional direction. [1058 E-G] 2. Judicial legisputation is not legislation but application of a given legislation ·to new or unforeseen needs and situations broadly falling within the statutory provision. In that sense, interpretation is inescapably a kind of legislation. legisputation is not legislation stricto sensu but application and is within the ·Court's province. So viewed the punishment of suspension under Sec. 35(3) of ·the Advocates Act serves two .purposes-injury and - expiation. The ends of justice will be served best in this case by directing suspension plus a provision for reduction on an undertaking to this Court to serve the poor for al year. Both are on!ers within this Court's power [1060 F-H] 3. Section 35(3) has a mechanistic texture, a set of punitive pigeon boles, but \\'ords grow in content \vith time and circumstance, that phrases are :ft.exible in semantics and the printed text is a set of vessels into which the Court may pour appropriate judicial meaning. That statute is sick which is allergic to change in sense which the times demand and the text does not countermand. That Court is superficial which stops with the cognitive and declines the creative func- tion of construction. 'Quarrying' more meaning is permissible out of Sec. 3 5 (3) and the appeal provisions in a brooding background of social justice sanctified by Art. 38 and of free legal aid enshrined by Art. 39A of the Constitution. [1059 A-Bl Per Sen (/.) In an appeal under Sec. 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 the Supreme Court would not, as a general rul~ interfere with the concurrent :findings of fact by the Disciplinary Committee, Bar Co
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