LexUPPER DOAB SUGAR MILLS LTD versus SHAHDARA (DELHI) SAHARANPUR LIGHT RAILWAY COMPANY LTD.
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·, 2 S.C.R. SUPREME OOUR'.t REPORTS UPPER DOAB SUGAR HILLS LTD. ti. SHAHDARA (DELHI) SAHARANPUR LIGHT RAILWAY OOMPANY LTD. (J,L~ K.il>UB, K.C. DAs GUI'T.6. and RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.) Rail.,,-ay Trib1mal-Oomplaint agaimt railway adminis· tratio,._;,,urisdiclion-lf empowered to· order refmed-lnttrpro- tation of words "is charging" and "i• ~vying"-Tht Indian Railways Act, 1890 (9 of 1890) iUJ amended by the Indian Railways (Amendment) Act, 1967 ( 63 of 1957), •· 34, 41. A complaint was made by the appellant to the Railway Rates Tribunal against station to station rates as being unreasonable on sugarcane imposed by the respondent Rail way Co. by their rates circular No. 8 of 1953 with cll'ect from October 1, 1953. The Railway company in their answer pointed ·out that the rates impC>S..d by the rates circular 8 of 1953 had long before the date of the complainant ceased to be in force and a new rate had come into operation from Feburary IO, 1960. Thereafter the complainant was allowed to amend the complaint. The prayers were for a declaration that the rates .charged were unreasonable, that a direction of refund of the e:1ccss collected or which may be collected after the date of the amendment of the complaint over the reasonable rates that may be futcd by the Tribunal and, lastly, for fixation of the rates. The main contentions of the respondent were that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as regards the reasonableness of rates prior to the institution of the complaint and that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to grant -refund. The Indian Railways Act underwent several amendments and by the amendment in December 1957, s. 41 was changed. As !'result of t~e change~!.. 1 of. s. 41 read_ thus: "Any com- plaint that a railway adm1mstrat1on-(a) 1s contravening the provisions of•· 28, or (b) is charging for the carriage of any commodity between two stations a rate which is unreasonable or ( c} is levying any other charge which is unreasonable -'I shall hear and decide any such complaint in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter." · IHI -- - VHtr Doob Sutor Jt111, Ltd. v. Sllal>licra ( Dtlhi) s.Jw-1.Uh• 111.1. C.. L1ii. 334 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963] The Tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction to enter- tain or try the complaint as regards the rates and charges to prior to the Institution of the complaint and it had no jurisdiction to grant any refund. The appellants came up in appeal to the Supreme Court. Htld, that the words "is charging" in clause (b) and "is levying" in clause (c) of s. 41 (I) of the Act must be construed to mean "is demanding a price at the preient time for services to be rendered''. The Railway Rates Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain or try the complaint as regards the reasonableness or otherwise of rates and charges made prior to the institution of the complaint. When the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider the reasonableness or otherwise of any charges made prior to the institution of the complaint, it follows necessarily that it could have no occasion to order any refund. For the question of refund could arise only after a decision that the charges made were more than what was reasonable. Held, further, that neither expressly nor by necessary implication has the Railway Rates Tribunal been given any jurisdiction to make any order for refund. Soullwn Railway v. Tho Railu:ag llatu Trilnmal, A.I.R. 1955 (Madras) 676, referred to. After a complaint is made the Tribunal shall hear and decide the complaint. The complaint being that something is unreasonable all that the Tribunal has to decide is whether that thing is unreasonable or not. A finding that it is unreasonable docs not involve any co:isideration or decision of what would flow from the Jinding. In other words, in making the complaint the complainant can ask only for a declaration that the rate or charge is unreason- able and it is only this declaratory relief which the Tribunal has been authorised to give. There is no provision that the Tribunal caa also give a consequential relief. The only other thing which the Tribuna I b authorised to do in connection with the complaint b to fix "such rate or charge as it considers reasonable." In the absence of any- thing to indicate to the contrary it is reasonable to think that this fixation can only be prospective, that is, the Tribunal in making thiJ order fixing the rea
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