UPADHYAYA HARGOVIND DEVSHANKER versus DHIRENDRASINH VIRBHADRASINHJI SOLANKI & OTHERS
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)' UPADHYAYA HARGOVIND DEVSHANKER A v. .,, ' DHIRENDRASINH VIRBHADRASINHJI SOLANKI & OTHERS FEBRUARY 17, 1988 [E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND K.N. SINGH, JJ.] B t y Whether a Letters Patent Appeal lies to a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court from an inter-locutory Order of a Single Judge of - that High Court in the course of trial of an election petition filed under the Representation of the People Act, 1951-Determination of question. '~ The question ~hlch arose for determination in this case was c 1 whether a Letters Patent Appeal would lie to a Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat from an interlocutory order of a Single Judge of that High Court in the course of the trial of an election petition filed under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. D • The appellant and respondents Nos. 1 to 6 were candidates at an election held to fill a seat in the Legislative Assembly of the Gujarat State. The appellant was declared elected. Thereupon, the lst respon- dent filed an election petition in the High Court, challenging the validity y of the election of the appellant on a number of allegations, and in order to establish his case, he filed an application before the Single Judge who E - was trying the election petition, to direct the Returning Officer to pro- duce all the records.of the election, mentioned in the application, and prayed for permission to inspect the same. The appellant opposed the prayers made by the lst respondent. The Single Judge declined to grant the application made by the Ist F ~ respondent .. Against the order of the Single Judge, the Ist respondent preferred an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Gujarat High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal to the extent indicated in its judgment, overruling the contention of the fl , ,, appellant that the appeal was not maintainable as there was no pro- vision in the Act, permitting an appeal to the Division Bench of the High G ~ Court against an interlocutory order of a Single Judge hearing an elec- tion petition filed under the Act. Aggrieved by the decision of the Division Bench, the appellant moved this Court for relief by special leave. Allowing the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the Division H 1043 1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R. A Bench of the High Court and dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal while expressing no opinion on the merits of the case, the Court, B c HELD: The only point urged in this appeal by the appellent was that the appeal filed under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court against the interlocutory order passed by the Single Judge was not maintainable and, therefore, the judgment of the Division Bench was liable to be set aside. [1048C·Dl Under the provisions of the Act as amended and the provisions of the Constitution of India, no Court exercising power under any ordi· nary law otlter than the Judge of a High Court who had been assigned the work of trying an election petition under ~ub-section (2) of section~ 80 A of the Act and the Supreme Court which was empowered to hear \- an appeal against any order passed by the judge of the High Court , under section 98 or section 99 of the Act, could decide any question arising out of an election petition. The power of the Supreme Court under the provisions of the Constitution was, however, unaffected by - !! D any of the provisions of the Act. It meant that when an election petition was pending in the High Court, only the judge who was asked to try the election petition could deal with the questions arising in it and no other judge or judges of the High Court could deal with them. When an order ·1 E F was passed under section 98 or section 99 of the Act by a judge of the High Court in an election petition, it was subject to the appellate juris- diction of the Supreme Court under section 116-A of the Act, Article l36 of the Constitution being excluded in view of the express provisions of section 116-A of the Act, and being resorted to by any party aggrieved by any order passed by the judge trying an election petition not falling under section 98 or section 99 of the Act. It followed that the Division Bench of the High Court, which was entitled to hear an appeal against any order of a Single Judge under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court, which was an ordinary law, could not hear an _.,., appeal against any interlocut
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