UNIVERSITY OF DELHI versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

Citation: [2019] 16 S.C.R. 1259 · Decided: 17-12-2019 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R. BANUMATHI, A.S. BOPANNA, HRISHIKESH ROY · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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UNIVERSITY OF DELHI
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 9488-9489 of 2019)
DECEMBER 17, 2019
[R. BANUMATHI, A. S. BOPANNA AND
HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
Delay/Laches:
Writ petition – By Delhi University – Challenging change in
use of the land acquired for Delhi Metro Rail project – Petition
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches – Letters Patent
appeal filed after delay of 916 days – Division Bench dismissed
the appeal, on the ground of delay refusing to condone the delay
– Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: In the facts of the case, the
explanation for the inordinate delay is not convincing as the same
is not reasonable – Considering the accrued right of the opposite
party, condonation of such delay would be contrary to public
interest – Therefore, writ petition as well as LPA were rightly
dismissed on the ground of delay.
Condonation of delay – Criteria for – Held: By and large a
liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of
delay – Consideration for condonation of delay would not depend
on the status of the party such as Government or the public body
– Condonaton of long delay should not be automatic – While
considering condonation of delay, routine explanation is not
enough, but it should be in the nature of indicating ‘sufficient
cause’ to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of
each case.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. By and large, a liberal approach is to be taken
in the matter of condonation of delay. The consideration for
condonation of delay would not depend on the status of the party
namely the Government or the public bodies so as to apply a
different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to
render even-handed justice to the parties. Even in such case
the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the
   [2019] 16 S.C.R. 1259
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 16 S.C.R.
accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party
is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while
considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would
not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating
“sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend on the
backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by
the Courts based on the fact situation.[Para 20] [1274-H; 1275-
A-C]
2. The delay in the instant facts in filing the LPA is 916
days and as such the consideration to condone can be made only
if there is reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot
be merely because the appellant is public body. The entire
explanation, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law of
limitation despite being aware of the position of law. That apart
when there is such a long delay and there is no proper
explanation, laches would also come into play while noticing as
to the manner in which a party has proceeded before filing an
appeal. In addition, there was delay and laches in filing the writ
petition itself at the first instance from which the present appeal
had arisen. [Para 21] [1275-E-F]
3. The entire explanation for the inordinate delay of 916
days is twofold, i.e. the non-availability of the Vice- Chancellor
due to retirement and subsequent appointment of new Vice-
Chancellor, also that the matter was placed before the Executive
Council and a decision was taken to file the appeal and the said
process had caused the delay. The reasons, as stated, do not
appear very convincing since the situation was of availing the
appellate remedy and not the original proceedings requiring such
deliberation when it was a mere continuation of the proceedings
which had already been filed on behalf of the appellant, after due
deliberation. Significantly, the Vice-Chancellor who was at the
helm of affairs when the writ petition was filed, prosecuted and
disposed of on 27.04.2015 was available in the same office till
28.10.2015, for about six months which was a long enough period
as compared to 30 days limitation period for filing appeal. In that
circumstance when the said Vice-Chancellor who had prosecuted
the writ petition was available, the submission of the appellant
that unseen hands are likely to have prevented the filing of the
appeal also cannot be accepted. Secondly, the reason sought to
be put forth about  the decision required to be taken by the
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Executive Council is also not acceptable when it was just the
matter of filing the appeal. In fact, in the wr

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