UNION OF INDIA versus M/S. POPULAR CONSTRUCTION CO.

Citation: [2001] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 619 · Decided: 05-10-2001 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: G.B. PATTANAIK · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

UNION OF INDIA 
.A 
v. 
MIS. POPULAR CONSTRUCTION CO. 
OCTOBER 5, 2001 
[G.B. PATTANAIK AND RUMA PAL, JJ.] 
· B 
Arb_itration and Conciliati~n Act, 1996/Limitation Act, 1963-Section 
34/Sections 5 and 29(2)-Application challenging award under 1996 Act-
Applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act there on-Held, Section 34 and the 
scheme of the ·1996 Act bars the applicability-Arbitration Act, 1940. 
C 
Words and Phrases-'But not thereafter'~Meaning of in the context of 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 
Award passed by Arbitrator was forwarded to appellant, to be filed 
in the High Court for passing decree, under the impression that Arb!tra.fion 
and Conciliation Act, 1940 applied. When the Award was filed in the High 
Court for decree to be passed under 1940 Act, appellant challenged the 
Award under Section 30 read with Section 16 of the 1940 Act. Subsequently 
application was amended by inserting "Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 
1996" in place of "Arbitration Act, 1940". The application challenging the 
Award was dismissed by a Single Judge on the ground that it was barred 
by limitation under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Division Bench upheld the 
findings of the Single Judge. 
In appeal to this Court, it was contended by the appellant that since 
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes the provision of Section 5 
of the Limitation Act applicable to special law~ like the 1996 Act and since 
the 1996 Act itself did not expressly exclude applicability of the Limitation 
Act and as there was sufficient cause, for the delay in filing the application 
under Section 34, should have been condoned. 
Respondent contended that the language of Section 34 plainly read, 
expressly excluded the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 
and that there was no scope for assessing the sufficiency of the cause for 
the defay beyond the period prescribed in the proviso to Section 34. · 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
619 
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620 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2001] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 
HELD : 1. The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are 
not applicable to an application challenging anAward, under Section 34 of 
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. (621-D] 
Union of India v. Mis. Hanuman Prasad & Brothers, 2000 AIR SCW 
3934 (2), distinguished .. 
2. It is not essential for the special or local law to, in terms, exclude 
the provisions of the Limitation Act. It is sufficient if on a consideration of 
the language of its provisions relating to limitation, the intention to exclude 
could be necessarily implied. [624-B; C] 
Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel, AIR (1964) SC 1099 and 
Hukum Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, [1974] 2 SCC 133, relied on. 
Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, [1976] 1 SCC 393, 
referred to. 
D 
r3. The phrase 'but not thereafter' in Section 34 of 1996 Act would 
amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the 
Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 ·of 
that Act. To hold that the Court could entertain an application to set aside 
the Award beyond the extended period ·under the proviso, would render 
E 
the phrase 'but not thereafter' wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation 
would justify such a result. [624-F] 
4. History and scheme of the 1996 Act support the conclusion that 
the time limit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an Award is absolute 
and .unextendable ~y Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The 
F 
Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 1995 which preceded the 1996 Act stated 
as one of.its main objectives the need "to minimise-the supervisory role of 
Courts in the arbitral process". This object-ve has found expression in 
Section 5 of the Act which prescribes the extent of judicial intervention in 
no uncertain terms. The 'Part' referred to in Section 5 is Part I of the 1996 
G · Act which deals with domestic arbitrations. Section 34 is contained in Part 
I and is therefore subjed to the sweep of the prohihitiml contained in 
Section 5 of the 1996 Act. [625-B; D] 
. 
. 
5. The consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 
Act is that the Award becomes immediately enforceable without any further 
H 
Act of the Court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of 
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U.0.1. v. POPULAR CONSTRUCTION CO. [RUMA PAL, J.] 
621 
the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act

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