UNION OF INDIA & ORS. versus V.N. SINGH

Citation: [2010] 4 S.C.R. 454 · Decided: 08-04-2010 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: H.S. BEDI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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8 
[2010] 4 S.C.R. 454 
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
v. 
V.N. SINGH 
{Civil Appeal No (s). 32 of 2003) 
APRIL 08, 2010 
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.] 
Army Act, 1950: 
c 
s. 122 - Period of limitation for trial - Irregularities with 
regard to local purchase of certain goods in a Army Depot -
Disciplinary action against an officer - General Court Martial 
convened and punishment of forfeiture of 11 years past 
service for purposes of pension, imposed - Set aside by High 
0 
Court holding that GCM proceedings time barred -
Sustainability of - Held: Not sustainable - Period of limitation 
for trial of the officer commenced when GOG-in-Chief-next 
superior authority in chain of command in terms of s. 122(1 )(b), 
came to know about the commission of offence by the officer 
E and issued direction to take disciplinary action against him -
GCM commenced trial after two years, thus was within the 
period of limitation in terms of s.122(1)(b) - Staff officer who 
ordered preliminary investigation, was not the person 
aggrieved by the offence - He only had technical control over 
the department - Thus, order of High Court set aside. 
F 
G 
H 
s. 122(1)(b) - Term 'person aggrieved by the offence' -
Held: Is attracted to natural persons-human beings who are 
victims of an offence and not to juristic persons like an 
organisation. 
Words and Phrases: 'Aggrieved' - Meaning of 
During the inspection of Reserved Petroleum Depot, 
Delhi Cantonment, certain irregularities were noticed with 
regard to local purchase of certain goods. The 
454 
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. V.N. SINGH 
455 
respondent was the Officiating Commandant in RPO. The 
A 
Technical Court of Inquiry and Staff Court of Inquiry was 
convened. The disciplinary action was initiated against 
the respondent. The Commanding Officer invoked s.123 
of the Army Act and took the respondent into close 
custody. The respondent challenged the said order. The 
B 
High Court stayed the order of the Commanding Officer. 
As directed by the High Court, General Court Martial was 
convened and the respondent was found guilty of some 
charges and the punishment of forfeiture of 8 year's past 
service for purpose of pension was imposed subject to c 
the confirmation by the Major General, GOC. The 
Confirming Authority sent back the report to GCM to 
revise/reconsider the exoneration of respondent from 
some charges. The respondent filed writ petition. On 
direction from the Confirming Authority, GCM was 
0 
convened. It passed a fresh order forfeiting 11 years of 
past service of respondent for the purpose of pension as 
well as the punishment of severe reprimand. The 
Confirming Authority approved the finding of GCM and 
imposition of sentence but did not approve the 
E 
punishment of severe reprimand. The said order was 
promulgated and was handed over to the respondent. 
The respondent filed application for amendment. The 
High Court holding that GCM proceedings were initiated 
after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed by 
s.122(1)(b), quashed the GCM proceedings as well as the 
sentence imposed upon the respondent. Hence the 
present appeal. 
F 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. Section 122 of the Army Act, 1950 
prescribes period of limitation for trial by Court Martial of 
any person subject to the provisions of the Act for .. any 
offence committed by him. A fair reading of s. 122 makes 
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it clear that after the expiry of the period of limitation, the 
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456 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2010] 4 S.C.R. 
A Court Martial will ordinarily have no jurisdiction to try the 
case. Section 122 is a complete Code in itself so far as 
the period of limitation is concerned for not only it 
provides in Sub-section (1) the period of limitation for 
such trials but specifies in Sub-section (2) thereof, the 
B offences in respect of which the limitation clause would 
not apply. Since the Section is in absolute terms and no 
provision has been made under the Act for extension of 
time, it is obvious that any trial commenced after the 
period of limitation will be patently illegal. The question 
c of limitation to be determined u/s. 122 of the Act is not 
purely a question of law. It is a mixed question of fact and 
law and therefore in exercise of Writ Jurisdiction under 
Article 226 of the Constitution, ordinarily the High Court 
will not interfere with the findings of Court Martial on 
0 question of limitation decided u/s. 122 of the Army Act. 
Section 122 in substance p

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