UNION OF INDIA ETC. ETC. versus HARI KRISHAN KHOSLA (DEAD) BY LRS. ETC. ETC.

Citation: [1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 620 · Decided: 16-09-1992 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: L.M. SHARMA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
UNION OF INDIA ETC. ETC. 
v. 
HARi KRISHAN KHOSLA (DEAD) BY LRS. ETC. ETC. 
SEPTEMBER 16, 1992· 
[LALIT MOHAN SHARMA, S. MOHAN AND 
N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.] 
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Propeny Act, 1952 : 
C 
Section 8(3)(a)-Whether violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of 
India-Determination of compensation---f'rinciple to be followed. 
Constitution of India, 1950: 
Article 14 and Ninth Schedule Item No.89-Constitutional validity of 
D section 8(3)(a) Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immoveable Propeny Act, 
1952. 
A large extent of land of the 1st respondent in C.A. No.1129-31175 
was requisitioned by the District Magistrate by an order dated 17th 
March, 1967 under Section 29(1) of the Defence of India Act, 1962. Later 
E 
on, these lands were acquired by the Central Government under Section 
7(1) of the Act. The Competent Authority, determined the compensation 
at Rs.1,62, Rs.1,61,109.37 Iakhs, an offer of payment was made to the 1st 
respondent who was also called upon to communicate his acceptance. By 
a written reply dated 22nd July, 1971 it was requested that the payment be 
F 
made to him under protest, and at the same time the inadequacy of the 
amount awarded was indicated, and that an arbitrator be appointed. 
Interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum was also claimed. 
The Competent Authority refused to pay even the amount of com-
pensation determined, and being aggrieved, the respondent filed a Writ 
G Petition in the High Court. 
The matter came up before a Single Judge, who directed that it be 
heard by a Division Bench, but later on the matter came up for adjudica-
tion before the Full Bench, which relying upon the decision of this Court 
in Nagpur Improvement Trust and antoher v. Vithal Rao and others, (1973] 
H 1 sec 500 upheld the contention that Section 8(3) (a) of the Requisi-
620 
U.0.1. v. H.K. KHOSLA 
621 
tioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 was violative of A 
Article 14 for the following reasons:- (i) The fact that the owner of the 
requisitioned property has been receiving conpensation even if it be 
equivalent to the market rent, does not make any difference as the owner 
of a non-requisitioned property may indeed be getting even a higher rate 
of rent from a primte tenant before his property was acquired. (ii) There B 
is nothing in the Act to suggest that the requisitioned property cannot be 
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. 1894 since there is no prohibi-
tion to do so. The result is that the Act leaves it to the arbitrary and 
unguided discretion of the Government to acquire the requisitioned land 
of one owner by resort to Section 7(1) of the Act, while the requisitioned 
land of another exactly similarly stitnated could be acqnired nnder the C 
Land Acquisition Act. (iii) The case arising out of the Bombay Town 
Planning Act viz. Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat, [1986) 1 SCC 
581 stands on a different footing since there is no option to the local 
authority to resort to one or other of the alternative methods which 
resulted in acquisition. (iv) The classification between requisitioned and D 
non-requisitioned land for the purpose of paying less compensation to one 
and more to the other is not founded on any intelligible differentia, nor is 
there any rational nexus to the obje.-t of acquisition of property for a 
public purpose. (v) The liability to pay interest is totally absent under the 
Act while there is a specific provision concerning the same under the land 
Acquisition Act. 
E 
The Union of India aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment appealed to 
this Court by special leave, and contended that: Section 8(1) of the Act 
lays down the principles and methods for determining compensation. and 
under Clause (e) of sub-section (ii of the said section the Arbitrator is F 
enjoined to determine the compensation which appears to him to be just, 
therefore, what is required to be paid under the Act is the just compeDsa· 
tion, and Section 8(3)(a) provides for just equivalent, that the High Court 
was not correct in holding that the owner of the requisitioned property 
was receiving compensation during the period of requisition, is of no 
significance, and was wrong when it held that the deprivation of solatium G 
and interest cannot be justified on the basis of the terms of Section 7(3) 
of the Act. It was further submitted that the Act having been included in 
the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution with effect from 

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