UNION OF INDIA & ANR. versus K. S. SUBRAMANIAN

Citation: [1977] 1 S.C.R. 87 · Decided: 30-07-1976 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.N. RAY · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 
v. 
K. S. SUBRAMANIAN 
July 30, 1976 
[A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.] 
87 
Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965-
Scope of-Rules applicable only when disciplinary proceedings are taken. 
Co11stit11tion of India, 1950, Arts. 309, 310 and 311--Scope of Art. 310 
vis-a-vis, Arts. 309 and 311. 
Practice-Duty of Hig/1 Court where there is conflict between the riews 
A 
B 
expressed by Divisional be11ches and larger benches of t/1e Supreme Court. 
C 
Respondent was a welder in the Civilian Defence Forces. On his services 
being terminated, without stating any reason, he filed a suit for damages for 
illegal termination on the basis that he would have continued in service uplo 
the age of 60 instead of being thrown out at the age of 41. 
The trial 
Court gave a decree for damages which was affirmed by the High Court on 
the ground, that the doctrine of post held during the pleasure of the President, 
oontained in Art. 310, does not authorise·· the termination without complying 
with the procedure prescribed by the Central Civil Services (Classification, 
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, framed under Art. 309. 
Allo\;•ing the appeal to this Court, 
HELD : ( 1) The Rules deal principally with the procedure for disciplinary 
proceedings and penalties and appeals and reviews against orders passed u.nder 
the rules. 
They are applicable if disciplinary proceedings had been taken 
against the respondent, but they do not make disciplinary proceedings incum-
bent or obliJ?;atory whenever the services of a person are terminated. In the 
present case, there were no disciplinary proceedings against 
the respondeht. 
[92 D-E] 
(2) The mere termination of the service, by an apparently innocent order, 
of a Government servant in permanent service, in the sense that he is entitled 
to remain in service nntil he reaches the age of retirement, could be deemed, 
in a given c"se, to be a punishment. 
But, in that even\, there had to be a 
finding on the rule or order under which the respondent was entitled to continue 
in service until he reached the age of 60. 
There is no reference t0 any 
such rule and there was no finding that any punishment was imposed upon 
him or that his services were terminated as a measure of punishment for 
any wrong done by hirr,i or for incompetence. [9'4 C; 93 GJ 
P. L. Dhingra v. Unio1i of India AIR 1958 SC 36 @ 47 referred. to. 
(3) Even assuming that the respondent was constructively punished, there 
is no legal obligation to apply the Rules. The legal obligation to apply the!" 
to every case of punishment, flows from the provisions of Art. 311 and is 
confined to holders of posts covered by Art. 311. 
But the provisions of 
Art. 311 do not apply to the respondent since they do not apply to the holder 
of a post cohnected with defence. [94 El 
[. R. "f(hurana v. Union of India [1971] 3 SCR 908 followed. 
( 4) Therefore, when no disciplinary proceedings are instituted, the Rules 
will not at all apply, and there is no other rule dealing with the conditions 
under which the ·service. such. as that of the respondent. may be terminated. 
Since there was no violation of any rule no question of a conflict between a 
rule framed under Art. 309 and the doctrine of pleasure contained in A rt. 310, 
which applies to all Government servants includinr? those in the services 
con~ 
nected wit/I defence, arises in the present case. [94 G] 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
G 
H 
88 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1977] 1 S.C.R. 
(5) The High Court in dealing with the question considered the view of 
a Divisional Bench of this Court in two cases, merely quoted the views expressed 
by larger Benches of this Court, and then observed that these were insufficient 
for deciding the point before it. The High Court did not act correctly in 
thus skirting the views expressed by larger Benches of this Court. The proper 
course for the High Court was to try to find out and follow the opinions 
expressed by the larger Benches in preference to those expressed by smaller 
Benches. This practice is followed even by this Court and h_as crystallized into 
a rule of law. If, however, the High Court was of opinion that the views 
expressed by larger Benches of this Court were not applicable to tho facts 
of the present case it should have said so, giving reasons in support. [92 A-CJ 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appea,l No. 212 of 1975. 
(Appeal by Special Leave from the

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