UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS versus RAJENDRA SINGH ETC

Citation: [1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 937 · Decided: 12-10-1992 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: KULDIP SINGH · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHL.,S 
v. 
RAJENDRA SINGH ETC. 
OCTOBER 12, 1992 
[KULDIP SINGH AND YOGESHWAR DAYAL, JJ.] 
Railway Protection Force Act, 1957/Railway Protection Force Rules, 
1959: 
A 
B 
Sections 6, 9 and 21/Rule W-Scope of-Appointmen~ dismissal and C 
removal of the members of the force-Power of-Whether Act. contemplates 
delegation of power by Chief Security Office,.....Appointment and removal by 
Assistant Security Officel'-Whether valid-Whether Rule 20 ultra vires Sec-
tion 6. 
Constitution of India, 1950: 
Article 311-Dismissal of employee-Order passed by authority 
delegated to make appointment;-Validity of 
D 
Both the respondents. in the two appeals were working as Rakshaks 
lo the Railway Protection Force. They were dismissed by the Assistant E 
Security Officers, Railway Protection Force. Both of them separately cbal· 
leoged their dismissal as Invalid on the ground that the dismissal order 
was passed by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority, viz., 
Chief Security Officer. The High Court upheld their plea and quashed the 
dismissal order. Io the first case the High Court upheld the trial court's F 
decision that there was no delegation of powers in favour of the Assistant 
Security· Officers, and since the Chief Security omcer was the appointing 
authority, the dismissal order was passed by the imcompeteot authority, 
and it was void. Io the second case, the High Court held that since the 
order of dismissal passed against the respondent was by a subordinate G 
omcer to that of the appointing authority, I.e. the Chief Security Omcer, 
It w11s Impotent violation of Article 311 of the Constitution. Hence, the 
Union of Inr~ia & Ors. flied appeals, by special leave, before this Court. 
On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the Act conferred 
the power of the appointment, by virtue or the Section 6 of the Act, only H 
937 
938 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 
A on the Chief Security Officer and, therefore, the Rules could not provide 
appointment of any class of employees by any person other than the Chief 
Security Officer and to the extent Rule 20 read with Schedule I vested 
power on the Assistant Security Officer to make appointment of Senior 
Rakshaks and Rakshaks, it was ultra vires the Act, and if the Rules were 
B valid then the appointing authority of the respondents in both the appeals 
was the Assistant Security Officer and would also be the authority for 
removal. 
Allowing the appeals, this Court, 
C 
HELD: 1.1. There can be no doubt that the Railway Protection Force 
D 
Act contemplates appointment of members of the force not only by the Chief 
Security Officer but also by others. The expression 'rest' in appointment of 
members of the Force shall rest with the Chief Security Officer, in Section 6 
conveys the Idea of over all control of appointment resting with the Chief 
Security Officer subject to the provisions of the Rules. [943 G·H] 
1.2. Section 6 of the Act contemplates appointment of the members 
of the Force by such authorities as may be authorised. The proviso to 
section 6 contemplates specifically written order of delegation by the Chief 
Security Officer but this does not derogate from the power of the rule 
E making authority to confer the said power. The Section and the proviso do 
not rest the power of appointment merely with the Chief Security Offieer. 
What is contemplated is that the Chief Security Offieer will have over all 
control In the matter of appointment and that control be exercised In 
accordanee with the Rules. If the Rules provide for appointment by other 
superior officers, it cannot be said to be in derogation of the Act or the 
F purpose of the Act. (944 A-CJ 
1.3. A bare reading of Section 9 of the Act also shows that It ls only 
subject to .the provisions of Section 311 of the Constitution and to such 
rules as the Central Government may make under the Act, that any 
G · superior officer could exercise the powers mentioned in Section 9(1)(i) of 
the Act. If only the Chief Security Officer, who is one of the snperior 
officers, alone have the powers of dismissal on the hypothesis that he alone 
was competent to appoint members of the Force then Section 9 of the Act 
would not have been worded in the manner it has been so enacted. (944-D] 
H 
1.4. I tis clear from Section 21 of the Act that the power of the Central 
U.0.1. v. RAJENDRASINGH(DAYAL,J.] 
939 
Government for making the Rules is for carrying out the purpo

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