UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS versus DILIP PAUL

Citation: [2023] 13 S.C.R. 473 · Decided: 06-11-2023 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: D.Y. CHANDRACHUD · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

[2023] 13 S.C.R. 473 : 2023 INSC 975
473
CASE DETAILS
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
V.
DILIP PAUL
(Civil Appeal No. 6190 of 2023)
NOVEMBER 06, 2023
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, CJI, 
J. B. PARDIWALA AND MANOJ MISRA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issues for consideration:
 
In an appeal directed against the judgment passed by the High 
Court by which it allowed the writ petition fi led by respondent and thereby 
set aside the order of penalty of withholding of 50% of his pension for all 
times to come, imposed upon the respondent in connection with disciplinary 
proceedings initiated against him on allegations of a lady employee of sexual 
harassment at workplace, the following questions arose for consideration:- 
I. Whether the Central Complaints Committee constituted by the 
Competent authority to inquire into the fi rst complaint dated 30.08.2011 
committed error in looking into the second complaint dated 18.09.2012 
containing additional allegations against the respondent alongwith few other 
documents including anonymous complaints made against the respondent 
in October 2011;
II. Whether the Central Complaints Committee erred in assuming the 
role of a prosecutor by putting questions to the witnesses in the course of 
departmental enquiry and thereby vitiating the disciplinary proceedings; and
III. Whether the Central Complaints Committee could be said to have 
based its fi ndings on mere conjectures and surmises and the case on hand 
was one of “No Evidence”
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, 
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Standing Order No. 1 of 2006 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2023] 13 S.C.R.
474
(Grievances Redressal Mechanism: To Redress Grievances of Women/
Sexual Harassment at Work Place) – Clauses 9 and 10(i) – Sexual 
harassment at workplace – Lady employee lodged complaint against 
respondent and subsequently submitted another (second) complaint 
containing additional allegations against respondent alongwith few 
other documents including anonymous complaints made against the 
respondent – Central Complaint Committee, constituted to inquire 
into the fi rst complaint, also looked into the second complaint – High 
Court held that the Central Complaints Committee was constituted 
by the competent authority to only inquire into the fi rst complaint – 
Correctness of.
Held: Irrespective of whether a prior complaint had already been made 
to any authority, a complaint regarding sexual harassment could be made 
under Clause 10(i) of the 2006 Standing Order to the complaints committee 
as-well – In the instant case, the second complaint had been promptly 
preferred right after the Central Complaints Committee was constituted and 
duly before its fi rst hearing – The High Court’s reasoning that as the Central 
Complaints Committee was constituted on the basis of the fi rst complaint, 
its scope of inquiry was restricted to its content, is completely erroneous 
inasmuch as the Central Complaints Committee owed its existence to the 
2006 Standing Order and not to the complaint – Moreover, even if it is 
assumed for a moment that the complaints committee owed its existence to 
the complaint, Clause 10(i) of the 2006 Standing Order envisages fi ling of 
a complaint to the complaints committee i.e., it envisages a situation where 
after a complaints committee had come into existence, a complaint may be 
preferred to it – In sensitive matters such as sexual harassment & misconduct, 
there is an obligation to look into the entire evidence of the complainant 
that inspires confi dence – It would be quite preposterous to hold that the 
complainant was precluded from making the second complaint before the 
Central Complaints Committee merely because she had already made one 
complaint – In the context of the second complaint, the only relevant aspect 
that required consideration was whether any serious prejudice was caused to 
the respondent – On facts, no prejudice could be said to have been caused 
to the respondent even if one believes that he was not asked to plead guilty 
to the second complaint – High Court mechanically proceeded to set-aside 
475
the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority on the ground 
that there was nothing to indicate that the respondent was asked whether 
he pleaded guilty to the charges imputed in the second complaint without 
applying the principle of “test of prejudice” [Paras 49, 50, 55, 56, 65 and 66]
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, 
Prohibition and

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