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UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. versus MOHAN LAL LIKUMAL PUNJABI AND ORS.

Citation: [2004] 2 S.C.R. 468 · Decided: 17-02-2004 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: DORAISWAMY RAJU · Disposal: Case Partly allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 
--
v. 
MOHAN LAL LIKUMAL PUNJABI AND ORS. 
FEBRUARY 17, 2004 
B 
[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.] 
........... 
Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) 
Act, 1976-Section 2(2)(b) proviso (i)-Applicability of-Would not apply 
c where any of the three conditions mentioned in.first proviso are not satisfied-
Detention order passed on 24. 5.1994-Revocation order of detention passed 
by Central Government not on the basis of report of the Advisory Board-
Held, proviso (i) not attracted-Forfeiture of property not illegal on that 
basis. 
D 
Conservation of F<?reign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling 
Activities Act, 1974-Sections 3 and I I-Detention order-Challenge t~ 
Detenue challenging order of detention-Central Government revoking order 
of detention-Consequential action taken against detenue under other Act-
Detenue challenging the order of detention on merit again-Held, permissible. 
E 
Orders of detention of the respondents were passed on 24.5.1994 
under the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign 
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA). 
-
Subsequently, proceedings were initiated on 12.10.1994 for forfeiture of 
)< 
the property of the respondents under Section 6(1) of the Smugglers and 
F 
Foreign Exchange ManipuJators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 
(SAFEMA). The respondents challenged the orders of detentions under 
COFEPOSA by filing writ petitions. Ultimately, on 19.12.1994, the Central 
Government, in exercise of its powers under Section ll(l)(b) of 
COFEPOSA, revoked the orders of detention of the respondents. On 
revocation of the detention orders, the writ petitions filed by the 
G respondents were disposed of as having become infructuous. 
On 31.8.1995, the Competent Authority under SAFEMA directed 
that the properties of the respondents should be forfeited under Section 7 
of SAFEMA. The respondents challenged the order of forfeiture before 
-
the Tribunal constituted under SAFEMA. Thereafter, the respondents filed 
H 
468 
-
-
-
UNION OF INDIA v. MOHANLAL L!KUMAL PUNJABI 
469 
writ petitions challenging both the orders of drtention as also the order A 
of forfeiture. The High Court, relying upon the order revoking detention 
of the respondents under COFEPOSA, allowed the writ petitions filed by 
the respondents .. The High Court held that in view of the first proviso to 
Section 2 (2) (b) of SAFEMA, the proceedings initiated under SAFEMA 
had become non est after the revocation of the orders of detention. 
The appellant filed appeal before the Court against the order of the 
High Court and contended, inter alia, that the first proviso to Section 2 
(2) (b) of SAFEMA had no application in the facts of the case as there 
was no revocation under COFEPOSA before the receipt of the report of 
B 
the Advisory Board or before making reference to the Advisory Board. C 
The appellant also contented that it was not open to the respondents to 
challenge the legality of the orders ~f detention after the first writ petitions 
filed by them had been disposed of as having become infructuous. The 
respondents contended, inter alia, that the counsel for the appellant had 
conceded before the High Court that the first proviso to Section 2 (2) (b) 
of SAFEMA was applicable in the present case and therefore, it was not D 
open to the appellant to contend otherwise before the Court. 
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. The concession, if any, made by the counsel for the 
appellant before the High Court is really of no consequence, because the E 
wrong concession made by the counsel cannot bind the parties when 
statutory provisions clearly provided otherwise. The courts are not to act 
on the basis of concession but with reference to applicable provisions. The 
applicability of the statute or otherwise to a given situation or the question 
of statutory liability of person/institution under any provision of law would F 
invariably depend upon the scope and meaning of the provisions concerned 
and has got to be adjudged not on any concession made. Any such 
concession would have no acceptability or relevance while determining 
rights and liabilities incurred or acquired in view of the axiomatic 
principle, without exception, that there can be no estoppel against statute. 
[473-D-E; 474-C-D) 'G 
Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. Mis Bharat Coking Coal 
Limited, (1983] 1 SCC 147; Central Cou

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