UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. versus JASWANT RAI KOCHHAR AND ORS.

Citation: [1996] 3 S.C.R. 206 · Decided: 11-03-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY, G.B. PATTANAIK · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 
v. 
JASWANT RAJ KOCHHAR AND ORS. 
MARCH 11, 1996 
B 
(K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] 
Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Section 4(1) 
Land Acquisition----Change of user contrary to purpose notified-Per-
• 
C missibility of-Land Acquisition for Housing Scheme-iJse of land for com-
mercial purpose---Construction of District Centre---Challenge-Quashing of 
notification by High Court-Held not correct-Held land sought to be ac-
quired for public purpose may be used for another public purpose-When 
land was sought to be acquired for Housing Scheme but was used for District 
Centre purpose does not cease to be public purpose-In such a case 
D no111enclature n1entioned in notification cannot be constrned to be a 
colourable one. 
E 
F 
G 
Raising fresh plea at appellate stage-Land acquisition-Entitlement to 
alternative site-Point not raised before High Court-Held it cannot be ex-
amined by this Court. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil appeal No. 4557 of 
1996. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.2.84 of the Delhi High Court 
in L.P.A. No. 1 of 1977. 
V.C. Mahajan and Arnn Mohan, Mrs. Indira Sawhney, B.K. Prasad, 
C.V.S. Rao, AK. Shrivastava, Ms. Sushma Suri, P.H. Parekh, Ms. Bina 
Madhavan and P.N. Gupta for the appearing Parties. 
The following Order of the Court was delivered : 
Leave granted. 
We have heard the counsel on both sides. 
Notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 
H (for short the 'Act') was published on November 6, 1958 acquiring the land 
206 
• 
I r 
U.0.1. v. J.R. KOCHHAR 
207 
for housing scheme. The same came to be challenged on the ground that A 
the appellant had proposed to use the land for the district centre i.e., 
commercial purpose. The learned single Judge allowed the writ petition 
and quashed the notification holding that the property acquired was for 
housing scheme which cannot be used for commercial prupose, namely, 
District Centre. On appeal, the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in B 
LPA No. 1of1977 by order dated February 6, 1984 confirmed the same. 
Thus this appeal by special leave. 
It is contended for the respondents that since the acquisition is for 
housing scheme, the land cannot be used for commercial purpose, namely, 
District Centre. Therefore, the learned single Judge and the Division C 
Bench have rightly disapproved the change of the user contrary to the 
purpose notified in section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. We find no 
force in the contention. It is conceded by the learned counsel that the 
construction of the District Centre for commercial purpose itself is a public 
purpose. No doubt it was sought to be contended in the High Court that D 
in a housing scheme, providing facilities for commercial purpose is also one 
of the composite purpose and that, therefore, acquisition was valid in law. 
However, the contention was rejected by the High Court. We need not go 
to that part. Suffice it to state that it is a well-settled law that land sought 
to be acquired for public purpose may be used for another public purpose. 
Therefore, when the notification has mentioned that the land is sought to 
E 
be acquired for housing scheme but it is sought to be used for District 
Centre, the public purpose does not cease to be public purpose and the 
nomenclature mentioned in the notification under section 4(1) as housing 
scheme cannot be construed to be a colourable one. The notification under 
section 4(1) could not have been quashed on the ground that the land is F 
sought to be used for District Centre, namely, for commercial purpose. It 
is obvious that the lands acquired for a public purpose should serve only 
the public purpose of providing facilities of commercial purpose, namely, 
District Centre as conceded by the learned counsel in fairness to be a 
public purpose. The notification under section 4(1) cannot be quashed on 
the ground of change of user. The High Court was wholly wrong in G 
quashing the notification on the ground of change of user. 
It is next contended that the first respondent is entitled to be 
provided with alternative site. It is stated in the additional affidavit filed in 
this Court, pursuant lo the direction issued earlier, that a private company H 
208 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 
A by name Sunlight Assurance, New Delhi had floated a scheme Sunlight 
Estate, which was not approved by the competent authority, i.e., either 
MCD or DOA. But some persons purchased plots and to

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