LexUNION OF INDIA AND ORS. versus BRIGADIER P.S. GILL
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[2012] 2 S.C.R. 571 UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. v. BRIGADIER P.S. GILL (Criminal Appeal No. 564 of 2012) MARCH 23, 2012 [T.S. THAKUR AND GYAN SUDHA MISRA, JJ.] A B Armed Forces Triburral Act, 2007 - ss. 30(1) and 31 - Appeal against final decision/order of the Armed Forces Tribunal - Whether can be made directly to Supreme Court C or is subject to s.31 - Held: There is no vested right of appeal aginst final decision! order of the Tribunal to Supreme Court except those falling u/s. 30(2) of the Act - Appeal under Section 30(1) is subject to s. 31 -Aggrieved party also cannot - approach Supreme Court directly under Section 31(1) rlw s. o 31(2). lnterpretion of Statutes: Each word used in an enactment, howsoever significant or insignificant, must be allowed to play its role in achieving E the legislative intent and promoting legislative object. Every clause of a statute should be construed with respect to the context and the other clauses of the Act. The question for consideration in the present F appeals was whether an aggrieved party can file an appeal u/s. 30 of Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 against final decision/order of the Armed Forces Tribunal, without taking resort to the procedure prescribed uls. 31 of the Act. G Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. A conjoint reading of Sections 30 and 31 571 H 572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 2 S.C.R. A of Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 can lead to only one conclusion viz. there is no vested right of appeal against a final order or decision of the Tribunal to Supreme Court other than those falling u/s. 30(2) of the Act. The only mode to bring up the matter to Supreme Court in appeal B is either by way of certificate obtained from the Tribunal that decided the matter or by obtaining leave of Supreme Court u/s. 31 for filing an appeal depending upon whether Supreme Court considers the point involved in the case to be one that ought to be considered by Supreme Court. C [Para 6] [579-E-F] 1.2 A plain reading of Section 30 would show that the same starts with the expression "subject to the provision of Section 31". Given their ordinary meaning there is no gainsaying that an appeal shall lie to this Court only in D accordance with the provisions of Section 31. It is also evident from a plain reading of sub-section (2) of Section 30 that unlike other final orders and decisions of the Tribunal, those passed in exercise of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to punish for contempt are appealable as of E right. The Parliament has made a clear distinction between cases where an appeal lies as a matter of right and others where it lies subject to the provisions of Section 31. The orders passed by the Tribunal and assailed in these appeals are orders that will be F appealable u/s. 30(1) but only subject to the provisions of Section 31. [Para 3] [578-D-G] 1.3. Section 30 of the Act is by reason of the use of the words "subject to the provisions of Section 31" made G subordinate to the provisions of Section 31. The question whether an appeal would lie and if so in what circumstances cannot, therefore, be answered without looking into Section 31 and giving it primacy over the provisions of Section 30. That is precisely the object which the expression "subject to the provisions of H UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. v. BRIGADIER P.S. GILL 573 Section 31" appearing in Section 30(1) intends to achieve. A Therefore, it cannot be said that the expression "subject to the provisions of Section 31" are either ornamental or inconsequential. The right of appeal under Section 30 can be exercised only in the manner and to the extent it is provided for in Section 31 to which the said right is made B subject. [Para 11] [582-E-H] 1.4. The contention that Section 30 granted an independent right to file an appeal against the final decision or order of the Tribunal and that Section 31 was only providing an additional mode for approaching C Supreme Court with the leave of the Tribunal would have · the effect of not only re-writing Section 30 which specifically uses the words "subject to the provisions of Section 31" but would make Section 31 wholly redundant and meaningless. The expression "subject to the D provisions of Section 31" cannot be rendered a surplusage for one of the salutary rules of interpretation is that the legislature does not waste words. Each word used in the enactment must be allowed to play its role howsoe
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