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UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. versus BRAJ NANDAN SINGH

Citation: [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 356 · Decided: 19-10-2005 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 
v. 
BRAJ NANDAN SINGH 
OCTOBER 19, 2005 
[ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, JJ.) 
Service law: Central Civil Service Pension Rules-Rule 26(/)-
Resignation of employee-Pensionary benefits-Entitlement of-Held: Under 
C Rule 26(/) past service stands forfeited on resignation and is excluded from 
the qualifYing period of service for receiving pension-Under Rule 26(2) 
resignation does not entail in forfeiture of past service when it is sought for 
seeking another appointment under the Government where service qualijies-
On facts, section 26(2) not attracted and since the employee did not have 
qualifYing period of service, he is not entitled to pension and as such order 
D of Tribunal and High Court set aside. 
Interpretation of statutes: legislative intention-Determination of-Held: 
ls determined from language employed in a statute-Court cannot read 
anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous-Attention 
is to be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said-
E Construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of word 
or which results in rejection of words as meaningless is to be avoided-Rule 
of Construction. 
Respondent-temporary sorter with Railway Mail Service tendered 
F his resignation and the same was accepted. However, the respondent filed 
application for grant of pension after 21 years and was denied pension 
since by Rule 26(1) of the Central Civil Services Pension Rules his past 
service stood forfeited on resignation. Respondent filed an application. 
Tribunal held that the forfeiture of past service was not sustainable and 
as such he cannot be denied pension. High Court upheld the order. Hence 
G the present appeal. 
H 
Respondent-employee contended that the entitlement of pension 
flows from the Rules; that Rule 26 cannot be pressed into service to deny 
the benefits; and that Rule 26(2) provides an escape route to the forfeiture 
of past service. 
356 
U.O.l v. BRAJNANDAN SINGH 
357 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
A 
HELD: 1.1. Rule 26 of the Central Civil Services Pension Rules in 
clear terms provides that resignation from a service or a post, unless it is 
allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the Appointing 
Authority, entails forfeiture of past service. The language is couched in 
mandatory terms. However, sub-rule (2) is in the nature of an exception B 
which provides that resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service 
if it has been submitted to take up, with proper permission, another 
appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government 
where service qualifies. Admittedly this is not the case in the instant appeal. 
[360-D] C 
1.2. The effect of Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) cannot be lost sight 
of while deciding the question of entitlement of pension. The language of 
Rule 26 sub-rule (1) and (2) is very clear and unambiguous. All the 
provisions of a statute have to be read together and no particular provision 
should be treated as superfluous. In terms of Rule 26 sub-rule (1) the past D 
service stands forfeited after the acceptance of resignation, and has to be 
excluded from the period of qualifying service. That being so, for the 
purpose of deciding entitlement to pension the respondent did not have 
the qualifying period of service and as such is not entitled to grant of 
pension. Further, it cannot be said that Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) have 
limited operation and do not wipe out entitlement to pension as quantified E 
in Rule 49. Said Rule deals with amount of pension and not with 
entitlement [360-F, G, H; 361-A] 
2.1. The Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which 
is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The 
language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative 
intent. Words and phrases Β·are symbols that stimulate mental references 
to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention 
of the Legislature enacting it. The intention of the Legislature is primarily 
to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should 
F 
be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a G 
consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or 
substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless 
has to be avoided. [361-B, CJ 
Institute a/Chartered Accountants of India v. Mis Price Waterhouse 

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