LexUMRI POOPH PRATAPPUR (UPP) TOLLWAYS PVT. LTD. versus M.P. ROAD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER
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[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1768 : 2025 INSC 907 Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another (Civil Appeal No. 9920 of 2025) 30 July 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration The core issue in the present matter revolves around determining the appropriate forum for the adjudication of disputes arising out of the Concession Agreement dated 05.01.2012 entered into between the appellant and respondent no.1. Headnotes† Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 – s.7 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – The appellant and respondent no.1-Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation entered into a Concession Agreement for the augmentation of the road – Disputes arose between the parties – The appellant raised claims before the Independent Engineer for amicable resolution and compensation, which were mostly rejected – With no resolution forthcoming, appellant initiated proceedings before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal – Thereafter, the appellant invoked Cl.44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement and approached the International Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution- respondent no.2 – Respondent no. 1 raised objections – ICADR by order dated 02.06.2022 appointed arbitrators – On the other side, the Arbitral Tribunal issued notice for preliminary hearing, by order dated 07.06.2022 – Subsequently, the appellant filed an application before Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal for seeking withdrawal, which was allowed – Aggrieved by the orders dated 02.06.2022 and 07.06.2022 of the ICADR and the Arbitral Tribunal, respondent no.1 filed writ petition which was allowed and orders dated 02.06.2022 and 07.06.2022 were quashed: * Author [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1769 Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another Held: The present Concession Agreement pertains to the construction of a State Highway situated entirely within the State and was awarded by respondent no.1, a State-controlled entity, the agreement clearly qualifies as a “works contract” u/s.2(1)(i) of the 1983 Act – Consequently, the dispute arising therefrom falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal – The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 stands excluded by operation of law in such matters – The private arbitration proceedings initiated by the appellant are therefore, non est in law, and the proper forum for adjudication is the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal established under the 1983 Act – It is not in dispute that the appellant had initiated Reference Case before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal and had obtained issuance of notice – While the said reference was pending, the appellant simultaneously invoked arbitration under Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement and initiated private arbitration proceedings before the ICADR (Respondent No. 2) under the 1996 Act – This parallel invocation of remedies is impermissible in law and squarely hit by the doctrine of election and estoppel – A party cannot pursue two mutually inconsistent remedies under different legal regimes arising from the same cause of action – Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement to the extent it purports to permit private arbitration, cannot override the statutory mandate of the 1983 Act – Accordingly, the attempt of the appellant to invoke Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement and re-agitate the issue of private arbitration-already settled in Viva Highways and affirmed by this Court-is barred by the doctrine of constructive res judicata and amounts to an abuse of the process of law – Additionally, the appellant’s conduct in withdrawing the reference petition before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal, without seeking liberty to re-agitate the claims, and simultaneously initiating proceedings under the 1996 Act, constitutes forum shopping – This conduct, aimed at circumventing the statutory mechanism and reviving abandoned claims, is tainted with mala fides – In terms of the statutory mandate under Rule 53(3)(b) of 1985 Regulations, once a reference is withdrawn without obtaining liberty to re-agitate the same, the appellant stands precluded from initiating a fresh reference on the same subject matter – This substantive bar also applies to any attempt to pursue the same claims before alternative fora – Nonetheless, considering 1770
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