UJAGAR SINGH versus THE STATE OF THE PUNJAB

Citation: [1952] 1 S.C.R. 756 · Decided: 23-02-1951 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. PATANJALI SASTRI

Judgment (excerpt)

1952 
D. X.. 
N abhirajiah 
v. 
The State of 
Mysore 
"1Jd Others. 
Chondr•· 
sek_horo 
Aiyor /. 
1951 
756 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[19521 
the Control Order purports to have been made not 
only under clause (bb) of sub-rule (2) of rule 81 of the 
Defence of India Rules, hut also under the Supplies, 
SefV!Ccs 
and 
Miscellaneous 
Provisions 
(Temporary 
Powers) Act of 1947. We have not got this Act be-
fore us and it was not even referred to in the course 
of the arguments. 
Hence, no decision is called for 
on this point. 
The petition fails and is dismissed without 
any 
order as to costs. 
Petition ditmiued. 
Agent for the petitioner: K. R. Kri1hnaswamy. 
Agent for the respondents : P. A. Mehta. 
UJAGAR SINGH 
II. 
THE STATE OF THE PUNJAB 
and 
JAGJIT SINGH 
II. 
THE STATE OF THE PUNJAB 
[SAtYID FAZL ALI, PATANJ ALI SAsTR1, Mu1rnEi.JEA, 
DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AtYAi., JJ. J 
Preventive Detention Act (IV of 1950), SJ. 3, 12-Detention 
order-Non-specification of period of detention-Ground supplied 
vague and same as in earlier order-Particulars supplied after 
'1-
months-Legality of deteiJtion-Duty to supply particulars 
~lls 
soon as may he'-Form of detention order-Order signed by Home 
Secretary-Validity. 
Non-specification of any 
d~finitc period in a detcntioa order 
made under s. 3 of the PrcventiVc Detention Act, IV of 1950, 
is not a material omission rendering the order invalid in view of 
the provisions contained in clauses (4) (a) and (7) (a) of Ar~ 22 
of the Constitution and •· 12 of the Act. 
An 
order of 
detention 
which 
expressly 
states 
that 
the 
Go•ernor of the State concerned was satisfied of the neCCMity of 
'_,. 
. . 
•• 
-~. 
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
757 
making such an order and that it was made by the order of the 
1951 
Governor i' not defective merely because it is signed by the 
Home Secretary. 
Ui11gar Si,,g1' 
Communication of the grounds of the 
made directly by the authority making the 
made through recognized channels prescribed 
tive rules of business. 
order need not be 
order but may be 
by the administra-
The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can be 
taken into account in making a detention order, and as a. matter 
of fact, it is largely from prior events showing tendencies or in-
clination of a man that im inference could be drawn whether he 
is likely even in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the 
maintenance of public order. If the authority making 
an 
order 
is satisfied that the ground on which the deten ue was detained 
on a former occasion is still available and that there was need for 
detention on its basis no ma/a fides can be attributed to the 
authority from the fact that the ground alleged for the second 
detention is the same as that of the first detention. 
Whether grounds have been communicated "as soon as may 
be" must depend on the facts of each case. 
No 
arbitrary 
time 
limit can be laid down. 
The recent rulings of the Supreme Court establish (a) that 
mere 11agueneu of grounds standing by itself and without leading 
to an inference of mala fides or lack of good faith is not a 
jNsticiable issue in a court of law for the necessity of making the 
order, inasmuch as the ground or grounds on which the order of 
detention was made is a matter for ·the subjective satisfaction 
of 
the Government or of the detaining authority ; ( b) that there i• 
nothing in the Act to prevent particulars of the grounds being 
furnished to the detenu within a reasonable time so that he may 
have the earliest opportunity of making a 
representation 
against 
the detention order-what is 
reasonable time being 
dependen~ 
on the facts of each case; (c) that failure to furnish 
grounds 
with the speedy addition of such particulars as would enable the 
detenu to 
make a representation at the earliest 
opportunity 
against the detention order can be considered by a court of law 
as an invasion of a fundamental right or 
safeguard 
guaranteed 
by the Constitution, viz., being given the earliest opportunity to 
make a representation; and (d) that no new grounds could be 
supplied to s~engthen or fortify the original order of detention. 
Where the petitioners against whom detention orders were 
made were given only vague grounds and there was inexcusable 
delay of nearly 4 months in acquainting them of the particulars, 
field that their detention was illegal and they should be released. 
ORIGINAL 
JuirsorcrroN :-Petitions 
Nos 
167 of 1950. 
149 
and 
v. 
T

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