U. SUVETHA versus STATE BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE AND ANOTHER
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[2009] 7 S.C.R. 902 A U. SUVETHA V. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE AND ANOTHER Criminal Appeal No.938 of 2009 B MAY 06, 2009 (S.B. SINHA AND R.M. LODHA, JJ) PENAL CODE, 1860 : 498-A, Explanation - 'Ret&iive' of husband - Connotation c of - FIR against girl friend of husband - HELD: Girl friend or concubine of husband would not be covered within the term 'relative' - The word 'relative' brings within its purview a status conferred either by blood or marriage or adoption - If no marriage has taken place, the question of one being relative D of another would not arise. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES: Penal provision - Held: Deserves strict construction. WORDS AND PHRASES: E Expression 'relative of husband' as occurring in s.498-A, /PC - Connotation of An F.l.R. alleging commission of offence punishable u/s 498-A IPC was filed against the appellant describing F her as 'girl friend'/'concubine' of the husband of the first informant. The appellant filed an application for discharge, inter alia, on the premise that the allegation made against her in the F.l.R., even if it be given face value, did not disclose an offence u/s 498A, IPC. The application was dismissed and so also the revision petition. G In the instant appeal, the question for consideration before the Court was whether the term "relative of c ~ husband of a woman" within the meaning of s.498-A, IPC should be given an extended meaning. H 902 U SUVETHA V. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE 903 AND ANOTHER Allowing the appeal, the Court A HELD: 1.1 An offence in terms of s.498-A, IPC is committed by the persons specified therein. They have to be the 'husband' or his 'relative'. Either the husband of the woman or his relative must have subjected her to B cruelty within the provision. A girl friend or even a concubine cannot be said to be a 'relative'. The word 'relative' brings within its purview a status which must be conferred either by blood or marriage or adoption. In the absence of any statutory definition, the term 'relative' must be assigned a meaning as is commonly understood. c Ordinarily it would include father, mother, husband or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece, grandson or grand-daughter of an individual or the spouse of any person. If no marriage has taken place, the question of one being relative of another would not arise. Applying D โข the principles laid down in various decisions, the appellant is not a relative of the husband of the first informant. [para 11, 12, 18 and 21] [909-D, H; 914-A; 916-F] Shivcharan Lal Verma and another v. State of M. P, (2002 (?) Crimes 177 SC = JT (2002) 2 SC 641; Rajeti Lax mi v. State E ., of Andhra Pradesh 1 (2007) DMC 797; Ranjana Gopalrao Thorat v. State of Maharashtra 2007 CRI. L.J .3866; John ldicul/a v. State ofKerala 2005 M.l.J. (Crl.) 841; Vungarala Yedukondalu -~ v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1988 CRl.L.J. 1538; and Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam (2004) 3SCC 199 - referred to. F Advanced Law Lexicon by P Ramanatha Aiyar- Volume ยท 4, 3rd Edition; and Random House Webster's Concise College Dictionary p.691 - referred to. 2.1 The provision of s.498-A IPC is a penal one. It, G thus, deserves strict construction. Ordinarily, save and -'-. except where a contextual meaning is required to be given to a statute, a penal provision is required to be construed strictly. [para 13] [911-F] T. Ashok Pai v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore H 904 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R. A 2007 (8) SCALE 354; Noor Aga v. State of Punjab 2008 (9) SCALE 681 - relied on. 2.2 The word 'cruelty' having been defined in terms of Explanation to s.498-A of the Penal Code, 1860, no other meaning can be attributed thereto. Living with another B woman may be an act of cruelty on the part of the husband for the purpose of judicial separation or dissolution of marriage but the same would not attract the wrath of s.498A of the Penal Code.[para 11) (909-C] 2.3 In the instant case, relationship of the appellant C with the husband of the first informant is said to have been existing from before the marriage. Indisputably they lived separately. For all intent and purport the husband was also living at a separate place. The purported torture is said to have been inflicted by the husband upon the first D informant either at her in-law's place or at her parents' place. There is no allegation that appellant had any role to play in that rega
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