TULSIPUR SUGAR COMPANY LTD. versus STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

Citation: [1970] 1 S.C.R. 35 · Decided: 18-03-1969 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.M. SHELAT · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

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TULSIPUR SUGAR COMPANY LTD. 
v. 
STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 
March 18, 1969 
[J. M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.] 
Indust,ial law-Labour Court, acting under s. 6(6) of the U.P. Indus-
trial Disputes Act (28 of 1947)-Correction of accidental omission In 
award after it became final and enforceable-Validity of. 
The Central Wage Board for sugar industry bad recommended revised 
wage scales, revised categories and fitment of workmen into those scales 
and categories as from November 1, 1960. The State Government had 
accepted those recommendations fully in.eluding the date of implementation . 
The appellant-company, however, did not implement them and hence, its 
workmen raised a dispute and two questions were referred to the Labour 
Court namely : (l) of fitment of certain workmen in the new grades, and 
(2) the date from which it was to have effect. By its award, the Labour 
Court held that two of the workmen should be fitted into certain grades 
and directed the company to do so within one month aft~r the award 
became enforceable, but, omitted to fix the date from which such fitment 
should have effect. 
On December 7, 1963, the award was published in 
the State Gazette and, under s. 6A (I) of the U .P. Industrial Disputes Act, 
1947, it became enforceable on January 7, 1964. The appellant fitted the 
two workmen in the two grades from February 7, 1964, that is, one month 
after the award became enforceable. The union thereupon applied to the 
Labour Court to amend its award on the ground that it had omitted to 
answer the second question referred to it and the _Labour Court amended 
its award and directed that the two workmen should be placed in their 
respective grades from November 1, 1960, as recommended by the Wage 
Board. The amendment was published in the Gazette on June 20, 1964. 
The appeJ!ant filed a writ petition iii the High Court for quashing the order 
of amendment, but the High Court dismissed the petition. 
In appeal to this Court, on the questions : (I) Whether the correction 
was of an error arising from ·an accidental omission within the meaning 
of s. 6(6) of the Act; and (2) Whether the award could be. corrected (i) 
after it was published in the Gazette and had become final, and (ii) after 
It had become enforceable. 
HELD : (1) Section 6(6) enables the· Labour Court to correct an 
accidental omitsion, 
In the present case, the Labour Court omitted to 
amwer the second question which it was bound to answer. Since the first 
question was answered by it in accordance with the Wage Board's recom· 
mendations an.cl the Government's notification accepting thorn fully, if the 
attention of the Labour Court had been drawn, it would have answered the 
second question ,also in consonance with those recommendations and the 
notification. Therefore, there was an error in the award due to an acciden~ 
ta! omission within the meaning of s. 6(6) of the Act. [39 G-H; 40A] 
(2) (i) The scheme of ss. 6 and 6A shows that there are 3 different 
lltages before an award becomes enforceable, namely : (a) when the award 
ii signed by the adjudicating authority; (b) when it is published and be-
comes final; and (c) when it becomes enforceable under s. 6A. Section 
6(6) does not lay down expressly any time limit within which the correc-
tional jurisdiction under the section should be exercised. 
To hold by im-
plication that such iurisdiction can only be exercised till the date of publica~ 
36 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
( 1970) ! S.C.R. 
tioi;i wheo. the award becomes 11.naI, would be contrary to the •uh-section 
which envisages the correction of an award even after it is published and 
has become final. (40 C; 41 G-H; 42 D-EJ 
(ii) There is nothing in""· 6, 6A or 60.to imply the limitation namely, 
that the power to correct is to be exercised only before the award becomes 
enforcca~le. The circumstance that t~e proceedings before a Labour Court 
and a Tribunal are deemed to be concluded under s. 6D when their award 
becomes enforceable and they become functus officio would be ao ground 
for inferring such a time limit, because : (a) Since an arbitrator is not 
mentioned in s. 60 it would lead to the result. which could not have been 
111tended, that there is a time limil only for the Labour Coun and Tribunal 
and not for an arbitrator; and (b) the power is similar to that of a civil 
coun under s. 152 C.P.C. or under r. 28 of the ludustrial Disputes (Cen.. 
tral) Rules, 1957 of an adjudicating authoriry under t

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