TRUSTEES OF PORT OF BOMBAY versus THE PREMIER AUTOMOBILES LTD. AND ANOTHER

Citation: [1974] 3 S.C.R. 397 · Decided: 15-02-1974 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: D.G. PALEKAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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TRUSTEES OF PORT OF BOMBAY 
v. 
THE PREMIER AUTOMOBILES LTD. AND ANOTHER 
February 15, 1974 
397. 
[D. G. PALEKAR, V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA JJ.] 
Bo111bay Port Trust Act 1879-S. 81-1/ a .~horter period of limitation applies 
when rhere is short delivery and the plaintiffs do not know if the total bundle o_f 
~oods hai·e actually arrived at the port of delivery. 
The first plaintiff became entitled to clain1 _a_consignment of 53 
bundles of 
mild steel plates despatched by a Japanese exporter to be delivered at the port 
of Bombay. The goods were discharged in the docks on 12th September 1959~ 
into the custody of the Bombay Port Trust. the appellant. 
The goods were in4 
sured and the second plaintiff was the insurer. 
On September 19, 1959, delivery 
of the goods was apphed for and was given .but only 52 bundles. 
A week there-
after, the first plaintiff demanded the missing bundle but was put off from time 
to time by the appellant assuring that a search was in progress to trace the goods. 
From the Indian Maritime Enterprises, the agents of the Japanese vessel, 
the 
plaintiff came to know on November 7, 1959 that all the 53 bundles had been 
duly unloaded. 
The plaintiff enquired from the appellant again on. December 5, 
1959 whether the bundle had been landed; but the port authorities still informed 
that the missing bundle was still under search. Thereafter, on January 22, 1960, 
the appellant informed the first plaintiff that the bundle under reference tiad been 
out-turned as landed but missing. 
Within a week thereafter, the first plaintiff asked for a non-delivery l:l!rtificate 
and the certificate was issued on March 1, 1960 and on May 12, 1960 a statutory 
notice under s .. 87 of the Bomhav Port Trust Act, 1879, was issued and a suit was 
filed for the m!s~ing bundle or its value by way of damages. 
Tite defence put 
forward by the appellant was, that since the suit was governed by s. 87 of the Act 
and the cause uf action having arisen on September 19. 
1959. 
the daim is 
barred by limitation because 6 nlonths had already passed from the time the first 
cau~e of ~ction arose. 
The secon<l plaintiff, insurer, having Paid the value of the lost articles t:::> the 
first nlaintiff got itself subrogated to the later's right, and they together filed the 
suit before the Court of Small Causes. That Court held against the appellant 
but the full Court in appeal reversed the judgment of the trial court and held in 
favour of the appellant holding that the claim was barred by limitation. The 
High Court, however, held in fav6ur of the plaintiff and hence the appeal to this 
Court. 
Section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879, _provides that no ~uit or other 
proceeding shall be commenced against any person for anything done or purport~ 
ing to have been done. in pursuance of this Act without one month's previous 
notice, and not after 6 months from the accrual of the cause of. such suit· or 
other proceeding. The question was whether the suit was for anything done or 
purporting to have been done in pursuance of this Act, when the action is for 
non :ddlvery of one out of 53 bundles. 
G 
Allowing the appeal, 
ll 
HELO: (1) Where a statute imposes a duty, the omission to do somethiu 
that ought to be done in order comoletely to perform the duty, or the conlinuin& 
to have any such duty unperformec( amounts to an act done or intended to be 
done within tho meaning of a statute which provides a special period of limita-
tion for ~;uch an act. [403 H--4-04 Al 
Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Ed. Vol. 2,.4 p. 189-190, referred to. 
Therefore in tho present case, the truncated limitation prescribed under the 
Act will apply. 
[415 El 
13-L 954 SupCl/74 
398 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
! 1974 I 3 s.C.R. 
(2) Sec. 87 of the Act insists on notice of one month. 
This period may 
legitimately be tacked on to the six months period mentioned in the section (vide 
sec. 15(2) Limitation Act 1963. (422 ·G-H] 
(3) The starting point of limitation is the accrual of the 
i,,:ause of action. 
Two components of the "Cause" are important. 
The date when 
the 
plaintiff 
CIJ!le to know or ought to know with reasonable diligence that the goods had 
been ·Jandcd from the vessel into the port. 
Two dear indications of when ·the 
consignee ought to know are :-( l) when the bulk of the goods arc delivered, 
there being short delivery leading to a suit, and (2) 7 days after knowledge of the 
Jan<fing of th

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