TRILOKI NATH SINGH versus ANIRUDH SINGH (D) THR. LRS. & ORS.

Citation: [2020] 4 S.C.R. 650 · Decided: 06-05-2020 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.M. KHANWILKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 4 S.C.R.
TRILOKI NATH SINGH
v.
ANIRUDH SINGH (D) THR. LRS. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3961 of 2010)
MAY 06, 2020
[A. M. KHANWILKAR AND AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. 23, r. 3 A – The appellant-
plaintiff, stranger to a Compromise decree, filed suit seeking a
declaration that the Compromise decree by the High Court on
15.09.1994 in the second appeal was illegal, inoperative and
obtained by fraud and misrepresentation – Held: The appellant was
not a party to the stated Compromise decree – He was, however,
claiming right, title and interest over the land referred to in a stated
sale deed dated 06.01.1984 which was purchased by him from one
of the party to compromise decree – It is well settled that the
compromise decree passed by the High Court in the second appeal
would relate back to the date of institution of the suit between the
parties thereto – In the suit now instituted by the appellant, at the
best, he could seek relief against the person who sold property to
him, but cannot be allowed to question the compromise decree passed
by the High Court in the partition suit between the other parties –
In other words, the appellant could file a suit for protection of his
right, title or interest devolved on the basis of the stated sale deed
dated 06.01.1984, allegedly executed by one of the party to the
proceedings in partition suit, which could be examined
independently by the Court on its own merits in accordance with
law – That apart, the Trial Court in any case would not be competent
to adjudicate the grievance of the appellant herein in respect of the
validity of compromise decree dated 15.09.1994 passed by the High
Court in partition suit – It must, therefore, follow that suit instituted
before the Civil Court by the appellant was not maintainable in
view of specific bar u/r. 3A of Or. 23 CPC – Also, findings were
recorded by the Trial Court against the appellant in reference to
issue regarding the right, title and interest of suit property and said
findings were not interfered by the Court of Appeal preferred at the
instance of the appellant – Thus, there were concurrent findings of
[2020] 4 S.C.R. 650
650
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Courts below against the appellant-plaintiff – Consequently, the
appeal is dismissed.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. In the present case, the partition suit was filed
in 1978 and after the decision of the trial Court, the matter went
in first appeal and eventually, Second Appeal No. 495/86 before
the High Court. During the pendency of first appeal being
continuation of the suit as stated, one of the parties to the pending
proceedings, allegedly entered into a sale deed with the appellant
on 6th January, 1984. Indubitably the issue regarding right, title
and interest in respect of the land which was the subject matter
of sale deed dated 6th January, 1984, was still inchoate and not
finally decided. In that sense, the claim of the appellant was to be
governed by the decision in favour of or against the party who
entered into a sale deed with him in the pending appeal. It must
follow that the alleged transaction effected in favour of the
appellant by a sale deed dated 6th January, 1984 ought to abide by
the outcome of the said proceedings which culminated with the
compromise decree passed by the High Court in Second Appeal
No. 495/86 dated 15th September, 1994. [Para 20][661-G-H;
662-A-C]
2. Indeed, the appellant was not a party to the stated
compromise decree. He was, however, claiming right, title and
interest over the land referred to in the stated sale deed dated
6th January, 1984, which was purchased by him from judgment
debtor and party to the suit. It is well settled that the compromise
decree passed by the High Court in the second appeal would
relate back to the date of institution of the suit between the parties
thereto. In the suit now instituted by the appellant, at the best,
he could seek relief against the party who entered into a sale
deed, but cannot be allowed to question the compromise decree
passed by the High Court in the partition suit. In other words,
the appellant could file a suit for protection of his right, title or
interest devolved on the basis of the stated sale deed dated 6th
January, 1984, allegedly executed by one of the party to the
proceedings in the partition suit, which could be examined
independently by the Court on its own merits in accordance with
law. The trial Court in any cas

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